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The foundational faith of disability law is the proposition that we
can reduce disability discrimination if we can foster interactions
between disabled and nondisabled people. This central faith, which is
rooted in contact theory, has encouraged integration of people with and
without disabilities, with the expectation that contact will reduce preju-
dicial attitudes and shift societal norms. However, neither the
scholarship nor disability law sufficiently accounts for what this Article
calls the “aesthetics of disability,” the proposition that our interaction
with disability is mediated by an affective process that inclines us to like,
dislike, be attracted to, or be repulsed by others on the basis of their
appearance. The aesthetics literature introduces a significant complication
to uncritical reliance on contact as the theoretical and remedial basis for
our inclusive ideal. Contact and engagement with the aesthetics of
disability may fail to provide the benefits assumed by contact theory, but
more perversely, under certain conditions, they may trigger negative
affective responses that may stunt the very normative change sought
through antidiscrimination law. This Article proposes a novel theoreti-
cal lens to more accurately reflect the complexity of the aesthetic–affective
process of discriminatory behavior in the context of disability.
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INTRODUCTION
Disability rights law has failed to change public hearts and minds about
people with disabilities.1 Nearly three decades ago, Congress identified the
primary barrier facing people with disabilities as prejudicial attitudes, a
product of historical segregation and invisibility. Prescriptively, Congress
designed the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to ensure that people
with disabilities are not denied access to employment, public services, and
places of public accommodations. The ADA also advanced integration as
a prospective tool to reduce disability discrimination—a familiar remedial
1. This Article uses “people first” language consistent with the view within the U.S.
disability rights movement. See What Is People First Language?, The Arc, https://www.thearc.
org/who-we-are/media-center/people-first-language [https://perma.cc/83K4-MWAL] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2019) (“By placing the person first, the disability is no longer the primary,
defining characteristic of an individual, but one of several aspects of the whole person. . . .
It eliminates generalizations and stereotypes, by focusing on the person rather than the
disability.”).
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strategy in the civil rights playbook. What explains the absence of meaning-
ful normative shifts in the context of disability?
Disability legal theories do not account for the ways in which the
aesthetics of disability mediate rights and the integrative ideal. The aesthe-
tics of disability are visible sensory and behavioral markers that trigger
particular aesthetic and affective judgments about marked individuals.
Disability rights law, like other areas of antidiscrimination law, relies on
contact theory and its chosen prescription, integration. The contact hypoth-
esis posits that increasing opportunities for interactions between diverse
groups can, under the right conditions, foster greater acceptance. The
problem in the context of disability, however, is that the literature does
not fully engage with the negative affective2 responses to disability that are
triggered when nondisabled and disabled persons interact.3 When the
literature does engage negative emotions about disability, these emotions
are understood to be a product of a history of segregation of people with
disabilities, and it is assumed that the negative valence will change over
time. The aesthetics of disability trigger affective processes, however, and
some emotions, such as fear or disgust,4 make it hard to recognize, respect,
adjudicate, and enforce the rights of people with disabilities.
We need look no further to find evidence of the failure to change social
norms of disability than the recent case of a police officer in Arizona who
assaulted an innocent teenager with Autism Spectrum Disorder (ASD)5
2. This Article uses “emotion,” “affect,” and “feeling” interchangeably in line with
the more recent theoretical conventions in philosophy and psychology. See, e.g., Dan Goodley
et al., Feeling Disability: Theories of Affect and Critical Disability Studies, 33 Disability &
Soc’y 197, 198 (2018) (“[W]e use affect and emotion interchangeably . . . to acknowledge
that biology and society are firmly wrapped up with one another.”).
3. This Article focuses on those with apparent or more visible disabilities, which tend
to be individuals with physical disabilities, such as wheelchair users; however, atypical behav-
ior is also included as are any other perceptible markers associated with disability. See
Michael W. Shelton & Cynthia K. Matthews, Extending the Diversity Agenda in Forensics:
Invisible Disabilities and Beyond, 38 Argumentation & Advoc. 121, 121 (2001) (defining
and describing invisible disabilities to include both physical and mental conditions).
4. Interdisciplinary scholars have explored the role of emotions in shaping legal and
nonlegal judgments. See, e.g., Daniel S. Hamermesh, Beauty Pays: Why Attractive People
Are More Successful 125 (2011) (“Beauty matters in labor markets—and it surely also
matters in an immense variety of non-economic activities.”); Martha C. Nussbaum, Upheavals
of Thought: The Intelligence of Emotions 22 (2001) (arguing that “emotions are forms of
judgment”); see also Daniel Kelly, Yuck! The Nature and Moral Significance of Disgust 2
(2011) (tracing the evolution of disgust and noting that “[a] swell of recent work has
raised disgust from relative obscurity to new levels of visibility”); William Ian Miller, The
Anatomy of Disgust 180 (1997) (explaining that “[b]y being so much in the gut, the idiom
of disgust has certain virtues for voicing moral assertions”). This Article is the first,
however, to consolidate and reconcile the research across multiple legal and nonlegal
disciplines and propose a new theoretical lens by which to understand discrimination in
the context of disability rights law.
5. Adding context to the story of Connor Leibel, the innocent teenager, ASD affects
approximately one of every forty-one children. See Guifeng Xu et al., Prevalence of Autism
Spectrum Disorder Among US Children and Adolescents, 2014-2016, 319 JAMA 81, 81
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because the officer apparently could not control his affective response to
the aesthetics of disability. Connor Leibel waited in a playground while his
aide crossed the street to run an errand, something they had done in the
past to increase Connor’s independent living skills.6 A police officer
approached Connor after the officer, patrolling the neighborhood, became
suspicious of Connor’s erratic, repetitive movements, and suspected drugs.7
Connor was not high on drugs; he was stimming, a self-soothing method
using repetitive movements.8 A police body camera captured the escalation
between the officer and Connor:9 The officer asks Connor to look him in
the eye and does not get the response he expects. The officer then grabs
Connor and forces him to the ground, restraining him with handcuffs
behind his back. Connor, fearing that he will be “taken away” by the
officer, alternates between screaming and attempting to self-soothe: “I’m
okay, I’m okay, help! . . . I’m okay . . . I need help . . . Am I going to go
away? . . . I’ll breathe . . . What are you doing? Am I going to go away?”10
Integration, as a principle norm in disability rights law, has
operated on autopilot without critical examination for nearly thirty
years. Approximately one in five people in the United States has one
or more disabilities.11 Disability rights law undoubtedly has increased
the visibility of people with disabilities in society. 12 Remote
(2018). Over 600,000 students in public schools receive special-education services with a
classification of autism. See Joel McFarland et al., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., NCES 2018-144, The
Condition of Education 2018, at 74 (2018), https://nces.ed.gov/pubs2018/2018144.pdf (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (showing that students with autism account for approxi-
mately nine percent of the 6.7 million students receiving special-education services).
6. Complaint at 6, Leibel v. City of Buckeye, No. 18-CV-01743 (D. Ariz. Jan. 30, 2019),
2019 WL 367995 [hereinafter Leibel Complaint].
7. Id. at 6–7.
8. “‘Stimming,’ or ‘self-stimulatory behavior,’ is the repetition of physical movements
and sounds, or the repetitive movement of objects, common in individuals with develop-
mental disabilities, and most prevalent in people with autism.” Id. at 6. Connor held a
piece of string in his hand while he was stimming. Id. at 7; see also Steve Silberman, Opinion,
Making Encounters with Police Officers Safer for People with Disabilities, N.Y. Times (Oct.
6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/opinion/police-disabilities-safety.html (on
file with the Columbia Law Review) (discussing a “pattern of law enforcement failing to
uphold the mandates of the Americans [w]ith Disabilities Act”).
9. Leibel Complaint, supra note 6, at 7.
10. ABC15 Ariz., Police Body Camera: Arizona Officer Detains Teen with Autism, YouTube
(Sept. 18, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=uErofKXMwq0 [https://perma.cc/BL4Q-
YZAV]; see also Leibel Complaint, supra note 6, at 6–8 (pleading relevant facts of the case).
11. The total number of people in the United States with one or more disabilities is
approximately 56.7 million. Matthew W. Brault, U.S. Census Bureau, P70-131, Americans
with Disabilities 2010: Household Economic Studies 4 (2012), https://www2.census.gov/library/
publications/2012/demo/p70-131.pdf [https://perma.cc/3GTK-UZSE].
12. This is certainly the case for people with physical disabilities and other aesthetic
markers discussed in this Article. Cf. Jasmine E. Harris, Reconciling Privacy and Publicity
Norms in Disability Antidiscrimination Law 16–18 (Mar. 21, 2019) [hereinafter Harris,
Reconciling Privacy] (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review)
(arguing that society is more aware of people with more apparent disabilities but has yet to
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institutions 13 and sheltered workshops have largely disappeared. 14 A
majority of children receive special-education services in mainstream
schools and inclusive classrooms.15 Indisputably, contact between people
with and without disabilities has increased.
Increased contact alone has proven insufficient, however, to shift soci-
etal norms of disability. Negative attitudes and bias are popularly attributed
to those who were raised in a different era or time and who lacked inter-
action with people with disabilities. The remedial narrative claims newer
generations—who were raised with the ADA—will be the ones who bring
attitudinal change and extract the full potential of antidiscrimination
laws. But a recent qualitative study concluded that one in five adults aged
eighteen to thirty-four admits to having intentionally avoided talking to a
person with disabilities due to uncertainty about how to communicate.16
This study is quite sobering. We have yet to account for this in the ways in
which we think about disability. Failure to assert, interpret, and enforce
rights has significant consequences, including invisibility and social erasure.17
contend with the high percentage of people with invisible disabilities).
13. See, e.g., infra section II.A (discussing the Willowbrook State School in New
York); see also Amie Lulinski et al., Coleman Inst. for Cognitive Disabilities, Univ. of Colo.,
Use of State Institutions for People with Intellectual and Developmental Disabilities in the
United States: Data Brief (1), at 1–2 (2018) (presenting data showing that the use of state-
operated residential institutions for people with intellectual and developmental disabilities
has steadily decreased since its peak in 1967).
14. Cf. Christina A. Samuels, Trump Team May Change Rules on Jobs for Students
with Disabilities, Educ. Wk. (July 17, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/ew/articles/2018/07/
18/trump-team-may-change-rules-on-jobs.html [https://perma.cc/ZJS4-QQEP] (explaining
the Department of Education’s notice of proposed rulemaking to amend regulatory
definitions implementing the Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act (WIOA)). See
generally Workforce Innovation and Opportunity Act, Pub. L. No. 113-128, 128 Stat. 1425
(2014) (codified at 29 U.S.C. § 3101 (2017)) (limiting job placements at sheltered workshops
and other employment settings where people with disabilities earn subminimum wages).
15. The number of students receiving special-education services of any disability classifi-
cation is approximately 6.7 million, or thirteen percent of the total number of public-school
students in the United States. McFarland et al., supra note 5, at 74. Ninety-five percent of
students who receive special-education services attend nonspecialized, mainstream public
schools. Id. at 76.
16. Hardeep Aiden & Andrea McCarthy, Scope, Current Attitudes Towards Disabled People
3 (2014), https://research-information.bristol.ac.uk/files/88783477/Aiden_and_McCarthy_2014.
pdf [https://perma.cc/JC6W-YSAB]. Scholars outside the law have explained social awkward-
ness and other antisocial reactions to disability as a function of “interactional uncertainty, attitu-
dinal ambivalence, belief in a just world, and magical thinking.” Justin H. Park et al., Evolved
Disease-Avoidance Processes and Contemporary Anti-Social Behavior: Prejudicial Attitudes and
Avoidance of People with Physical Disabilities, 27 J. Nonverbal Behav. 65, 66 (2003).
17. Civil rights are rights of inclusion that fundamentally go against the grain. David
M. Engel & Frank W. Munger, Rights of Inclusion: Law and Identity in the Life Stories of
Americans with Disabilities 3 (2003) (“[Civil rights] outrage at the very moment when they
most effectively insist on an identity and a legal status for the person who invokes them.
When civil rights are not asserted, the consequences can be profound: invisibility, the eras-
ure of the individual from membership in the community.”).
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Scholars in other disciplines, such as neuroscience,18 anthropology,19
psychology,20 and philosophy,21 have begun to challenge core field-defining
assumptions about discrimination, appearance, and emotions.22 Recent
developments in aesthetic theory, for instance, signal a new understand-
ing of the ways in which aesthetic judgments operate, not just for art and
literature but for a number of everyday objects including human bodies.23
Why we like what we like matters to antidiscrimination law, particularly in
the context of disability, where the disabled body may disrupt norms of
symmetry, beauty, and effortlessness in inescapable ways.24
This Article is the first to critically examine the role of aesthetics and
affect in disability antidiscrimination law.25 Disability law scholars have
18. See, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett, How Emotions Are Made: The Secret Life of the
Brain 19, 35–36 (2017) [hereinafter Barrett, How Emotions Are Made] (discussing the
neuroscience of “degeneracy” which challenges the notion that emotions have unique
fingerprints).
19. See, e.g., Sara Ahmed, The Cultural Politics of Emotion 15, 36–39 (2d ed. 2014)
(discussing how emotions—fear, disgust, shame, and love—“shape individual as well as
collective bodies”); Sara Ahmed, Happy Objects, in The Affect Theory Reader 29, 29
(Melissa Gregg & Gregory J. Seigworth eds., 2010) (framing “affect” as “sticky,” relational,
and constructed).
20. See generally Ellen Winner, How Art Works: A Psychological Exploration (2018)
(discussing the experience of art and its relation to everyday relationships and behavior).
21. See, e.g., A.W. Eaton, Taste in Bodies and Fat Oppression, in Body Aesthetics 37,
37–39 (Sherri Irvin ed., 2016) (“[T]he standard picture is misguided in its underestimation
of the role of aesthetics in instituting and maintaining oppression.”).
22. Tom Mashberg, Do You Like ‘Dogs Playing Poker’? Science Would Like to Know
Why, N.Y. Times (July 8, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/08/arts/design/do-
you-like-dogs-playing-poker-science-would-like-to-know-why.html (on file with the Columbia
Law Review) (“The mysteries of the aesthetic response, and the creative impulse, have
become a burgeoning area of inquiry for scientific researchers across many disciplines.”).
23. See Eaton, supra note 21, at 37–39.
24. See Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Disability and Representation, 120 PMLA 522,
523 (2005) [hereinafter Garland-Thomson, Disability and Representation] (“The way we
imagine disability through images and narratives determines the shape of the material world,
the distribution of resources, our relationships with one another, and our sense of ourselves.”).
25. Legal scholars in other areas have discussed appearances, emotions, and inter-
disciplinary literature, albeit separately. See, e.g., Deborah L. Rhode, The Beauty Bias: The
Injustice of Appearance in Life and Law 11 (2010) [hereinafter Rhode, Beauty Bias] (con-
demning appearance discrimination because “it offends principles of equal opportunity
and individual dignity”); Susan A. Bandes, Introduction to The Passions of Law 1, 1–2
(Susan A. Bandes ed., 1999) (“Emotion pervades the law . . . [yet] [i]n the conventional story,
emotion has a certain, narrowly defined place in law.”); Tristin K. Green, Racial Emotion
in the Workplace, 86 S. Cal. L. Rev. 959, 964–65 (2013) (arguing that “[e]motion today
takes a central position in the study of interracial interaction within the social sciences”
and advocating for “bring[ing] racial emotion to the fore of conceptualizing and addressing
discrimination in the workplace”); Deborah L. Rhode, The Injustice of Appearance, 61
Stan. L. Rev. 1033, 1035 (2009) (arguing “that discrimination based on appearance is a signi-
ficant form of injustice, and one that the law should remedy”). This Article integrates the
aesthetics and emotions literatures across disciplines and applies key lessons to disability rights
law in particular. Future articles may explore the ways in which aesthetics comparatively (and
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not yet drawn upon the transformative potential of key research conclusions
in other disciplines studying aesthetics and affective responses to craft
structural and individual remedies.26 The structural origins of aesthetic
taste and emotions have significant implications for the ways in which we
think about the nature of prejudice, the process of discrimination, and
legal remedies for antidiscrimination law more broadly. For instance, the
aesthetics of disability offer a theoretical lens to challenge how race, gen-
der, and other sensory markers of identity can trigger affective responses
that can undermine even the most intellectually enlightened and well-
intentioned social progressive.
Contemporary disability rights debates lay bare the challenges of com-
munity integration—including, for example, the astounding rates of sexual
assault and abuse against people with disabilities living in community
in absolute terms) operate in other areas of antidiscrimination law, such as race, gender,
and sexual orientation.
26. Disability studies scholars have developed a rich literature engaging with aesthetic
and affective norms in society. See, e.g., Elizabeth Barnes, The Minority Body: A Theory of
Disability 168–69 (2016) (discussing the normative conception of disabled bodies as
having “played the natural lottery” and lost); Simi Linton, Claiming Disability: Knowledge
and Identity 2 (1998) (examining “disability studies as a field of inquiry, its historical roots,
present configuration, and explanatory value”); Ato Quayson, Aesthetic Nervousness:
Disability and the Crisis of Representation 14–31 (2007) (“[T]he literary representation of
disabled persons and the aesthetic nervousness that attends such representation can be
taken as an analogue to the real-life responses toward people with disabilities by society at
large.”); Susan M. Schweik, The Ugly Laws: Disability in Public 2 (2009) (aiming “first, to
provide a fuller account of the story of unsightly subjects than has yet been written;
second, to rethink aspects of U.S. culture through the insights of disability theory . . . and
finally, to illuminate the conditions of disability”); Tobin Siebers, Disability Aesthetics 2–3
(2010) [hereinafter Siebers, Disability Aesthetics] (using the term “disability aesthetics” as
the examination of the role of disability in art and literature); Rosemarie Garland Thomson,
Extraordinary Bodies: Figuring Physical Disability in American Culture and Literature 12
(1997) [hereinafter Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies] (coining the notion of the
“normate” or culturally constructed corporeal normativity); Susan Wendell, The Rejected
Body: Feminist Philosophical Reflections on Disability 173–77 (1996) (discussing the ways
in which the distinction between body and mind advocated by some theorists does not
fully capture the complex experience of bodily pain associated with some disabilities);
Lennard J. Davis, Introduction to The Disability Studies Reader 1, 6 (Lennard J. Davis ed.,
4th ed. 2013) [hereinafter Davis, Disability Studies Reader] (discussing the fitness of the
body and its connection to eugenics and national identity); Harlan Hahn, The Appearance
of Physical Differences: A New Agenda for Research on Politics and Disability, 17 J. Health
& Hum. Servs. Admin. 391, 411 (1995) [hereinafter Hahn, The Appearance of Physical
Differences] (“From this perspective, both the normative standards supporting the attributes
of the dominant group and the ubiquitous media depictions . . . may be even more
politically relevant—and oppressive—than verbal displays of bias or intolerance.”); Anita
Silvers, Formal Justice, in Disability, Difference, Discrimination: Perspectives on Justice in
Bioethics and Public Policy 13, 73 (Anita Silvers et al. eds., 1998) (rejecting the notion that
differences in bodies are the result of “any biological mandate or evolutionary triumph”
but arguing instead that they are the product of dominant preferences); Brian Soucek,
Aesthetic Judgment in Law, 69 Ala. L. Rev. 381, 382 (2017) (discussing the ways in which
state actors make decisions about “what is art, or what counts as artistically or aesthetically
valuable”).
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settings;27 police violence in encounters with people with disabilities;28
legislative attempts to roll back rights of public accommodations under
Title III of the ADA;29 resistance to structural reform with a preference
for individual relief;30 the rise of designer babies and genetic manipula-
tion;31 cuts to Medicaid and Medicare programs;32 and funding deficits
for special education at both the federal and state levels despite increas-
ing eligibility numbers.33 Almost three decades after the ADA, this is a key
moment to take stock of the challenges of implementation, diagnose the
root issues, and reassess remedial paths. It is not enough to say that
disability stigma exists like race or gender, and that we need a post-rights
structural approach such as antisubordination.34 It is necessary to dig
27. See, e.g., Jasmine E. Harris, Sexual Consent and Disability, 93 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 480,
491 & n.39 (2018) [hereinafter Harris, Sexual Consent and Disability] (noting that rates of
sexual assault against people with intellectual disabilities are seven times that against
nondisabled people and that most victims live in community settings).
28. See David M. Perry & Lawrence Carter-Long, The Ruderman White Paper on Media
Coverage of Law Enforcement Use of Force and Disability 1 (2016), http://rudermanfoundation.
org/wp-content/uploads/2017/08/MediaStudy-PoliceDisability_final-final.pdf [https://perma.
cc/TY8X-45DC] (finding that people with disabilities comprise a “third to half of all people
killed by law enforcement officers” and are “the majority of those killed in use-of-force
cases that attract widespread attention”); see also infra section III.B.2 (discussing aesthe-
tics of disability in risk assessment).
29. E.g., The ADA Education and Reform Act of 2017, H.R. 620, 115th Cong. (2017)
(requiring additional procedural and administrative hurdles, including extended notice
and cure period, to owners or operators of places of public accommodation before a
plaintiff may file suit under Title III of the ADA).
30. See, e.g., A.H. v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 589–90, 596 (7th Cir. 2018)
(affirming the district court’s rejection of the plaintiff’s structural accommodation request
to create a separate division for para-ambulatory runners because the nature of track
competition is inherently discriminatory).
31. See, e.g., Brigham A. Fordham, Disability and Designer Babies, 45 Val. U. L. Rev.
1473, 1475–76 (2011) (discussing people with disabilities’ stakes in genetic selection and
the double standard imposed on people with disabilities who wish to make genetic deci-
sions “to produce a child with physical attributes commonly associated with disability”);
Lisa C. Ikemoto, The Racialization of Genomic Knowledge, 27 Seton Hall L. Rev. 937,
943–50 (1997) (discussing racial identity and ethical considerations of various genetics
research initiatives).
32. See, e.g., John Nichols, Disability-Rights Activists Are the Real Heroes of the Health-
Care Fight, Nation (July 28, 2017), https://www.thenation.com/article/disability-rights-activists-
are-the-real-heroes-of-the-health-care-fight/ [https://perma.cc/A3TH-8WRG] (describing
recent threats to repeal the Affordable Care Act and effective grassroots protests by disability-
rights advocates to block Medicaid cuts).
33. See, e.g., U.S. Dep’t of Educ., 2018 Determination Letters on State Implementation
of IDEA 3–4 (2018), https://sites.ed.gov/idea/files/ideafactsheet-determinations-2018.pdf
[https://perma.cc/8GEN-MKPJ] (showing that less than half of states are adequately
meeting their obligations to serve students with disabilities under special-education law).
34. See, e.g., Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82
Notre Dame L. Rev. 1415, 1482 (2007) (“From an anti-subordination perspective, the issue
is not the benefits to the nondisabled community; instead, the issue is the benefit to the
historically subordinated group—individuals with disabilities.”); Zoë Brennan-Krohn,
Note, Employment for People with Disabilities: A Role for Anti-Subordination, 51 Harv.
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deeper into the moment of subordination and mine it to see what is
there—how it happens, why it happens, whether there are opportunities
to intervene, and when the law has a comparative remedial advantage
over other forms of intervention.
The central claim of this Article is that aesthetics research compli-
cates our understanding of the remedial aspiration of contact which, in
turn, compels us to reconsider how best to structure integration to get to
broader goals of inclusion. Uncovering structural preferences around
beauty and bodily functionality does not mean, however, that disability
rights law should move away from integration in service of inclusive
communities. Nor does it support repeal of legal prohibitions on discrim-
ination if attitudes do not change. Rather, this Article lays the ground-
work to develop a more comprehensive governing theory of disability rights
that better captures the aesthetic and affective nature of disability discrim-
ination. Disability rights law has conflated the meta-goals of building an
inclusive society with mere integration due, in part, to a misguided
understanding of contact theory. As a result, prescriptive interventions
largely focus on granting access to spaces occupied by nondisabled people
through reasonable accommodations without attention to the predicate
conditions, intended beneficiaries, or, even definitionally, the meaning of
integration.35 Legislative reforms to public benefits law, the argument
goes, will enable people to live successfully in the community, and, as a
result, nondisabled people will come to accept people with disabilities
and lift attitudinal barriers to inclusion. The formula for social acceptance
is: Add, accommodate, and stir for the desired results. Uncovering
aesthetic and emotional difficulties with integration at the individual
level in the disability context complicates but should not erase integration
as a central value. The interdisciplinary research opens space for a richer
theorizing of integration as the collective normative goal.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part I contends that integration
is the guiding normative principle in all aspects of disability rights law.
Disability statutes, regulations, doctrine, and scholarship privilege integra-
tion as the chosen prescription. Congress explicitly sought to address nega-
tive stereotypes and prejudice against people with disabilities by removing
barriers to integration in employment and public programs and accom-
modations. While this may seem somewhat uncontroversial, the ADA is
the only antidiscrimination statute with such a clear normative orientation
and remedial mission. Part II argues that reliance on integration comes
directly from the race context, particularly school desegregation and the
contact hypothesis. Yet unlike contact’s relative reduction of prejudice in
the context of race and sexual orientation, empirical studies challenge
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 239, 266 (2016) (arguing that integration in employment may not work
and suggesting adoption of an antisubordination approach instead).
35. See, e.g., Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, 114 Yale L.J. 1, 4
(2004) [hereinafter Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law] (arguing for investment in
welfare law reform).
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contact’s ability to shift prejudicial norms when nondisabled and disabled
people interact. Part III answers the natural question of why contact has
not worked as expected in the context of disability. I advance a novel
descriptive claim that the aesthetics of disability mediate legal rights.
These physical and sensory markers of difference—for instance, facial dis-
figurement, non-normative speech, or, as in Connor Leibel’s case, atypical
behavior—produce emotional responses (for example, fear, attraction,
contempt, disgust) that are often viewed as noncognitive, visceral, and thus
involuntary reactions. Contemporary research in affect theory and neuro-
science, however, suggests that while the body certainly feels a range of
emotions almost instinctively, the speed signals the depth of collective
norms of beauty and emotions. Said differently, aesthetics and emotions
are “made.”36 Finally, Part IV addresses the normative and prescriptive
potential of the aesthetics of disability through a special-education case
study. The aesthetics of disability as a theoretical lens has normative impli-
cations for how legislators, courts, and scholars should think about the
future of disability rights law. The Article concludes with a preliminary pre-
scriptive agenda and offers legal, policy, and research considerations that
will begin to confront the aesthetics of disability in antidiscrimination law.
I. CONTACT AS PRESCRIPTIVE
Integration serves as the primary antidiscrimination intervention in
disability rights law due largely to its reliance on the integrative principles
and established doctrine in the school-desegregation context. The notion
is that if one comes into contact with someone with a disability, this inter-
group contact will decrease prejudice and, in turn, reduce discrimina-
tion. The origin of this faith lies in social science literature and its early
influence on prescriptions for racial prejudice and discrimination in the
education context. Yet the contact hypothesis gets absorbed into law and
policy in ways that do not heed its cautionary caveats and instability over
time. This Part explains the role of the contact hypothesis in shaping
integration and the ways in which a particular conception of integration
(specifically, mainstreaming) emerges out of Brown v. Board of Education.37
Disability rights advocates then intentionally adopt Brown’s integration
model to shape their antidiscrimination agenda.
A. The Contact Hypothesis
Antidiscrimination law’s prescription of choice, integration, was influ-
enced by the work of social scientists on the harms of racial segregation
36. Barrett, How Emotions Are Made, supra note 18, at 279 (“Emotions are very real
creations of social reality, made possible by human brains in concert with other human
brains.”).
37. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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and the use of intergroup contact as a remedy.38 That is, integration is an
example of how the contact hypothesis operates. The contact hypothesis
is a cognitive theory of prejudice that uses intergroup contact as a means
of generating new beliefs and information.39 Racial and ethnic categories
(and by extension, disability) reflect a pernicious type of social categoriza-
tion that shapes the nature of stereotypes.40 Social scientists posit that
negative prejudicial beliefs develop because people create categories based
on differences in physical appearance that are visibly salient: “Even a frag-
ment of visibility . . . focuses people’s minds on the possibility that everything
may be related to this fragment . . . . Where visibility does exist, it is almost
always thought to be linked with deeper lying traits than is in fact the case.”41
The contact hypothesis places in-group members at the center of its
remedial strategy and seeks to address their moral development by open-
ing up their existing spaces to outgroup members. The nature of the con-
tact holds potential to exacerbate or reduce prejudice under certain condi-
tions,42 in part, by reducing intergroup anxieties and threat.43 Theoretically,
38. See, e.g., Aimi Hamraie, Building Access: Universal Design and the Politics of
Disability 65 (2017) (arguing that in the Jim Crow South, “[t]he consequence of racism . . .
was disability”); Michael F. Potter, Racial Diversity in Residential Communities: Societal
Housing Patterns and a Proposal for a “Racial Inclusionary Ordinance,” 63 S. Cal. L. Rev.
1151, 1182 n.156 (1990) (“The integrationist ideology was based, in part, on the contact
hypothesis.”).
39. Prejudice scholars rebuked emotions in favor of the “cognitive revolution” of the
1960s and 1970s. See Eliot R. Smith & Diane M. Mackie, Aggression, Hatred, and Other
Emotions, in On the Nature of Prejudice: Fifty Years After Allport 361, 363 (John F.
Dovidio et al. eds., 2005) [hereinafter After Allport]. There was a deliberate shift from a
focus on the irrational nature of prejudice manifested by groups such as the Nazis and the
Klu Klux Klan in the 1950s to an acceptance of prejudice as a more natural part of
cognitive sorting that could be undone through opportunities for contact to change
beliefs. Id. at 364 (“Emotions may have fallen out of favor in theories of prejudice in part
because of this shift in focus from the extreme bigot to the more ‘normally’ prejudiced
person.”). Interestingly, even Gordon W. Allport’s original thesis in the 1950s recognized
“hot emotions” that mediate relations, but this part of his work was largely ignored by
scholars with the dawn of the cognitive revolution in the 1960s and has only recently been
reclaimed. See id. at 371.
40. See John F. Dovidio et al., Introduction to After Allport, supra note 39, at 1, 5
[hereinafter Dovidio et al, Introduction].
41. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Gordon W. Allport, The Nature
of Prejudice 109, 132 (25th anniversary ed. 1979)).
42. See Jared B. Kenworthy et al., Intergroup Contact: When Does It Work and Why?,
in After Allport, supra note 39, at 278, 279 (enumerating four elements of contact: (1)
equal status, (2) common goals, (3) institutional support, and (4) a perception of similarity
between the two groups). Later empirical research has challenged Allport’s treatment of
these as “required” rather than as “facilitating factors.” See Thomas F. Pettigrew & Linda
R. Tropp, Allport’s Intergroup Contact Hypothesis: Its History and Influence, in After
Allport, supra note 39, at 262, 271.
43. See Dovidio et al., Introduction, supra note 40, at 6–7 (“Intergroup contact that
arouses identity or realistic threat increases bias, whereas appropriately structured,
cooperative contact can reduce prejudice, at least in part by reducing intergroup anxiety
and threat.”).
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intergroup interactions occasion increased similarity of perspectives and,
hence, can reduce prejudicial attitudes and discriminatory conduct.44
Intergroup contact counters negative stereotypes (again, held by the in-
group members) and supports the development of positive attitudes about
outgroup members “by providing sensitizing information to the norms,
lifestyles, values, and experiences of others—[that is,] familiarity erases
ignorance and paves the way for positive interaction.”45 Gordon W.
Allport’s work is the foundational literature on the social psychology of
intergroup relations and prejudice.46 A very specific model of integration
becomes a prescriptive application of the contact hypothesis to antidiscrimi-
nation law through “personal acquaintance, residential contact, occupa-
tional contact, and the pursuit of common goals.”47
B. Contact and Brown’s Mainstreaming Model
Key social science research on the cognitive nature of prejudice
strategically shaped early civil rights law in the context of race. The
equation of segregation with discrimination derives from the particular
history of racial relations in the United States.48 As in the context of
disability, the law excluded African American children from schools and
places of public accommodations.49 The Supreme Court in Brown v. Board
44. See Christopher G. Ellison & Daniel A. Powers, The Contact Hypothesis and Racial
Attitudes Among Black Americans, 75 Soc. Sci. Q. 385, 385 (1994) (“[C]ontact, particu-
larly close and sustained contact, with members of different cultural groups promotes posi-
tive, tolerant attitudes. By contrast, the absence of such contact is believed to foster
stereotyping, prejudice, and ill will toward these groups.”).
45. Chad Trulson & James W. Marquat, The Caged Melting Pot: Toward an Understanding
of the Consequences of Desegregation in Prisons, 36 Law & Soc’y Rev. 743, 745 (2002).
46. Allport offered descriptive insights on the role of social categorization and stereo-
types, diagnostic insights regarding the complex causes of prejudice, and prescriptive insights
about the alterability of group identities through contact. See Dovidio et al., Introduction,
supra note 40, at 1–2; see also Irwin Katz, Gordon Allport’s The Nature of Prejudice, 12 Pol.
Psychol. 125, 126 (1991) (describing Allport’s view of contact as rooted in “human relations”
and responding to structural problems).
47. Dovidio et al., Introduction, supra note 40, at 9.
48. See, e.g., Brief on Behalf of ACLU et al. as Amici Curiae Supporting Appellants at
17, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (No. 1), 1952 WL 82040 (“[It is] an area of
certainty that segregation and equality cannot co-exist.”); see also Brown, 347 U.S. at 495
(“Separate educational facilities are inherently unequal.”).
49. See, e.g., Robert A. Burt, Beyond the Right to Habilitation, in The Mentally
Retarded Citizen and the Law 417, 432 (Michael Kindred et al. eds., 1976) (“[T]he
adequacy of in-community resources is not an afterthought. It is central to the inquiry into
whether separate treatment for the mentally retarded person is not inherently unequal
just as racially segregated education was found inherently unequal in Brown v. Board of
Education.”); see also Fred Pelka, What We Have Done: An Oral History of the Disability
Rights Movement 1–4 (2012) (discussing the ways in which Brown and the racial justice move-
ment influenced the structure of early disability rights litigation, including a relationship
between disability rights leader Jacobus tenBroek and Thurgood Marshall); Deborah L.
Rhode, Class Conflicts in Class Actions, 34 Stan. L. Rev. 1183, 1211–12 (1982) (arguing
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of Education found the practice of maintaining separate public schools
unconstitutional, emphasizing, in particular, the stigmatic effects of seg-
regation on Black students in public schools.50 At the district court level,
Judge Huxman, who presided over the trial in Brown, noted that the plain-
tiffs’ case emphasized that “segregation, racial segregation, [wa]s the
prime and controlling factor of the equality of the whole curriculum, and
that the[] physical factors [wer]e secondary.”51 The emphasis on segregation
as per se detrimental to the “experience” of public education framed the
harm in terms of the individual Black student who was psychologically
damaged by his exclusion from white students and teachers. The focus
on integration as an end goal52 is clear in, for example, the following
cross-examination of the plaintiffs’ expert witness:
Q. You think that the negro child was simply by edict of law
forced into the white school, whether the white school was
ready to receive him or not, and however much he was in the
minority and however much he was left out of [social activities
and other] things, he would still be happy merely because he
had found his way into the white school, is that right?
A. I think on a long-range plan[, yes,] he would be happier
than on the other way.53
In the time between the Court’s decisions in Brown I and Brown II,
the Court expanded its underlying rationale for its original holding. Rather
than focusing entirely on racial segregation’s stigmatizing effect on
individual Black students, the Court employed the term “discrimination”
that class counsel in Pennhurst, like counsel in Brown, ignored the views of parents and
guardians who opposed or raised concerns about deinstitutionalization).
50. See 347 U.S. at 492– 95. In particular, footnote eleven of the opinion cites the
work of social scientists to support the Court’s reasoning regarding segregation as harmful
to Black children. See id. at 494 & n.11 (“Whatever may have been the extent of psycho-
logical knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding [of harm] is amply supported
by modern authority.”); Michael Heise, Brown v. Board of Education, Footnote 11, and
Multidisciplinarity, 90 Cornell L. Rev. 279, 281 (2005) (emphasizing the importance of “how
the Court articulated Brown”).
51. Transcript of Proceedings June 25 & 26, 1951 at 119, Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 98 F.
Supp. 797 (D. Kan. 1951) (Civ. No. T-316) [hereinafter Brown Trial Transcript] (on file
with the Columbia Law Review).
52. See Martha Minow, In Brown’s Wake: Legacies of America’s Educational
Landmark 9–10 (2010) [hereinafter Minow, In Brown’s Wake] (“[W]e believed that the
surest way for minority children to obtain their constitutional right to equal educational
opportunity was to require removal of all racial barriers in the public school system . . . .
Integration was viewed as the means to our ultimate objective, not the objective itself.”
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Robert Carter, The Unending Struggle for
Equal Educational Opportunity, 96 Tchrs. C. Rec. 619, 621 (1995))). But see Sheryll
Cashin, The Failures of Integration: How Race and Class Are Undermining the American
Dream, at XII (2004) (noting that African Americans have become “integration weary”);
Risa L. Goluboff, The Lost Promise of Civil Rights 198–201 (2007) (arguing that “integration”
was not the explicit or even primary goal of civil rights leaders, particularly given the
holding in Plessy v. Ferguson of “separate but equal”).
53. Brown Trial Transcript, supra note 51, at 126–27.
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to describe a broader harm at play in Brown. This, in turn, allowed the
Court to invalidate laws enforcing segregation as discriminatory ipso facto
because they were “activated by bias and prejudice, and thus for that
reason alone . . . violat[ive] [of] the Constitution.”54 Post-Brown decisions
appear to use the terms “segregation” and “discrimination” interchange-
ably.55 As a result, this early association of segregation as discrimination
led to a call for integration as a natural remedy and goal of civil rights
advocacy. This position received support from a growing social science
literature on the value of contact to reduce prejudice and promote social
acceptance.56 In fact, the Brown litigation team ushered in a nascent practice
of extralegal citations with a nod to Justice Brandeis and his famous
“Brandeis brief” in Muller v. Oregon.57
After Brown, the contact hypothesis continued to influence key civil
rights legislation—most notably the Civil Rights Act and the Fair Housing
Act.58 Floor debates explicitly referenced contact and integration as a
means of shifting social norms of racial and gender discrimination.59 Yet
54. See Reginald Oh, Discrimination and Distrust: A Critical Linguistic Analysis of
the Discrimination Concept, 7 U. Pa. J. Const. L. 837, 850 (2005) (noting that the Court
omitted a remedy in its original opinion); id. at 846 (“In Brown II, a case asserting the
appropriate remedy for school segregation, the Court managed to go through the entire
opinion without ever mentioning the word ‘segregation’ itself.”); see also Albert P.
Blaustein & Clarence Clyde Ferguson, Jr., Desegregation and the Law: The Meaning and
Effect of the School Segregation Cases 150–53 (1957) (noting that the word “segregation”
is not present in Brown II even though “one would have expected to have found [it]
repeated many times”); Reva B. Siegel, Equality Talk: Antisubordination and Anticlassification
Values in Constitutional Struggles over Brown, 117 Harv. L. Rev. 1470, 1478 (2004) (“Brown
is often invoked as an opinion prohibiting states from classifying on the basis of race. But
in so recalling Brown, we reason from an understanding that emerged from struggles over
enforcement of the decision, rather than from an understanding that prevailed at the time
the case was decided.”). A discussion of how these discursive moves muddied federal equal
protection doctrine is beyond the scope of this Article.
55. See generally Oh, supra note 54, at 852–53 (discussing how the linguistic shift by
the Court from discussion of “the harms of segregation to the harms of discrimination . . .
opened up a linguistic Pandora’s box [about] the ‘true’ meaning of Brown and . . . Equal
Protection”).
56. See, e.g., David L. Hamilton & George D. Bishop, Attitudinal and Behavioral
Effects of Initial Integration of White Suburban Neighborhoods, 32 J. Soc. Issues 47, 65–66
(1976) (discussing success of even minimal contact in decreasing whites’ anxiety over
black entry into their neighborhoods).
57. See generally Brief for the State of Oregon, Muller v. Oregon, 208 U.S. 412
(1908) (No. 107), 1908 WL 27605 (using social science data to support constitutional
claims challenging the hours of female laundry workers).
58. See Trulson & Marquart, supra note 45, at 745 (“The equal status contact hypothesis
was set out by Allport in the same year as [Brown]. Brown signaled the beginning of the
end of de jure segregation . . . . [T]he contact hypothesis was subjected to numerous tests,
most often in the aftermath of racial contact by way of racial desegregation.”).
59. Title VI Enforcement in Medicare and Medicaid Programs: Hearings on
Enforcement of Title VI of the 1964 Civil Rights Act on Medicare and Medicaid Before the
Subcomm. on Civil Rights & Constitutional Rights of the H. Comm. on the Judiciary, 93d
Cong. 125 (1973) (statement of Dr. Paul B. Cornely, Past President, American Public
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social scientists cautioned legislators that desegregation alone did not
reflect the tenets of contact theory: “All interracial contact is assumed to
constitute ‘integration.’”60 This is not to undermine or oversimplify the
impact of Brown; scholars continue to debate Brown’s wins and losses,61 its
sociopolitical aftermath,62 and its macro influence on civil rights move-
ments.63 Rather, it is to highlight the ways in which integration—spatial
integration generating contact—vacillated between an antidiscrimination
tool and an end goal itself.
Brown advocated a particular model of integration, mainstreaming
Black students from all-Black, segregated schools to white schools, without
attention to the design and quality of the education itself.64 Post-Brown
research and scholarship has challenged the view that Brown was a
“victory” for Black students. The central narrative in Brown professed the
poorer quality of Black schools relative to white schools and the lasting
psychological effects on Black children of being educated in separate
schools under sanction of law. Segregation, according to the Court, made
Black schools inherently bad. Yet the plaintiffs in Brown articulated other
reasons for their willingness to join the class action—namely, choice. Black
parents did not take issue with the quality of the Black schools; in fact,
they praised the teachers and communities built around those schools.65
Health Association) (discussing the need for and societal implications of integration of
Black students at medical schools).
60. Thomas F. Pettigrew, Another Look at the “Evidence on Busing,” Nat’l Ctr. for
Res. & Info. on Equal Educ. Opportunity Newsl., May 1973, at 3, 16; see also id. at 5 (“De-
segregation is achieved by simply ending segregation and bringing blacks and whites
together; it implies nothing about the quality of the interracial interaction. Integration
involves Allport’s four conditions for positive intergroup contact, cross-racial acceptance,
and equal dignity and access to resources for both racial groups.”).
61. See, e.g., Goluboff, supra note 52, at 238–70.
62. See, e.g., Michelle Alexander, The New Jim Crow: Mass Incarceration in the Age
of Colorblindness 36–37 (2012) (tracing the political impact of Brown in the United
States); Derrick A. Bell, Jr., Serving Two Masters: Integration Ideals and Client Interests in
School Desegregation Litigation, 85 Yale L.J. 470, 479–81 & n.32 (1976) (challenging
litigation strategy that focused on “maximum integration” but overshadowed parents’
interests).
63. See, e.g., Minow, In Brown’s Wake, supra note 52, at 6 (“[E]quality in law and
policy in the United States increasingly calls for mixing English-language learners with
English-speaking students and disabled with nondisabled students, but students’ residential
segregation and school assignments often produce schools and classrooms divided along
lines of race, ethnicity, and socio-economic class.”).
64. See James S. Liebman, Desegregating Politics: “All-Out” School Desegregation
Explained, 90 Colum. L. Rev. 1463, 1472 (1990) (stating that the focus of desegregation
before the 1970s was “simply ‘enroll[ing] a few Negro children in formally all-white schools’”
(quoting J. Wilkinson, From Brown to Bakke : The Supreme Court and School Integration,
1954–1978, at 132 (1979))).
65. Interview by Blackside, Inc. with Linda Brown Smith in Topeka, Kan. (Oct. 26,
1985), http://digital.wustl.edu/e/eop/eopweb/smi0015.0647.098lindabrownsmith.html
[https://perma.cc/JZ44-XVEY] (“I remember Monroe School, the all-black school that I
attended, as being a very good school, uh as far as quality is concerned, the teachers were
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For some parents, Brown was about school choice and broader principles
of segregation as limiting the universe of choices.66 Interestingly, the
mainstreaming model did not account for the Black teachers and admin-
istrators in the Black schools that closed post-Brown; this issue developed
through a related case, Brooks v. School District of City of Moberly.67 These
teachers lost their jobs and were not part of the integration model in
white schools; while these teachers filed suit and went up to the Eighth
Circuit only a few years after Brown, their case was ultimately unsuccess-
ful.68 The mainstreaming model merely moved Black students to white
schools without attention to key institutional-design choices such as who
would be teaching the students, choices that have a significant effect on
the quality of education students of color receive.69
Still, Brown produced a vetted “civil rights blueprint” with three key
elements. First, children became the quintessential (and palatable) sym-
pathetic victims of discrimination, and education became the key spatial
and ideological target for integration. Education, as the Court announced
in Brown, “is perhaps the most important function of state and local
governments. . . . It is the very foundation of good citizenship. . . . [I]t is
a principal instrument in awakening the child to cultural values, in
preparing him for later professional training, and in helping him to adjust
normally to his environment.”70 Second, a paternalistic narrative called for
integration as a prescription to save Black children from per se deficient,
segregated environments. The agency of Black parents and their children,
which ignited the flames of racial justice before Brown, did not always
align with the institutional and structural demands of emerging civil rights
movements. Third, shifts in social norms of racial bias were expected
byproducts of integration, natural consequences of the law’s emphasis on
integration as discussed in footnote eleven in Brown.71 At the time,
however, there was no real discussion about what happens during contact
itself—that is, when you add students of color to white spaces (such as
very good teachers, they set very good examples for their students, and they expected no
less of the student.”).
66. Id. (“My father was like a lot of other black parents here in Topeka at that time.
They were concerned not about the quality of education that their children were
receiving, they were concerned about the amount—or distance, that the child had to go to
receive an education.”).
67. 267 F.2d 733 (8th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 894 (1959) (mem.).
68. See id. at 740 (affirming the trial court’s determination that the teachers failed to
prove that the school board’s decisions were based on racial discrimination).
69. Interview by Kisha Turner with Celestine Diggs Porter in Norfolk, Va. (Aug. 2, 1995),
https://library.duke.edu/digitalcollections/media/pdf/behindtheveil/btvct08070.pdf [https://
perma.cc/6Z4B-CPQB] (“But . . . they just transferred everybody—you know, moving them
from one place to the other. . . . They should have had teachers first, and they didn’t do
that. . . . It did something to [the students]. It made them hate. . . . [And it made them
think] nobody’s here for me.”).
70. Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 493 (1954).
71. See supra note 50 and accompanying text.
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schools or places of public accommodations), as the Civil Rights Act and its
progeny did, what actually happens? Who are the intended beneficiaries,
and how do you resolve tension among, at times, competing interests?
What is the role of the law in shaping intergroup contact post-physical
integration to achieve its antidiscrimination goals? These discussions hap-
pened much later when scholars discussed the practical (and sometimes
unexpected) challenges of integration such as white flight.72
Other historically marginalized groups seeking sociopolitical rights,
witness to the traction gained by racial-justice movements, embraced this
civil rights blueprint with integration at its core.73 Yet the sociopolitical
contestation around race that led to the Civil Rights Act was largely
absent from the road to the Americans with Disabilities Act.74 Dr. Martin
Luther King described the bill that would become the Civil Rights Act as
“the child of a storm, the product of the most turbulent motion the
nation has ever known in peacetime.”75 By contrast, the ADA was not born
in a storm, “but rather in a metaphorical weather inversion in which the
long developing pressures were about to be unleashed.”76 The absence of
public debate about disability rights as civil rights relegated equality of
opportunity to an aspirational goal rather than elevating it to a moral
imperative worthy of the remedial power of law.
C. The Effects of Contact
Allport cautioned that contact, as originally conceived, was more of a
“hypothesis” than a “theory” and even questioned whether contact itself
would generally reduce prejudice absent certain positive conditions.77
72. See Paul Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 Yale L.J. 585, 641–42 (1983) (“To
recognize that white flight interferes with the effectiveness of a desegregation remedy in a
legally relevant way is the starting point for sensible legal analysis of the remedial problem
it poses.”).
73. See infra section II.A.
74. Lennard J. Davis, Enabling Acts: The Hidden Story of How the Americans with
Disabilities Act Gave the Largest U.S. Minority Its Rights 14–15 (2016) [hereinafter Davis,
Enabling Acts]; Michael E. Waterstone, The Costs of Easy Victory, 57 Wm. & Mary L. Rev.
587, 593 (2015) (“There is no organized anti-disability movement, politicians do not
regularly take public stands on matters important to the disability community, and views
on disability issues are not a factor in judicial selection or confirmation. . . . This lack of
conflict reflects low public engagement on disability issues.”).
75. Martin Luther King Jr., Hammer of Civil Rights, Nation (Mar. 9, 1964), https://
www.thenation.com/article/hammer-civil-rights/ [https://perma.cc/V6W2-WX9A].
76. Davis, Enabling Acts, supra note 74, at 15 (“[T]here was no Selma or Birmingham
in the disability movement. . . . [N]ational demonstrations . . . were, and perhaps had to be,
coordinated and orchestrated.”); see also Mary Johnson, Before Its Time: Public Perception
of Disability Rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act, and the Future of Access and
Accommodation, 23 Wash. U. J.L. & Pol’y 121, 121–22 (2007) (explaining that the absence
of public debate was a deliberate legislative strategy adopted by disability rights advocates
and legislative allies).
77. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 42, at 271 (noting that “Allport held his optimal
factors to be essential conditions for intergroup contact to diminish prejudice”).
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Contemporary social scientists challenge previous constructions of the
contact hypothesis primarily on two grounds. First, the “positive factors”
requirement is vague and advances an open-ended prescription with the
potential for limitless conditions. As a result, “optimal” contact is impos-
sible.78 Second, contact’s original formulation failed to identify or theorize
the actual processes involved in the intergroup contact’s effects, or how
they would generalize such effects to other situations, the entire outgroup,
or other outgroups not involved in the contact.79 Consequently, contempo-
rary scholars of prejudice have pivoted in their research agendas from an
examination of “positive factors” to an explicit search for “negative factors
operating in contact situations . . . that may inhibit the development of
positive contact outcomes.”80 For example, recent research studies: (1)
seek to identify the “moderators and mediators of intergroup contact’s
effects”; 81 (2) adopt a disaggregated methodological approach that
examines contact’s effects on specific outgroups;82 and (3) explore the
ways in which particular histories and relations between in-groups and
outgroups trigger particular emotional responses that may hinder contact’s
effectiveness.83
Meta-analysis of intergroup contact studies shows overall positive
results in the reduction of prejudice on the basis of increased contact.84
However, disaggregation of the data by marginalized group tells a more
complex story about the relative success of current versions of contact to
mitigate negative intergroup prejudices.85 The largest effects occurred in
the context of contact between heterosexuals and gays and lesbians. Per-
haps because the difference is not physically apparent as a relative mat-
ter, the effects with this marginalized group were significantly larger than
those for studies with racial and ethnic groups.86 By contrast, studies
involving contact between people with disabilities and nondisabled
78. See id. (arguing that “with an ever-expanding list of necessary conditions, it
becomes increasingly unlikely that any contact situations could meet these highly
restrictive conditions”).
79. Id.; see also Daniel A. Miller et al., Effects of Intergroup Contact and Political
Predispositions on Prejudice: Role of Intergroup Emotions, 7 Group Processes & Intergroup
Rel. 221, 222 (2004) (calling for greater attention to the role of emotions in intergroup
relations, particularly in the mediation of intergroup contact and political predispositions);
infra sections III.A, IV.A.
80. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 42, at 272.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 273.
83. Id.
84. Id. at 266–68 (describing meta-analysis covering data from the 1940s to the
present for over 250,000 individuals).
85. Id.; see also Ryan D. Enos, What the Demolition of Public Housing Teaches Us
About the Impact of Racial Threat on Political Behavior, 60 Am. J. Pol. Sci. 123, 139 (2016)
(challenging contact theory and concluding “that proximity is often not a valid measure of
social interaction and that, in segregated contexts, proximity may increase conflict”).
86. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 42, at 267–68.
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persons produced significantly smaller average effects. Those with mental
disabilities or mental illness in contact with those without mental disabili-
ties or mental illness produced the lowest average measure of success.87
Some social scientists argue that, as a result, “[i]t may be especially difficult
to achieve truly equal status between groups in these intergroup contexts
due to an exaggerated focus on the stigma, and the perceptions of
unpredictability and dangerousness often associated with [disabilities].”88
Notably, these meta-analyses tend to group all people with disabilities
together without due attention to key variables such as the nature of the
disability (defined, for example, by type, severity, degree of visibility, or
functional capacities) or the ways in which disability identity intersects with
other identity categories such as race, ethnicity, nationality, class, or gender.
Recent studies by education scholars reveal that meaningful inclusion
of students with disabilities in general-education classrooms is more
complicated than the classic narratives profess.89 Historically, states excluded
students with known, severe, or visible disabilities who required support
from schools and created separate institutions, schools, and classrooms for
those students.90 Similar to racial integration, the physical integration of
students with disabilities into neighborhood schools largely resulted in
shared physical space rather than inclusion.91
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) assumes that
including students with disabilities in general-education classrooms results
in progress or benefits to the student, the class, or, as contact theory pos-
its, society more broadly. Interestingly, the IDEA offers no preference for
or prioritization of these beneficiaries as a measure of success. Exposure
is different from meaningful access or “appropriateness,” the operative
legal standard codified in the IDEA.92 If one is to evaluate the success of
87. Id. at 268; see also Patrick Corrigan et al., An Attribution Model of Public
Discrimination Towards Persons with Mental Illness, 44 J. Health & Soc. Behav. 162, 172–
73 (2003).
88. Pettigrew & Tropp, supra note 42, at 266 (citing examples of other scholars).
89. See, e.g., Allison F. Gilmour, Has Inclusion Gone Too Far?, Educ. Next, Fall 2018,
at 9, 16, https://www.educationnext.org/files/ednext_xviii_4_gilmour.pdf [https://perma.
cc/QV92-X55Q] (describing how special-education policies and practices have “narrowly
focused on [students with disabilities]’s outcomes without considering the confluence of
factors that can affect a classroom”).
90. See infra notes 114–127 and accompanying text.
91. “Inclusion is always reciprocal. Everyone in an inclusive setting contributes for
the good of the whole. If a member receives (or takes) but does not give, he is not
included. He’s a recipient of charity, a guest, or a thief.” Sheryle Dixon, Inclusion—Not
Segregation or Integration Is Where a Student with Special Needs Belongs, 39 J. Educ.
Thought 33, 35 (2005) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Kathie Snow, Disability
Is Natural: Revolutionary Common Sense for Raising Successful Children with Disabilities
391 (2001)).
92. Gilmour, supra note 89, at 10 (“The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
(IDEA), first signed into law in 1975 as the Education for all Handicapped Children Act,
mandates that [students with disabilitie]s receive a free appropriate public education
(FAPE) in the least-restrictive environment (LRE) possible.”).
914 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:895
the disability rights movement purely on the basis of integration—or moving
more students with disabilities from segregated educational environments
into general-education settings—then the movement has been tremen-
dously successful: More than sixty percent of all students with disabilities
spend more than eighty percent of their school day in general-education
classrooms alongside their nondisabled peers.93
If success, however, includes other factors such as learning outcomes
or shifts in negative attitudes or increased social acceptance, the research
suggests a more complicated story. In terms of curricular benefits, a review
of placement data posits that some students with disabilities exposed to
general-education curriculum classrooms are not actually learning the
curriculum, and worse, may be falling further behind their peers in aca-
demics and skills acquisition.94 “Though federal laws stress the importance
of educating [students with disabilities] in the regular classroom, there is
no good evidence that placement there improves the outcomes of these
students.”95 Research on the attitudes of nondisabled students toward
students with visible disabilities in integrated settings has produced mixed
results and varies along a number of axes including type of disability,
severity, and visibility and the type of contact (whether structured or unstruc-
tured).96 For example, a number of studies have found that contact with
students with intellectual disabilities in general classroom environments
does not necessarily promote positive attitudes and, in some cases, may
actually lead to more negative attitudes. This is so because the type of
contact highlights the aesthetic and functional dissimilarities rather than
commonalities between children with and without intellectual disabilities.97
One national study of close to 6,000 middle school students about their
attitudes regarding the inclusion of peers with intellectual disabilities
noted that, although prior research claimed contact with and exposure to
people with intellectual disabilities directly influences attitudes, students
with a classmate with an intellectual disability did not hold attitudes about
93. Id. at 10 fig.1 (citing data from the National Center on Education Statistics, Digest
of Education Statistics).
94. Id. at 11–12. For example, one meta-analysis found that students with disabilities
score about 1.2 standard deviations below their nondisabled peers in reading, which
amounts to a lag of approximately three years of academic growth. Id. at 11. Note that
these studies present aggregate data and use umbrella terminology rather than offering
disaggregated statistics to account for differences along such dimensions as types of
disabilities or visibility of those disabilities, for example.
95. Id. at 11–12. The author focuses on educational outcomes measured by demon-
stration of content proficiency, progression from grade to grade, and alignment with state
and federal educational standards. Id.
96. See, e.g., Gary N. Siperstein et al., A National Study of Youth Attitudes Toward the
Inclusion of Students with Intellectual Disabilities, 73 Exceptional Child. 435, 436 (2007)
[hereinafter Siperstein et al., Youth Attitudes] (comparing existing studies and highlighting
inconsistencies). “Most studies to date have essentially provided only a glimpse of a much
larger picture.” Id. at 437.
97. Id. at 436.
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their peers with intellectual disabilities different from those who did not
report this type of contact.98
In the employment context, the studies suffer from many of the
same inconsistencies in outcomes, perhaps also the result of the absence
of disaggregation or due to differences in methodology.99 Studies agree,
however, that the integrative effort—that is, the actual process of increas-
ing the number of people with disabilities in integrative employment
settings—has been less successful than in the contexts of education and
public accommodations, where increased integration (visibility) is uncon-
tested. Less than twenty percent of people with disabilities are employed
in the formal economy as compared with more than seventy-seven per-
cent of nondisabled people.100 In a comprehensive literature review, one
study concluded that employers have become more willing to endorse
hiring workers with disabilities after the ADA, though in their actual
hiring practices, they are still more likely to hire a nondisabled person.101
“[E]mployers’ fears and negative expectations, rather than the existence
of external barriers, . . . create[] obstacles to hiring people with disabili-
ties.”102 Such fears include the costs of accommodations, fear of greater
legal restrictions on regulating their employment and its termination,
and safety and liability concerns that may arise.103 Many of these fears
have been deemed irrational or inconsequential in research studies,
however, suggesting that the average costs of reasonable accommodations,
for example, are at most de minimis.104
The primary lesson from these studies is that the degree to which
disabilities are physically manifest and the particular setting of the con-
tact are positively correlated with the importance of the structure of the
contact between people with and without disabilities. Importantly, the
takeaway is not that integration should be discarded as a tool of disability
98. Id. at 450–51.
99. See Brigida Hernandez et al., Employer Attitudes Toward Workers with Disabilities
and Their ADA Employment Rights: A Literature Review, 66 J. Rehabilitation 4, 5 (2000)
(highlighting disparate findings in studies analyzing employer attitudes toward workers
with disabilities).
100. Gary N. Siperstein et al., A National Survey of Consumer Attitudes Towards
Companies that Hire People with Disabilities, 24 J. Vocational Rehabilitation 3, 3 (2006).
101. Id. at 4.
102. Id.
103. See, e.g., Sharon L. Harlan & Pamela M. Robert, The Social Construction of
Disability in Organizations: Why Employers Resist Reasonable Accommodation, 25 Work &
Occupations 397, 422 (1998) (“The employer’s desire to avoid the expense of purchasing
equipment, services, or architectural modifications may well be part of the explanation for
their resistance [to providing accommodations].”).
104. See id. (“[N]ational studies have shown consistently the average cost of providing
reasonable accommodation is extremely low.”); see also Michael Ashley Stein, The Law and
Economics of Disability Accommodations, 53 Duke L.J. 79, 104 (2003) (describing empiri-
cal data showing that one-half of accommodations cost less than five hundred dollars and
also save companies fifty dollars per dollar spent on accommodations).
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antidiscrimination law, nor is it that inclusion should be abandoned as a
normative goal. The more granular findings on the structure of contact
can help inform remedial designs. For example, in the education context,
researchers concluded that students without intellectual disabilities were
most likely to engage in superficial interaction—such as passing them a
pencil or saying hello in passing—with their peers with intellectual
disabilities.105 Respondents in the study believed that integration, theo-
retically, helped them develop greater social acceptance of differences
but that they were unlikely to move beyond the superficial interactions in
school settings.106 Participants’ perceptions of their peers’ competence
and their expectations of the impact of inclusion on their own education
explained more than fifty percent of the variance of youths’ willingness to
interact with a student with intellectual disabilities.107 Students supplement
their judgments regarding the “competency” of disabled children—
developed “predominantly from secondary sources” such as media and
conversations with teachers and parents—by engaging in superficial inter-
actions with their peers and by making observations in the classroom
setting that would necessarily rely on visible manifestations or markers of
competence.108
II. THE LOGIC OF DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
Integration holds a favored prescriptive role in disability rights law.109
Congress explicitly defines economic, political, and social segregation of
people with disabilities as discrimination under the Americans with
Disabilities Act.110 While prior civil rights laws emphasized economic and
political exclusion as actionable discrimination, the ADA was the first civil
rights legislation to explicitly target social isolation as a form of discrim-
ination. Members of Congress, some of whom had personal experiences
with disability,111 framed disability discrimination as a product of anti-
quated social norms that inhibit social inclusion and acceptance. As a
result, the ADA uniquely articulates as a central goal the elimination of
prejudicial attitudes and norms to remedy discrimination. This Part
describes the development of integration as a remedial ideology.
105. Siperstein et al., Youth Attitudes, supra note 96, at 451.
106. Id.
107. Id. at 452.
108. See id. at 450–51.
109. References to “disability rights law” include major federal statutes such as the
Americans with Disabilities Act, Rehabilitation Act, Fair Housing Act, and Individuals with
Disabilities Act.
110. See infra section II.B.
111. See Davis, Enabling Acts, supra note 74, at 3–6 (discussing bipartisan sponsors of
the ADA who either were themselves disabled or had a close family member with a disability—
including Representative Tony Coelho, a person with epilepsy, Senator Tom Harkin, who
had a deaf brother, and Senator Ted Kennedy, whose son had a leg amputation).
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A. Framing Disability Discrimination as Segregation
To understand how and why integration gets imported into disability
rights law, it is important to first appreciate the way in which discrimination
against people with disabilities emerges in public discourse and the unex-
plored tensions among inclusion, the value of integration, and individual
needs. Early nuisance ordinances, known as the “ugly laws,” criminalized
the sight of disability in public spaces.112 Inaccessible and inhospitable
public spaces policed the presence of disability. This de facto segregation
complemented eugenic laws and policies designed to hide and eliminate
disability altogether.113 The shift from publicly endorsed segregation to
popular condemnation came about as a result of television and newspaper
exposés of state institutions for people with severe intellectual and
developmental disabilities. Congressional leaders attributed the widespread
abuse and neglect to the physical separation of people with disabilities in
these remote institutions, many of which were located in rural communi-
ties outside of the public’s eye.114 In 1972, a television news reporter, on a
tip from a whistleblower,115 covertly entered the Willowbrook State School,
one of the largest public institutions at the time,116 and with one cameraman
publicized rampant human rights abuses occurring there.117 Two months
112. See Schweik, supra note 26, at 23–24; see also Jasmine E. Harris, Processing
Disability, 64 Am. U. L. Rev. 457, 466–68 (2015) (discussing local ordinances criminalizing
disability in public spaces).
113. See Jasmine E. Harris, Commentary: Forced Sterilization and Buck v. Bell, in
Feminist Judgments: Reproductive Justice Rewritten (Kimberly Mutcherson ed., forthcoming
2019) (manuscript at 3–4) (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (describing the early
history of eugenic laws and policies in the United States).
114. See, e.g., 134 Cong. Rec. 9384 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon) (“In spite of progress
resulting from laws such as . . . the Rehabilitation Act, this sizeable part of our population
remains substantially hidden . . . in institutions[,] . . . in nursing homes[,] . . . in the homes
of their families. . . . Because they are hidden, we too easily ignore the problem and the need
for change.”). Institutions spatially isolated outside of cities and far from community life
operated as self-contained campuses and provided local employment for surrounding rural
areas. See Wolf Wolfensberger, The Origin and Nature of Our Institutional Models 20 (1975).
115. Dr. Michael Wilkins, a doctor employed by the institution, passed a key to an
investigative news reporter, Geraldo Rivera, who entered the institution without notice to
capture real-time footage. Geraldo Rivera, Willowbrook: A Report on How It Is and Why It
Doesn’t Have to Be That Way 9–14 (1972).
116. See N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 958 (2d Cir.
1983) (noting that Willowbrook housed over 5,700 people, over sixty-five percent above its
official capacity).
117. Geraldo Rivera offered the following testimonial upon first entering Willowbrook:
[T]he . . . smell of the place staggered me. It was so wretched that my first
thought was that the air was poisonous and would kill me. . . . I saw . . . a
grotesque caricature of a person, lying under the sink on an incredibly
filthy tile floor in an incredibly filthy bathroom. . . . It was skinny. It was
twisted. It was lying in its own feces. . . . Sitting next to this thing was
another freak . . . making a noise. It was a wailing sound . . . . I said out
loud, but to nobody in particular, “My God, they’re children.”
Rivera, supra note 115, at 3.
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after the news story aired, several families of residents filed a class action
lawsuit against Willowbrook, New York State Ass’n for Retarded Children v.
Carey,118 which, like many civil rights cases in this period, challenged
alleged violations of statutory (and, on occasion, constitutional) rights and
produced a remedial consent decree.119
Federal courts resolving constitutional and statutory claims in the
context of institutionalized persons with mental disabilities framed the
harm as a product of unnecessary social isolation and segregation.120 In
Halderman v. Pennhurst State School & Hospital, for example, the district
court held that “[t]hese institutions are the most isolated and restrictive
settings in which to [educate, train, and] treat the retarded.”121 Early court
decisions laid the conceptual and doctrinal groundwork for the “least re-
strictive environment” in special education122 and the “integration mandate”
in ADA regulations.123 Courts held that such isolation was counterproductive
to the broader theoretical investment in habilitation (skills training) as a
way to “normalize” people with intellectual and developmental disabili-
ties.124 In Pennhurst, the court stated, “The environment at Pennhurst is not
118. 393 F. Supp. 715 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
119. Id. at 316, 318; see also Harold Baer, Jr. & Arminda Bepko, A Necessary and
Proper Role for Federal Courts in Prison Reform: The Benjamin v. Malcolm Consent Decrees,
52 N.Y.L. Sch. L. Rev. 3, 11–12 (2007–2008) (discussing the use of consent decrees in
structural reform litigation such as class actions in “school desegregation, mental health,
prison reform, environmental, and antitrust litigation”).
120. See Halderman v. Pennhurst State Sch. & Hosp., 446 F. Supp. 1295, 1303 (E.D.
Pa. 1977); see also Bruce G. Mason & Frank J. Menolascino, The Right to Treatment for
Mentally Retarded Citizens: An Evolving Legal and Scientific Interface, 10 Creighton L.
Rev. 124, 157 (1976) (framing constitutional harms in institutional cases). But see Wyatt v.
Stickney, 325 F. Supp. 781, 784–85 (M.D. Ala. 1971) (“There can be no legal (or moral)
justification for the State of Alabama’s failing to afford treatment—and adequate treatment
from a medical standpoint—to the several thousand patients who have been civilly
committed to Bryce’s for treatment purposes.”).
121. 446 F. Supp. at 1303.
122. See Mills v. Bd. of Educ., 348 F. Supp. 866, 878 (D.D.C. 1972) (holding that students
with intellectual and behavioral disabilities shall not be excluded “unless such child is
provided . . . a constitutionally adequate prior hearing and periodic review” and the school
district “shall provide . . . a free and suitable publicly-supported education regardless of the
degree of the child’s mental, physical or emotional disability”); Pa. Ass’n for Retarded Children
v. Pennsylvania, 343 F. Supp. 279, 285 (E.D. Pa. 1972) (recognizing the consent agreement
before the court requiring the school district to provide students with intellectual disabilities
“a free public program of education and training appropriate to the child’s capacity”).
123. Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1321–22 (holding that “confinement and isolation of
the retarded in . . . Pennhurst is segregation in a facility that clearly is separate and not
equal” and “equal protection principles . . . prohibit the segregation of the retarded in an
isolated institution such as Pennhurst where habilitation does not measure up to minimally
adequate standards”); see also 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2018) (“A public entity shall adminis-
ter services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the
needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.”).
124. See, e.g., Pennhurst, 446 F. Supp. at 1298 (reasoning that “[r]etardation is wholly
distinct from mental illness” and “is primarily an educational problem and not a disease
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conducive to normalization. It does not reflect society. It is separate and
isolated from society . . . . Pennhurst provides confinement and isolation,
the antithesis of habilitation.” 125 Accordingly, courts saw community-
based integration as the natural remedy to support habilitation and inclu-
sion.126 Pursuant to the Willowbrook consent decree, for example, the
court required New York State to reduce the population at Willowbrook
from 5,700 to 250 through relocation and integration into “community
placements” designed “to ready each resident, with due regard for his or
her own disabilities and with full appreciation for his or her own capabili-
ties for development, for life in the community at large.”127
Pre-ADA, Congress codified emerging doctrinal principles of non-
discriminatory habilitation in Spending Clause legislation, most notably,
special-education laws128 and section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973
(Rehab Act).129 The Rehab Act articulated the model language proscribing
disability discrimination.130 Congress responded to concerns about involuntary
which can be cured through drugs or treatment” but that “with proper habilitation, the
level of functioning of every retarded person may be improved”).
125. Id. at 1311, 1318.
126. See id. at 1311–12 (discussing relocation of residents from Pennhurst to smaller
community-based programs dispersed across nearby counties).
127. N.Y. State Ass’n for Retarded Children v. Carey, 706 F.2d 956, 959 (2d Cir. 1983)
(internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting 1 Mental Disability L. Rep. 58, 67 (1976)).
128. See Education of the Handicapped Act, Pub. L. No. 91-230, tit. 6, 84 Stat. 121,
175–88 (1970) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. §§ 1400–1482 (2012)) (renamed Individuals
with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) by Pub. L. No. 101-476, § 901(a)(1), 104 Stat. 1103,
1141–42 (1990) (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1400(a))); see also Education for All
Handicapped Children Act of 1975, Pub. L. No. 94-142, sec. 5(a), § 612(5)(B), 89 Stat.
773, 781 (codified as amended at 20 U.S.C. § 1412(a)(5)(A)) (conditioning federal education
funds on a state’s promise to educate children with disabilities “to the maximum extent
appropriate” with nondisabled children). The legislative history of the IDEA includes a
congressional task force report which presents the findings from a study on the education
of children with disabilities—in part, the result of the Mills and Pennsylvania Ass’n for
Retarded Children cases in 1972. Congress notes in its findings that more than half of all
children with disabilities, or about four million children, were not receiving appropriate
educational services with approximately one million excluded entirely from any public
education. Education for All Handicapped Children Act of 1975, sec. 3(a), § 601, 89 Stat.
773, 774.
129. Pub. L. No. 93-112, § 504, 87 Stat. 355, 394 (codified as amended at 29 U.S.C.
§ 794(a) (2012)); see also Vocational Rehabilitation Services to the Handicapped: Hearings
on H.R. 8395 and 9847 Before the Select Subcomm. on Educ. of the Comm. on Educ. &
Labor, 92d Congress 196 (1972) [hereinafter Rehab Act Hearings] (statement of Milton
Ferris, Chairman, Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment Committee, National Association
for Retarded Children, Wakefield, R.I.) (“With the new concept of depopulating our
various giant institutions by one-third or more in favor of community facilities, the role of
the vocational rehabilitation agency is vital in providing more community services for the
severely handicapped involved.”).
130. Rehab Act § 504 (“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . . shall, solely
by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”); see also Rehab Act Hearings, supra note 129, at 249 (statement of
Rep. Carey) (“[W]hy do people [with disabilities] in this country continue to remain
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sterilization and segregation “which caused [people with disabilities] to live
among society ‘shunted aside, hidden, and ignored.’”131 Congress saw the
prohibition of disability-based discrimination as a direct extension of the
protections afforded other minority groups identified in the Civil Rights
Act of 1964.132
The regulation implementing the Rehab Act’s nondiscrimination
provision was the first regulatory authority on integration in disability
rights law. Section 41.51 requires all recipients of federal financial assis-
tance to “administer programs and activities in the most integrated setting
appropriate to the needs of qualified handicapped persons.”133 Thereafter,
plaintiffs used section 504 to challenge segregated public services in
education, health care, and housing. Known as the “integration mandate,”
this interpretation laid the foundational bricks for the ADA’s normative
orientation.134
Constitutional arguments advanced in favor of a more rigorous
standard of review of state action in the context of disability focused on
the prescriptive role of integration. The Supreme Court, for example, in
City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Center, Inc., rejected the Fifth Circuit’s
holding below but did not criticize its dicta that although the city’s zoning
ordinance did not implicate a constitutionally recognized fundamental
right, “[w]ithout group homes . . . the retarded could never hope to inte-
grate themselves into the community.”135 Furthermore, Justice Marshall’s
outside the boundaries of life in our society? . . . Not only do many rehabilitation workers
fail to understand that people [with disabilities] can be rehabilitated, but some of them
are not too anxious to deal with such people.”).
131. Alexander v. Choate, 469 U.S. 287, 296 (1985) (quoting 117 Cong. Rec. 45,974
(1971) (statement of Rep. Vanik)); see also 118 Cong. Rec. 525 (1972) (statement of Sen.
Humphrey) (“The time has come when we can no longer tolerate the invisibility of the
handicapped in America. . . . [T]oo often we keep children, whom we regard as ‘different’
or a ‘disturbing influence,’ out of our schools and community activities altogether . . . .”).
132. Compare Rehab Act § 504 (“No otherwise qualified handicapped individual . . .
shall, solely by reason of his handicap, be excluded from the participation in, be denied
the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving
Federal financial assistance.”), with Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, § 601, 78
Stat. 241, 252 (codified at 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (2012)) (“No person . . . shall, on the ground
of race, color, or national origin, be excluded from participation in, be denied the benefits
of, or be subjected to discrimination under any program or activity receiving Federal
financial assistance.”). This comparison has been recognized by courts as well. See Ams.
Disabled for Accessible Pub. Transp. (ADAPT) v. Skinner, 881 F.2d 1184, 1187 (3d Cir.
1989) (“[S]ection 504 . . . [is] commonly known as the civil rights bill of the disabled.”).
133. 28 C.F.R. § 41.51(d) (2018) (emphasis added); see also 42 U.S.C. § 15009(a)(1)–
(2) (providing for the statutory right of people with developmental disabilities to receive
“appropriate treatment, services, and habilitation” in a setting that is “least restrictive of
[their] personal liberty”).
134. Section 504 of the Rehab Act was “the first federal language that clearly and
uncompromisingly guaranteed the civil rights of people with disabilities . . . . Section 504
was only forty-four words, yet its tweet-like length belied the volumes of language it would
generate in the coming years.” Davis, Enabling Acts, supra note 74, at 11.
135. 473 U.S. 432, 438 (1985) (referencing the Fifth Circuit’s decision in this case).
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dissent in Cleburne underscores the importance of the group home as a
site of contact between disabled and nondisabled persons to remedy
“outmoded and perhaps invidious stereotypes”: “[G]roup homes have
become the primary means by which retarded adults can enter life in the
community. . . . Excluding group homes deprives the retarded of much
of what makes for human freedom and fulfillment—the ability to form
bonds and take part in the life of a community.”136 Although the majority
ultimately refused to elevate the standard of constitutional review, the
Court in Cleburne did not dispute the history of segregation experienced
by this group and, in fact, underscored the prescriptive value of integra-
tion in antidiscrimination law.
B. The Americans with Disabilities Act and Olmstead
Integration of people with disabilities into community life is the core
normative mission of contemporary federal disability rights law, and, by the
time the early ADA bills hit the desk of congressional staffers, integration
had also become a familiar legal prescription to remedy the effects of seg-
regation.137 The ADA best expresses Congress’s unwavering commitment
to promoting contact between people with and without disabilities as a
means of addressing prejudice,138 a key congressional target.139 Disability
was a civil rights issue “about the right of individuals to have access to the
world that everyone else [was] part of.”140 Until 1990, however, people with
disabilities did not have the full range of civil rights that nondisabled
136. Id. at 461, 465 (Marshall, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) (emphasis added).
137. See Joseph P. Shapiro, No Pity: People with Disabilities Forging a New Civil Rights
Movement 144 (1993) (“[I]n a society where disabled people are remote, we have not
understood the need to adjust attitudes, programs, and laws to fit the changing reality of
disabled people who now seek independence. As a result, integration . . . has become a
primary goal of today’s disability movement.”).
138. The high costs and economic inefficiencies of segregating people with disabilities
played a notable role in the advancement of the ADA. See, e.g., Timothy M. Cook, The
Americans with Disabilities Act: The Move to Integration, 64 Temp. L. Rev. 393, 457 (1991)
(“Congress expressly determined that the costs of continued segregation of persons with
disabilities were outweighed by the benefits of integration—on both an economic and a
moral basis.”); see also 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(8) (finding that discrimination “costs the United
States billions of dollars in unnecessary expenses resulting from dependency and nonpro-
ductivity”); Emily Blumberg, Recent Development: Forest Grove School District v. T.A., 45 Harv.
C.R.-C.L. L. Rev. 163, 163–64 (2016) (noting the concerns over the costs of educating
individual students at nonpublic schools); Admissions: Tuition & Fees, The Lab School,
https://www.labschool.org/admissions/tuition-and-fees [https://perma.cc/2D5A-689C] (last
visited Apr. 6, 2019) (stating that the annual tuition for one student in a D.C. nonpublic
school serving students with learning disabilities is between $50,650 and $52,500 per year).
139. See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2) (“[H]istorically, society has tended to isolate and
segregate individuals with disabilities, and . . . such forms of discrimination against
individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive social problem . . . .”);
id. § 12101(a)(5) (“[I]ndividuals with disabilities continually encounter various forms of
discrimination, including . . . segregation . . . .”).
140. Davis, Enabling Acts, supra note 74, at xiii.
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citizens enjoyed (with the exception of those rights provided through
federally funded programs).
Congressional debates demonstrate the ways in which segregation
itself was understood as discrimination: “To be segregated is to be
misunderstood, even feared. . . . [O]nly by breaking down barriers between
people can we dispel the negative attitudes and myths that are the main
currency of oppression.”141 While economic realities drove congressional
action on employment in particular,142 the overarching goal of the ADA was
to shift social norms that prevented people with disabilities from accessing
employment, public services, and places of public accommodations.143
Regulatory guidance, particularly with respect to public programs
and services under Title II, mirrors the integration mandate issued under
the Rehab Act.144 Public entities must “administer services, programs, or
activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of
141. 136 Cong. Rec. 11,430 (1990) (statement of Rep. Collins); see also H.R. Rep. No.
101-485, pt. 3, at 26 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N. 445, 449 (recognizing that
the ADA intended to end exclusion and segregation of handicapped); id. at 50 (rejecting
the separate-but-equal approach to public services for the disabled); S. Rep. No. 101-116,
at 20 (1989) (noting the need for a “clear and comprehensive” mandate to integrate the
disabled into the “economic and social mainstream of American life”); id. at 6 (“One of
the most debilitating forms of discrimination is segregation imposed by others.”); 136
Cong. Rec. 11,430 (1990) (statement of Rep. Collins) (“A basic goal which runs through this
landmark civil rights legislation . . . is to fully integrate disabled Americans into all aspects
of life in our country.”); Id. at 10,877 (statement of Rep. Miller) (“[I]t has been our unwill-
ingness to see all people with disabilities that has been the greatest barrier to full and
meaningful equality. Society has made them invisible by shutting them away in segregated
facilities.”); 135 Cong. Rec. 8514 (1989) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) (describing “American
apartheid” and the “unthinking and unacceptable practices by which disabled Americans
today are segregated, excluded, and fenced off from fair participation in our society”); 134
Cong. Rec. 9384 (1988) (statement of Sen. Simon) (“[Persons with disabilities] remain[] sub-
stantially hidden. They are hidden in institutions. They are hidden in nursing homes. . . .
Because they are hidden, we too easily ignore the problem and the need for change.”).
142. People with disabilities were (and continue to be) among the poorest, least employed,
and least educated of all minority groups in the United States. For example, people with
disabilities are nearly twice as likely as nondisabled people to have an annual household
income of $15,000 or less. Davis, Enabling Acts, supra note 74, at x. The poverty and edu-
cational inequities are compounded at the intersection of other marginalized identities
such as race, national origin, gender, or sexuality. See generally Nanette Goodman et al.,
Nat’l Disability Inst., Financial Inequality: Disability, Race and Poverty in America (2017)
(exploring how the intersection of race and poverty exacerbates the challenges people of
color with disabilities face).
143. Pelka, supra note 49, at 505 (“It was an attitudinal thing. That was why we needed
the [ADA], to change the attitudes foremost.” (quoting Ambassador C. Boyden Gray)).
144. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (2018) (“A public entity shall administer services, programs,
and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to the needs of qualified
individuals with disabilities.”); see also James Leonard, The Shadows of Unconstitutionality:
How the New Federalism May Affect the Anti-Discrimination Mandate of the Americans
with Disabilities Act, 52 Ala. L. Rev. 91, 144 (2000) (“The clearest expression of the main-
streaming goal is found in the Title II regulation which requires that a ‘public entity shall
administer services, programs, and activities in the most integrated setting appropriate to
the needs of qualified individuals with disabilities.’” (quoting 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d) (1990))).
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qualified individuals with disabilities.”145 The text of this regulation, like
that interpreting the Rehab Act’s nondiscriminatory provision, includes
language requiring individual assessment and design with an eye toward
maximizing integration.146
The ADA experienced fifteen years of doctrinal growing pains,
similar to the early years of the Rehab Act, as courts grappled with thresh-
old questions of eligibility and the scope of remedial coverage.147 At their
core, the doctrinal debates concerned the breadth of congressional intent
for this newly minted minority classification. Nevertheless, throughout
this period, courts continued to understand Congress’s chosen ends and
means to remedy disability discrimination as integration.
The Supreme Court’s decision in Olmstead best illustrates the role of
integration as a central organizing principle in disability rights law.148
Plaintiffs L.C. and E.W., two adult women with intellectual and mental
disabilities, challenged their institutional residential placement, arguing
that Title II of the ADA and its regulations entitled them to “the most
integrated setting appropriate to their needs,” which, in their case, was
treatment outside of an institutional setting.149 The facts underlying
Olmstead developed at the tail end of the deinstitutionalization movement
when most large-scale institutions were closed and people with intellectual
and developmental disabilities, in particular, were moved into smaller
residential, community-based settings.150 In order to receive necessary
medical and support services to which the law entitled them, L.C. and
E.W. had to trade participation in the general community for life in an
institution. The Supreme Court adopted the Attorney General’s view that
“undue institutionalization qualifies as discrimination ‘by reason of . . .
145. 28 C.F.R. § 35.130(d).
146. Id.; see also supra notes 133–134 and accompanying text (describing the Rehab
Act’s integration mandate).
147. See, e.g., Toyota Motor Mfg., Ky., Inc. v. Williams, 534 U.S. 184, 187 (2002) (inter-
preting the meaning of “substantially limits” in the ADA); Albertsons, Inc. v. Kirkingburg,
527 U.S. 555, 567 (1999) (holding that monocular individuals must meet the same
evidentiary burden as others under the ADA); Murphy v. United Parcel Serv., Inc., 527
U.S. 516, 518–19 (1999) (holding that an individual’s ADA eligibility should consider his
functionality when he is medicated); Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 475
(1999) (finding that ADA eligibility should consider measures that mitigate an individual’s
impairment); Bragdon v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 628 (1998) (addressing the ADA’s application
to individuals with HIV); Gonzales v. Nat’l Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 225 F.3d 620, 625 (6th Cir.
2000) (considering whether a student who claims a reading disability is eligible for relief
under the ADA).
148. Olmstead v. L.C. ex rel. Zimring, 527 U.S. 581 (1999).
149. L.C. ex rel. Zimring v. Olmstead, 138 F.3d 893, 895, 897–98 (11th Cir. 1998).
150. See Sheryl Larson et al., Inst. on Cmty. Integration/UCEDD, Coll. of Educ. &
Human Dev., Univ. of Minn., Residential Services for Persons with Developmental
Disabilities: Status and Trends Through 2010, at 17 tbl.1.6 (2012), https://rtc.umn.edu/docs/
RISP2010.pdf [https://perma.cc/YQ48-2HMK] (illustrating that the greatest number of
institutional closures occurred in the period between 1990 and 1994 (fifty-four closures)
and the total number of institutional closures through the end of 1999 was 114).
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disability.’”151 Isolation of people with disabilities reflected an entrenched
belief that people with disabilities were inherently unequal, inferior
beings.152 In turn, these negative attitudes, fear, and stereotypes, the gov-
ernment argued, could spill over into employment, public accommodations,
and transportation.153 Furthermore, as both Congress and the Attorney
General recognized, they would “perpetuate . . . indefinitely unless efforts
were taken to increase interaction between persons with disabilities and
non-disabled persons.”154
Congress amended the ADA in 2008 to directly respond to the
Supreme Court’s narrow interpretation of its scope of coverage and key
remedial provisions.155 Yet Congress retained its integrative intent: “[H]is-
torically, society has tended to isolate and segregate individuals with
disabilities, and, despite some improvements, such forms of discrimination
against individuals with disabilities continue to be a serious and pervasive
social problem.”156 With Olmstead in place, private and public litigation
today largely focuses on “Olmstead enforcement” actions as applied to dif-
ferent public programs and services under Title II—such as employment,
residential programs (from institutional settings to community settings), and
education—to increase contact between disabled and nondisabled persons.
C. Integration “Above All” in Disability Rights Scholarship
Disability rights scholars understandably privilege integration. Professor
Jacobus tenBroek’s157 work first shaped the scholarly framework for defin-
ing disability discrimination and its potential remedies. In 1966, Professor
tenBroek penned two key law review articles advancing principle tenets
of disability rights law. In one article, aptly titled The Right to Live in the
World, Professor tenBroek advanced a social constructivist view of disability
discrimination.158 He deliberately related the nature of disability discrim-
ination to that experienced by racial minorities and women, familiar
151. Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 597 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (1995)).
152. Id. at 600.
153. Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae Supporting Respondents at 18,
Olmstead, 527 U.S. 581 (No. 98-536), 1999 WL 149653.
154. Id.
155. See ADA Amendments Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-325, 122 Stat. 3553 (codified
as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.).
156. Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-336, § 2, 104 Stat. 327,
328 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2012)). For an in-depth discussion of the
ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), see generally Chai R. Feldblum et al., The ADA
Amendments Act of 2008, 13 Tex. J. on C.L. & C.R. 187 (2009).
157. Notably, Professor tenBroek, then a political science scholar at the University of
California–Berkeley, wrote in the area of constitutional law and slavery. His scholarship
became an important part of the research and lawyering by Thurgood Marshall when he
was special counsel for the NAACP preparing to argue Brown v. Board of Education before
the U.S. Supreme Court. Pelka, supra note 49, at 2–3.
158. Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of
Torts, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 841 (1966).
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emerging paradigms.159 He argued that disability law “should be controlled
by a policy of integrationism—that is, a policy entitling the disabled to
full participation in the life of the community and encouraging and
enabling them to do so.”160
“[I]f there is one goal that has achieved near-consensus status among
disability rights supporters, the goal of integration is a strong candidate.”161
The ADA Amendments Act of 2008 underscored the integrative mission,
and contemporary legal scholars focus on how to make this a reality.
Prescriptive contributions take integration as a shared starting point and
proffer ways to make integration meaningful through legislative and reg-
ulatory edits, the provision of broader economic and social supports,162
framing rules to help change attitudes,163 adoption of alternative theoretical
frames,164 doctrinal interventions,165 and cross-area discussions about shared
vulnerability and human capabilities.166
159. See id. at 858; see also Jacobus tenBroek & Floyd W. Matson, The Disabled and the
Law of Welfare, 54 Calif. L. Rev. 809, 814 (1966) (“[T]o an extent only beginning to be
recognized, [disability discrimination] is the product of cultural definition—an assumptive
framework of myths, stereotypes, aversive responses, and outright prejudices, together with
more rational and scientific evidence.”).
160. TenBroek, supra note 158, at 843.
161. Samuel R. Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption? Not Yet, 156 U. Pa. L.
Rev. Online 157, 157 (2007), https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=
1003&context=penn_law_review_online [https://perma.cc/H9Z6-DL2B] [hereinafter
Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption?]; Leonard, supra note 144, at 144
(noting that contemporary disability rights scholars agree that “[i]ntegration of the dis-
abled into American society is one of the overarching goals of the ADA”).
162. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 35, at 4; Mark C. Weber,
Disability and the Law of Welfare: A Post-Integrationist Examination, 2000 U. Ill. L. Rev. 889,
890–93 (examining disability theories and arguing that welfare law offers a viable theoretical
path).
163. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA
Amendments Act, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 231–32 (2012) (arguing that the ADAAA offers
possibilities to consider the ways in which disability itself is understood as a negative state);
Elizabeth F. Emens, Framing Disability, 2012 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1383, 1385–88 [hereinafter Emens,
Framing Disability] (describing a tension between disability antidiscrimination law and “main-
stream discourse about disability” and prescribing “framing rules” for “the moments when
nondisabled people make decisions that implicate their future relationship to disability”).
164. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Disability Human Rights, 95 Calif. L. Rev. 75, 76–77
(2007) (developing a “disability human rights paradigm” that combines aspects of the social
model of disability, the human right to development, and the human “capabilities” approach).
165. See, e.g., Michael Ashley Stein, Same Struggle, Different Difference: ADA
Accommodations as Antidiscrimination, 153 U. Pa. L. Rev. 579, 602 (2004) (arguing that
there is similarity between ADA accommodations and other antidiscrimination remedies
because both remedy exclusion from employment through cost shifting); Michael E.
Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, 63 Emory L.J. 527, 533 (2014) [hereinafter
Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law] (arguing for a more nuanced understanding of
equal protection in the context of disability for state laws that facially discriminate against
people with disabilities, particularly those with mental disabilities).
166. See, e.g., Martha C. Nussbaum, Women and Human Development: The Capabilities
Approach 74–80 (2000) (advancing ten human capabilities to fully realize human
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Disability law, however, has incorrectly framed the core problem driv-
ing disability discrimination. Congress believes that deficits in experience
with and information about disability—largely the product of a history of
segregation and social isolation—inform or generate flawed beliefs about
the capabilities of people with disabilities (and, in turn, support implicit
biases, stereotypical norms, or discriminatory conduct).167 This framing
naturally sets up integration as a choice prescription to correct assump-
tions about disability.168 This progression is logical given the dominance
of integration in the civil rights remedial playbook, the cognitive theories
of prejudice and stereotypes in social psychology during the 1960s and
1970s, and an early theoretical rejection of emotions as irrational and
extracognitive.169 Thus, prescriptively, legal and policy interventions tar-
geted cognitive recategorization of people with disabilities from outgroup
members to in-group members through intergroup contact.170
If, however, the problem is a broader structural aesthetic and affec-
tive distaste for disability that drives the production and maintenance of
prejudicial beliefs, as this Article argues,171 then individual experiences
with disability through integration only reach beliefs and knowledge about
disability. Contact, then, does not address how people feel when they
engage with the aesthetics of disability.172 Even if one designs that contact
development); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject: Anchoring Equality in
the Human Condition, 20 Yale J.L. & Feminism 1, 9–15 (2008) (constructing a theory of
shared human vulnerability); Amartya Sen, Development as Capability Expansion, in Human
Development and the International Development Strategy for the 1990s, at 41, 43–44
(Keith Griffin & John Knight eds., 1990) (discussing foundations of the human capabili-
ties approach).
167. See supra section II.B (discussing ideological underpinnings of the ADA and
Congress’s desire to remedy social isolation and discrimination faced by people with
disabilities).
168. See supra Part I (advancing this argument).
169. See, e.g., Susan T. Fiske, Stereotyping, Prejudice, and Discrimination, in 2 The
Handbook of Social Psychology 357, 357–64 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al. eds., 1998) (outlining
major theoretical trends in research on stereotyping, prejudice, and discrimination);
Diane M. Mackie et al., Intergroup Emotions and Intergroup Relations, 2 Soc. Personality
Psychol. Compass 1866, 1866–67 (2008) (characterizing traditional approaches to inter-
group theory as “overly static”).
170. See, e.g., David W. Johnson et al., Interdependence and Interpersonal Attraction
Among Heterogeneous and Homogeneous Individuals: A Theoretical Formulation and a
Meta-Analysis of the Research, 53 Rev. Educ. Res. 5, 8 (1983) (concluding that cooperative
experiences between people with and without disabilities promote a stronger process of
acceptance than do competitive and individualistic experiences).
171. See infra Part III.
172. See Michelle Clare Wilson & Katrina Scior, Implicit Attitudes Towards People with
Intellectual Disabilities: Their Relationship with Explicit Attitudes, Social Distance,
Emotions and Contact, PLOS ONE, Sept. 14, 2015, at 1, 13–14, https://journals.plos.org/
plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0137902 [https://perma.cc/TU7U-9J4F] (finding
that negative implicit attitudes are more likely to influence individuals’ behavior and “may
drive subtly prejudiced non-verbal behaviours, interfering with the formation of positive
social relations”).
2019] AESTHETICS OF DISABILITY 927
with the ideal facilitators prescribed by social scientists, such as equal
status and common goals, the fact remains that the nondisabled person
encounters disabled markers that equal status under the law or assigned
common tasks may not address.
Contemporary empirical studies show how cognitive-based contact
theories fall short.173 Those in the dominant in-group may discount or
reject the new information through cognitive coping processes such as
attributional reasoning or cognitive dissonance.174 Thus, changes in stereo-
types and prejudice may not happen even with contact as currently
understood and implemented.175 Other studies suggest the weak effect of
contact on the ability to change group stereotypes.176 Consider this in the
race context. Post–Civil War, some white Southern Baptist ministers invited
Black ministers and their families to regular Sunday lunches. Ideologi-
cally, these ministers and their families sincerely rejected Jim Crow laws
and openly advocated for their demise. Yet there are a number of
examples of white women, also fervent advocates of desegregation, whose
interaction with Black bodies triggered affective reactions of disgust and
repulsion. For example, one woman tried to eat at the same table as African
Americans but “could not keep her food down, running home in tears”:
Though her conscience was serene, and her enjoyment of this
association was real, yet she was seized by an acute nausea which
disappeared only when the meal was finished. She was too honest
to attribute it to anything other than her anxiety welling up
173. See, e.g., Miller et al., supra note 79, at 224 (“[C]ontact leads to increased know-
ledge about the outgroup, which should help undermine inaccurate stereotypes. . . . Despite
its intuitive appeal, the available evidence offers only partial support for this picture.”).
174. Id.
175. See Lauren K. Huckstadt & Kristin Shutts, How Young Children Evaluate People with
and Without Disabilities, 70 J. Soc. Issues 99, 110 (2014) (finding that schooling environment
had no impact on children’s evaluations of individuals with disabilities, regardless of
whether the school had dedicated inclusion programs or not); Frank H. Kobe & James A.
Mulick, Attitudes Toward Mental Retardation and Eugenics: The Role of Formal Education
and Experience, 7 J. Developmental & Physical Disabilities 1, 6 (1995) (finding that short-
term educational and direct contact experiences had little impact on fundamental attitudes
and beliefs about eugenics and intellectual disability). But see Jacqueline J. Freudenthal et
al., Assessing Change in Health Professions Volunteers’ Perceptions After Participating in
Special Olympics Healthy Athlete Events, 74 J. Dental Educ. 970, 978 (2010) (pointing out
that this experience moved volunteers toward a positive perspective from which they were
looking forward to interactions with individuals with intellectual disabilities); Jessica L.
McManus et al., Contact and Knowledge as Predictors of Attitudes Toward Individuals with
Intellectual Disabilities, 28 J. Soc. & Pers. Relationships 579, 580 (2010) (finding that parti-
cipants’ greater positive experiences, such as more contact, with individuals with intellectual
disabilities predicted more positive attitudes).
176. See Pettigrew, supra note 60, at 5–7 (finding strong effects of contact on affective
measures as well as those tapping overall group evaluation).
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from the “bottom of her personality,” as she expressed it, creeping
back up from her childhood training.177
Although seemingly innate and visceral, and counter to her professed
normative beliefs, this woman’s embodied response was “grounded within
the historical sedimentation of racist myths and representations” of “white
[fables] . . . [of] self-aggrandizement: smelly Negroes; hyper-sexed Blacks;
ugly baboons; coons; Black savages.”178
Justin Dart, one of the key architects of the ADA, traveled the country
in the 1980s to meet with people with disabilities and collect their experi-
ences of discrimination to advance early bills in the Senate and House of
Representatives. Countless entries in his compiled “discrimination diaries”
reflect a similar, deep public disgust with disability.179 The diaries are
replete with examples of aesthetic–affective responses to disability that
mediate rights.180 For example, reminiscent of the southern minister’s
spouse above, Mr. Dart received the following testimony: “My friend
Chuck . . . was asked to leave a restaurant where he was dining. Chuck
was born without arms and another patron was offended by having to
watch Chuck eat with his feet.”181 Chuck triggered disgust among restau-
rant patrons who could not physically eat in his presence and led the
restaurant to deny him access to a public accommodation. Eating with
his feet made people think about the typical use of feet and their asso-
ciation with the ground, dirt, and disease. Consequently, Chuck’s non-
normative eating style appeared ugly and distasteful to the patrons, thus
challenging collective notions of cleanliness and health. Yet if one polled
the patrons upon arrival whether they would object to a person with a
disability dining with them in the same establishment, they likely would
have expressed few (if any) objections in the abstract.182 Despite these
vivid aesthetic and affective depictions of disability discrimination, and
the circulation of social science revisions to earlier contact theories of
177. George Yancy, White Embodied Gazing, the Black Body as Disgust, and the
Aesthetics of Un-Suturing, in Body Aesthetics, supra note 21, at 243, 245–46 (quoting
Lillian Smith, Killers of the Dream 148 (1949)).
178. Id. at 246.
179. See H.R. Rep. 101-485, pt. 2, at 29–30 (1990), as reprinted in 1990 U.S.C.C.A.N.
1, 311–12 (recounting Judith Heumann’s testimony regarding her lived experience with
segregation and exclusion as a wheelchair user, some based explicitly on aesthetics, such as
being asked to leave an auction house because she and her disabled friend were
“disgusting to look at”).
180. Dart’s discrimination diaries have never been fully assembled in one place. There
is currently a collective national effort to transcribe the thousands of pages of original letters,
testimony, and exhibits provided to Mr. Dart during his national interviews. While I have not
transcribed records from each state forum (nor has the web effort produced such transcrip-
tion), I have access to the submissions, and they are on file with the Columbia Law Review.
181. Letter from Tim Harris to President George H.W. Bush (May 22, 1989), in Disability
Diaries, California, at 22 (unpublished compilation) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
182. Some of this may be due to the social pressure to express a nondiscriminatory
view. Given that this testimony dates back to pre-ADA days, there may have been greater
discontent expressed at the onset in the hypothetical above.
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antidiscrimination,183 courts and advocates continued to push (and ulti-
mately codify) a cognitive-based contact theory of integration without
sufficiently interrogating its structural designs.
Although disability rights scholars have proffered several innovative
and notable interventions to increase access for people with disabilities,
these prescriptions generally accept the theoretical underpinnings of
contact as unproblematic as structured in current disability rights laws.
Their remedial frameworks generally do not disrupt the definition of
discrimination as segregation per se, nor challenge integration as the law’s
remedial end goal rather than a means of achieving broader norms of
equality. While current scholarly interventions rightly seek to restructure
integrative efforts and designs, many of the recommendations double
down on integration itself as an end goal and seek to make it more
qualitatively meaningful—for example, through welfare law reforms that
expand social safety nets and increase opportunities for contact. 184
Professor Elizabeth Emens’s work on “framing disability,” for example,
attributes prejudicial attitudes to pervasive information deficits about the
lives of people with disabilities.185 With this diagnostic lens, Professor
Emens’s proposed prescription for discrimination focuses on ways to
generate more accurate and diversified information at critical moments
when nondisabled people are primed to consider disability—for example,
when undergoing prenatal testing, purchasing disability insurance, apply-
ing for driver’s licenses, or reading warning labels.186 Default framing
rules, however, do not engage directly either the aesthetic or affective
183. By the mid to late 1980s and early 1990s, social science researchers revisited
earlier theories of prejudice and discrimination that omitted affective processes to better
understand the persistence of prejudice and discrimination. See, e.g., Samuel L. Gaertner
& John F. Dovidio, The Aversive Form of Racism, in Prejudice, Discrimination, and Racism
61, 65 (John F. Dovidio & Samuel L. Gaertner eds., 1986) (advancing an “aversive theory
of racism” that whites avoid interactions with Blacks and other minority groups not
because they hate them but, rather, because interacting with members of these groups
arouses negative emotions of awkwardness, anxiety, and uncertainty).
184. See, e.g., Bagenstos, The Future of Disability Law, supra note 35, at 4. For instance,
while Title I of the ADA prevents discrimination in employment, a person with limited
mobility may need personal assistance each morning to actually get to the office, without
which the person may be unable to remain employed. Personal-assistance services are not
part of the employer’s duties under Title I to provide “reasonable accommodations,” which
instead may be covered by Medicaid or private insurance. Consequently, the logic goes, if
we invest in health care to include personal-assistance services, then this individual (and
others similarly situated) will remain in the workforce and support the nondiscrimination
principles of Title I. Employment allows for greater contact with nondisabled persons who,
over time, will accept this individual.
185. Emens, Framing Disability, supra note 163, at 1408–10 (explaining and defining
“framing rules” as “rules about the information, context, and wording that frame a deci-
sion, as well as the timing of the frame”).
186. Id. at 1410–34. Emens, however, does consider the ways in which nondisabled
people perceive the “happiness” of people with disabilities (the “disability paradox”), but
she does not specifically engage aesthetic and affective literatures to rethink the construc-
tion of disability discrimination. Id. at 1391–93.
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dimension of disability discrimination; instead, affective dimensions are
often seen as a positive externality of antidiscrimination laws rather than
an explicit target. There is no challenge to the premise that contact
theory, as imported into disability rights law, could itself be problematic
or less effective without critical disaggregation.187
Similarly, Professor Martha Minow’s work on the “dilemma of differ-
ence”—while grappling with the challenge of institutional designs that
must account for, accommodate, and yet not generate or perpetuate
difference—does not address the question of aesthetic and affective
barriers that disrupt her prescriptive “social relations” approach to law
and jurisprudence. Professor Minow contends that prescriptive success
requires direct contention with difference and favors a “social relations
approach.” This approach, like the social model of disability, focuses on
the way in which individuals relationally respond to the difference.188 She
calls for a reciprocal and inclusive “dialogue” between the “normal” and
“abnormal” to inquire “how all people, with all their differences, should
live.”189 In other words, Professor Minow relies on the power of contact to
generate more inclusive and reflective institutions without a discussion
about the aesthetic–affective process that disrupts the ameliorative
benefits of contact. Contemporary critiques of Professor Minow’s work in
this area focus on questions of participatory inclusiveness—who gets to
speak for groups of those marked abnormal—but do not challenge the
underlying reliance on contact theory.190
Scholars outside of law have called attention to the ways in which
outgroup members trigger existential or aesthetic anxieties. Professor
Harlan Hahn’s work most notably identifies the ways in which people
with apparent disabilities make nondisabled people uncomfortable because
the former are associated with death, poor health, and asexual, deficient
bodies.191 In this sense, the aesthetics of disability introduced in this
Article build on his initial insight, expand upon it, and apply it to a new
context—antidiscrimination law.
An interesting debate recently ensued between disability rights
scholars Ruth Colker and Sam Bagenstos in the special-education context
regarding the default presumption of integration.192 Professor Colker,
187. See infra section IV.C (arguing for disaggregation as a prescriptive response to
the aesthetics of disability).
188. Martha Minow, Making All the Difference: Inclusion, Exclusion, and American Law
211–13 (1990).
189. Id. at 213.
190. See Book Note, Talking Through Our Differences, 104 Harv. L. Rev. 1120, 1122
(1991) (arguing that Minow’s focus on the relational approach leaves open the possibility
that applications of the approach will not be fully inclusive).
191. See, e.g., Hahn, The Appearance of Physical Differences, supra note 26, at 392.
192. Compare Ruth Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption: Thirty Years Later,
154 U. Pa. L. Rev. 789, 792–93 (2006) [hereinafter Colker, The Disability Integration
Presumption] (discussing “whether [the integration presumption] continues to be the
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reflecting on the ideological and practical problems associated with inte-
gration of some students with disabilities,193 rightfully questions the contin-
ued reliance on the “integration presumption” which, she contends, may
not benefit the individual child.194 Professor Bagenstos, by contrast, strongly
defends the need for an “integration presumption” in the context of
education where students with disabilities have a history of isolation and
exclusion.195 He asserts that the presumption is there to remedy this
history of segregated education. Furthermore, he argues that because the
IDEA calls for an individualized education program, the presumption
shifts depending on the needs of the child.196 This individualization, he
contends, renders Professor Colker’s concerns moot.197 However, Professor
Colker’s main argument is that the very existence of a presumption
endangers the individualization because it is often misunderstood in terms
of broader structural priorities such as funding to bring the student into
a mainstream classroom at large cost without sufficient attention to develop-
ing alternative placements along a continuum between full mainstreaming
and separate schools.198
III. THE AESTHETICS OF DISABILITY
An examination of what happens with contact in the context of dis-
ability reveals, therefore, a more complicated picture. Familiarity may breed
contempt rather than acceptance—and visible manifestations of func-
tional capacity matter. Why? Contact triggers aesthetic– affective responses
to disability that make it hard for nondisabled people—unaccustomed to
the broad spectrum of capabilities of people with disabilities—to over-
come deeply rooted and seemingly intuitive aesthetic judgments. This
Part argues that disability rights law does not sufficiently account for the
ways in which the aesthetics of disability mediate rights.
most appropriate educational strategy for all children with disabilities”), with Bagenstos,
Abolish the Integration Presumption?, supra note 161, at 157–58 (arguing that Colker
“fails to establish that the IDEA’s individualized integration presumption imposes
significant costs, and . . . seems to downplay significant benefits of that presumption”).
193. Professor Colker is one of the only disability rights legal scholars to question the
theoretical and practical application of integration as a normative and policy default in the
context of disability rights law. Her analysis is limited to the special-education context. Her
critique does not include the reliance on a limited version of contact theory as the
underlying prescriptive engine, however. This Article critiques reliance on integration by
challenging its application of contact theory and how aesthetics disrupt contact’s
prescriptive potential of disability rights laws more broadly.
194. Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption, supra note 192, at 796 (questioning
the IDEA’s “integration presumption because, for some children, it hinders the develop-
ment of an appropriate individualized educational program”).
195. Bagenstos, Abolish the Integration Presumption?, supra note 161, at 163–64.
196. Id. at 161.
197. Id.
198. Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption, supra note 192, at 821.
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A. Why Aesthetics and Affect Matter
The literature on aesthetics and affect offers key lessons that chal-
lenge conventional conceptions of disability discrimination with implica-
tions for how lawmakers design legal interventions.199
1. Aesthetics Are Structural and Consequential. — When we think about
discrimination, we do not generally think of appearance-based discrim-
ination as actionable.200 We tend to think of taste in bodies and minds
(including behavioral functionalities) as individual preferences generally
beyond legal regulation. Whether someone is attracted to people with hazel
eyes who can run a six-minute mile seems to be about individual choice
rather than animus.
Yet appearances (and the ways we feel about them) mediate access
to economic, social,201 and political rights and influence behavior.202 The
aesthetic–affective process is “felt at the level of the body but is always
socially and culturally conditioned.”203 The aesthetic markers themselves—
from eye or hair color to height and build—become visible measures of
success, privilege, and, consequently, social control.204 They shape decisions
199. Equality law scholars in other areas have challenged the effectiveness of contact
theory based on perceptional discrimination. See, e.g., Rhode, Beauty Bias, supra note 25,
at 1035; Angela Onwuachi-Willig & Mario L. Barnes, By Any Other Name?: On Being
“Regarded as” Black, and Why Title VII Should Apply Even If Lakisha and Jamal Are White,
2005 Wis. L. Rev. 1283, 1310 (describing findings that discrimination can arise without
contact); Russell K. Robinson, Perceptual Segregation, 108 Colum. L. Rev. 1093, 1161–62
(2008) (“[I]t is doubtful that the most common, perfunctory interracial interactions in
workplaces and educational contexts help instill a deep understanding of the forces that
create perceptual segregation.”); Brian Soucek, Perceived Homosexuals: Looking Gay Enough
for Title VII, 63 Am. U. L. Rev. 715, 716–18 (2014) (arguing that people who fit a certain
perception as gay receive more legal protection).
200. See Tobin Siebers, In/Visible: Disability on the Stage, in Body Aesthetics, supra
note 21, at 141, 143 (“[Aesthetics appear] raw precisely because they occur in the most
mundane circumstances, when feelings of attraction and repulsion, of acceptance and
rejection, surge forth with embarrassing immediacy, fierceness, and clarity. . . . [T]hey are
so familiar to the experience of being human.”).
201. One study of college students found that surveyed students would prefer to marry
“an embezzler, drug user, or shoplifter than someone who is obese.” Rhode, Beauty Bias,
supra note 25, at 27.
202. See Goodley et al., supra note 2, at 199 (“Emotions and embodied feelings need
to be part of sociological and critical psychological thinking. . . . Affect theory responds to
the ways in which affects are mobilised by economic and cultural forces. Affect theories
are interested in the ways in which contemporary citizens are ‘thrown into a constellation
of affections . . . .’” (quoting Robbie Duschinsky et al., Wait Up! Attachment and Sovereign
Power, 28 Int’l J. Pol. Culture & Soc’y 223, 224 (2014))); Mackie et al., supra note 169, at
1874–75 (“Particular emotions have a privileged association with motivation to act . . . .
Intergroup emotions are a powerful force for both directing and regulating interactions
between social groups.” (citation omitted)).
203. Goodley et al., supra note 2, at 199.
204. See, e.g., Michel Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison 184
(Alan Sheridan trans., Pantheon Books 1977) (1975) [hereinafter Foucault, Discipline
and Punish] (“[N]ormalization becomes one of the great instruments of power at the end
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to abort a fetus,205 the degree of supervision and medical attention given
to patients,206 and job offers and promotions,207 all of which influence
physical,208 mental,209 and financial health and quality of life.210 Appear-
ance also impedes access to accommodations for people with “invisible”
disabilities—for example, people who can assimilate or “cover” more
easily. As described by a woman with severe bronchial asthma:
The cortosteroids I take daily give my face a rosy glow; appear-
ances are deceiving. I am the picture of good health, and my
disability is not obvious to other people. Yet my history of respir-
atory and cardiac arrests makes my handicapping condition more
life threatening than those with recognizable disabilities.211
Aesthetics and emotions also inform assessments about competence,
irrespective of actual distinctions in cognitive capacity: Grades and behav-
ioral evaluations assigned students in school212 and course evaluations of
of the classical age. . . . [T]he marks that once indicated status, privilege and affiliation
were increasingly replaced . . . by . . . degrees of normality indicating membership of a homog-
enous social body but also playing a part in its classification [and] hierarchization.”); John
Rajchman, Foucault’s Art of Seeing, October, Spring 1988, at 88, 91 (discussing Foucault’s
concern with “how things were made visible, how things were given to be seen, how things
were ‘shown’ to knowledge or to power”).
205. See, e.g., Kathleen LeBesco, Revolting Bodies? The Struggle to Redefine Fat
Identity 59 (2004) (“[A] survey of married couples revealed that 11 percent would abort a
child known in advance to be genetically predisposed to obesity.”); Chris Kaposy, Opinion,
The Ethical Case for Having a Baby with Down Syndrome, N.Y. Times (Apr. 16, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/04/16/opinion/down-syndrome-abortion.html (on file
with the Columbia Law Review) (reporting that when prenatal testing shows Down
Syndrome, sixty-seven percent of fetuses are aborted).
206. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 21, at 43 (discussing a study of more than six
hundred health care professionals’ aesthetic attitudes toward patients that showed more
than fifty percent viewed “morbidly obese” patients (defined as having a Body Mass Index
of greater than forty) as “awkward, unattractive, ugly, and noncompliant”).
207. See, e.g., Rhode, Beauty Bias, supra note 25, at 27 (discussing studies that show
that appearance “skews judgments about competence and job performance,” including
the assessment of resumes and the rating of written materials).
208. See id. at 35–41 (discussing various unhealthy and dangerous practices stemming
from “beauty bias,” including foot binding, female genital mutilation, physically restrictive
fashion items such as corsets, impure beauty products, risky cosmetic surgeries, and eating
and exercise disorders).
209. See id. at 39–41 (describing “mental health difficulties associated with appearance,”
including depression, anxiety, and low self-esteem).
210. See Hamermesh, supra note 4, at 4 (noting that consumer spending on apparel
and beauty-related services and products totaled $400 billion in 2008, or roughly five
percent of all consumer spending that year).
211. Testimony by Joy Canfield-Cansleet (Apr. 25, 1989), in Disability Diaries, New
York, at 233 (unpublished compilation) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
212. See, e.g., Margaret M. Clifford & Elaine Walster, The Effect of Physical Attractiveness
on Teacher Expectations, 46 Soc. Educ. 248, 251 (1973) (finding that “attractive children
appear to have a sizeable advantage over unattractive ones” in a study of teachers’
perceptions of children’s educational potential based on normative attractiveness).
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faculty are examples.213 Such considerations can also inform judgments
about a person’s moral or ethical character214 and leadership skills.215
Aesthetic judgments are deeply rooted in the adjudication of rights—for
example, juror determinations of a witness’s trustworthiness,216 a defend-
ant’s guilt,217 sentences, and damages awards during trials.218 They also
mediate the rights of others with whom people with disabilities interact.
Consider the recent trial of a former Rutgers University Professor,
Marjorie Anna Stubblefield, for the sexual assault of D.J., a thirty-two-
year-old man with significant mental and physical disabilities (including
communication impairments) who the state argued was incapable of
sexual consent.219 D.J. never testified and appeared only once before the
legal decisionmakers, when the prosecution invited D.J.’s mother to
introduce him to the jury, effectively as a “demonstrative exhibit.”220 After
a guilty verdict, one juror reported that she and other jurors found D.J.’s
appearance most probative of Stubblefield’s credibility: “I couldn’t
213. Daniel S. Hamermesh & Amy Parker, Beauty in the Classroom: Instructors’
Pulchritude and Putative Pedagogical Productivity, 24 Econ. Educ. Rev. 369, 375 (2005)
(“[There is] little doubt that measures of perceived beauty have a substantial independent
positive impact on instructional ratings [of faculty] by undergraduate students.”).
214. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 21, at 42 (discussing the “halo bias” or the “halo effect,”
“a strong tendency to rate individuals perceived to be physically attractive higher than
those deemed less attractive with respect to personality traits and characteristics such as
intelligence, various types of competence, and trustworthiness”).
215. See, e.g., Brad Verhulst et al., The Attractiveness Halo: Why Some Candidates Are
Perceived More Favorably than Others, 34 J. Nonverbal Behav. 111, 116 (2010) (finding
that physical attractiveness influences assessments of competence in elected leaders).
216. Ronald Mazzella & Alan Feingold, The Effects of Physical Attractiveness, Race,
Socioeconomic Status, and Gender of Defendants and Victims on Judgments of Mock
Jurors: A Meta-Analysis, 24 J. Applied Soc. Psychol. 1315, 1319–25 (1994) (discussing the
results of the authors’ study, which showed that “mock jurors were less likely to find
physically attractive defendants guilty than physically unattractive defendants”).
217. Cf. Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 512 (1976) (holding that states cannot force
an accused criminal defendant to stand trial before a jury while dressed in identifiable
prison garb, consistent with the constitutional presumption of innocence).
218. Researchers designed simulated trial settings to study the effects of appearance.
See, e.g., David B. Gray & Richard D. Ashmore, Biasing Influence of Defendants’
Characteristics on Simulated Sentencing, 38 Psychol. Reps. 727, 736 (1976) (“The present
findings clearly support the existence of a social discrimination hypothesis in the
treatment of ‘unattractive’ convicted offenders for certain kinds of samples.”); Cookie
Stephan & Judy Corder Tully, The Influence of Physical Attractiveness of a Plaintiff on the
Decisions of Simulated Jurors, 101 J. Soc. Psychol. 149, 150 (1977) (“[P]hysical attractiveness
influenced the decision of the simulated jurors. . . . [They] found in favor of the attractive
plaintiff significantly more often than they found in favor of the unattractive plaintiff . . . .
The attractive plaintiff was also awarded significantly more money in damages . . . .”).
219. State v. Stubblefield, 162 A.3d 1074, 1075 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017).
220. See Daniel Engber, The Strange Case of Anna Stubblefield, N.Y. Times Mag. (Oct.
20, 2015), https://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/the-strange-case-of-anna-stubblefield.
html (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (“His mother led him in, holding up his tiny
frame at the armpits. She walked him down the aisle and over toward the jury, as his head
rolled back and his eyes seemed to focus on the ceiling lights. ‘Jury, this is my son,’ she said.”).
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understand why she did it when I did see [D.J.] . . . . I was like . . . ‘You’re
going to leave your husband and your kids for someone like this?’”221
This example illustrates that as people with disabilities participate in the
adjudication of their rights and those of others, the appearances of
disability (and emotions they trigger) directly affect how those rights are
interpreted.
In many ways, we have moved from an ideology-based to aesthetics-
obsessed body politic.222 Aesthetic tastes are at the core of aesthetic
judgments and present structural challenges, though they are often con-
ceived of as individual preferences. Taste is a “standing disposition for
evaluative sentiments regarding some x—whether a particular thing or
kind of thing—where these sentiments are partially or fully constituted
by or based on pleasurable or displeasurable responses to some of x’s
properties.”223
An emergent subfield within aesthetics called “everyday aesthetics”
applies the concept of “taste” to everyday objects beyond art, including
food, fashion, pop culture, cars, and, for the purposes of this Article, people
and their bodies. Collective taste in bodies is a set of aesthetic prefer-
ences for particular body types, features, and bodily functional capabili-
ties that govern dominant forms of cultural expression and happiness.224
It shapes wholesale, or in significant part, individual taste in bodies.225
While collective taste can vary, increased technology and connectivity
have actually decreased the heterogeneity associated with different national,
ethnic, and cultural tastes—converging, for example, on the ideals of
beauty in the United States.226
221. Harris, Sexual Consent and Disability, supra note 27, at 490–91 (internal quotation
marks omitted) (quoting Bill Wichert, Juror Explains Why Professor Was Convicted of
Sexually Assaulting Disabled Man, NJ.com (Oct. 3, 2015), https://www.nj.com/essex/index.
ssf/2015/10/why_was_professor_convicted_of_sexual_assaulting_d.html [https://perma.cc/
78J8-8FYX]). For a discussion of the evidentiary challenges to reliance on aesthetics, see
id. at 553–56; see also David M. Perry, Sexual Ableism, L.A. Rev. Books (Feb. 25, 2016),
https://lareviewofbooks.org/article/sexual-ableism [https://perma.cc/EML4-LFL2] (“To the
juror, sexual desire for a disabled body . . . is a mark of deviance. So although the purpose
of the trial, ostensibly, was to determine whether D.J. required protection and to avenge
wrongs done to him, the juror’s determination of guilt depended on disgust.”).
222. See Julie Allan, The Aesthetics of Disability as a Productive Ideology, in Ideology
and the Politics of In(Exclusion) 32, 32 (Linda Ware ed., 2004) (“Ideology has both remained
the same elusive beast and become something else.”).
223. Eaton, supra note 21, at 41.
224. Id. at 37–38.
225. This Article uses the term “bodies” throughout to include the functional
capacities of bodies as well as minds.
226. See Michelle Lelwica et al., Spreading the Religion of Thinness from California to
Calcutta: A Critical Feminist Postcolonial Analysis, 25 J. Feminist Stud. Religion 19, 35–36
(2009) (discussing the exportation of white-European and American ideals of thinness to
developing nations).
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The aesthetics literature in the context of obesity offers a particularly
useful illustration of this point and its relation to disability.227 A popular
justification for an aesthetic distaste for obesity in the United States is
that obese people are unhealthy.228 “Obesity” is one of four standard
weight categories defined by the “body mass index” (BMI).229 In fact, it is
the category that reflects the highest percentage of body fat based on
weight and height and, statistically, has shown some correlation with
health risks such as heart disease.230 But “fatness”231 (the presence of
more body fat) is not an objective measure of health; it is a negative
marker given meaning by a society that defines beauty and desirability, in
large part, according to “thinness.”232 On the other end of the BMI
spectrum, extreme thinness—despite its association with eating disorders
like bulimia or anorexia—is aestheticized and even heavily coveted in
some cases. The “pro-Ana” subculture (short for anorexia), for example,
follows a “fairy-like goddess[,] . . . [a] young woman with silky blond curls,
glimmering white skin, butterfly wings, and a slender body.”233 Ana’s
“disciples”—predominantly women—characterize bulimia and anorexia
as “lifestyle choices, rather than illnesses” counter to “mediocre standards
of ordinary people.”234 While perhaps an extreme example, one need not
look beyond everyday images in popular media to see more common
forms of “pro-Ana” at work with fundamentally the same message: In
order to be “happy, healthy, and beautiful one must be remarkably
thin.”235 Rather than locating fatness solely within the person, some
feminist scholars argue, the norms of thinness reflect broader aesthetic
227. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 21, at 42 (“[E]veryday taste has far-reaching moral,
psychological, social, and economic ramifications that are nowhere more apparent than in
the case of taste in bodies.”).
228. See, e.g., id. at 44–45 (describing the “health objection” to “fatness”).
229. See About Adult BMI, CDC, https://www.cdc.gov/healthyweight/assessing/bmi/
adult_bmi/index.html [https://perma.cc/S3JW-MYGP] (last updated Aug. 29, 2017).
230. Obesity Definition, Harvard T.H. Chan Sch. of Pub. Health, https://www.hsph.harvard.
edu/obesity-prevention-source/obesity-definition/ [https://perma.cc/2WW6-VBDN] (last
visited Jan. 25, 2019).
231. I use this term in conjunction with the linguistics and rhetoric of the “fat
movement” that tries to detach itself from medicalization and medical terms such as
“obesity.” See Eaton, supra note 21, at 39 (explaining that it is “standard practice” in the
fat movement to use the word “fat” in a value-neutral sense, to combat the medicalization
of fat and subvert “the all-too-common notions that fat is unacceptable, inferior,
unappealing, and must be eliminated”); Obesity Definition, supra note 230.
232. “[T]he health objection is a red herring, adduced post facto to justify and disguise
what is at bottom a discriminatory attitude.” Eaton, supra note 21, at 45–46. This is not to
dismiss the real health risks associated with extreme cases of obesity but rather to point out
that the pervasive societal fears of “fatness” are constructed and highly gendered.
233. Lelwica et al., supra note 226, at 19.
234. Id. at 19–20.
235. Id. at 23; see also id. at 20 (revealing that “80 percent of ten-year-old girls have
dieted” and 75 percent of “healthy-weight adult women” in the United States believe they
are “too fat”).
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norms, similar to race and gender, that are used to oppress marginalized
populations.236
2. Aesthetic–Affective Processes Are Habitual. — In addition to the struc-
tural nature of aesthetics discussed above, recent challenges to the classic
theory of emotions237 should make us rethink our understanding of
disability discrimination. Emotions, like anger or disgust, do not have
unique genetic or biologically determined fingerprints; they are not
inborn but learned.238 According to the classic view of emotions, certain
facial expressions (such as a startled, wide-eyed expression) evolved to
convey internal mental states such as fear or anxiety; as a result, humans
are innately capable of identifying and distinguishing these “universal”
expressions.239 Many researchers across disciplines accept as uncontested
the premise that expressions are biologically based and universally
recognized.240
This premise underwrites critical institutional designs in the law. For
example, several evidentiary objections to the default exclusion of hearsay
evidence, such as excited utterances, rely on the belief that people in or
immediately after stressful situations are more prone to tell the truth
than to lie.241 Similarly, criminal law views emotions as erratic, involuntary
disruptions of the cognitive functioning needed to form mens rea.242 Thus,
the physical reaction is the product of emotion, not reason.243
236. See, e.g., Eaton, supra note 21, at 39 (“Body size is often omitted from the
familiar list of features on which modern forms of oppression center—the list often looks
like ‘race, class, gender, disability, etc.’—and fatism is rarely specifically mentioned . . . . Yet
fatism is one of the most ubiquitous . . . forms of oppression in our culture today.”);
Lelwica, supra note 226, at 21–22 (noting how scholars of the critical feminist framework
have highlighted the connections between fatism and other forms of oppression and
domination).
237. See, e.g., Lisa Feldman Barrett, Was Darwin Wrong About Emotional Expressions?,
20 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 400, 400 (2011) (describing the “basic emotion” approach,
which “hypothesize[s] that certain physical movements in the face and body are evolved
adaptations that are biologically basic in their form and function”).
238. See Joseph E. LeDoux & Richard Brown, A Higher-Order Theory of Emotional
Consciousness, 114 PNAS E2016, E2022 (2017) (noting that emotional schema are learned).
239. See, e.g., Azim F. Shariff & Jessica L. Tracy, What Are Emotion Expressions For?,
20 Current Directions Psychol. Sci. 395, 397 (2011) (building on Darwin’s evolutionary
theory of emotions through current research studies).
240. See, e.g., id.
241. See Fed. R. Evid. 803(2); Fed. R. Evid. 803(2) advisory committee’s notes to 2012
amendment (explaining the underlying theory justifying the hearsay exception: “[S]imply
that circumstances may produce a condition of excitement which temporarily stills the
capacity of reflection and produces utterances free of conscious fabrication”).
242. Take, for example, crimes of passion, which operated in common law as a partial
excuse or justification for intentional homicide. Muneer I. Ahmad, A Rage Shared by Law:
Post-September 11 Racial Violence as Crimes of Passion, 92 Calif. L. Rev. 1259, 1303–04 (2004);
see also Bandes, supra note 25, at 1–2 (describing the broad reach of emotions in law).
243. Goodley et al., supra note 2, at 198 (noting that affect is “a physical response
rooted in biology”); Kristyn Gorton, Theorizing Emotion and Affect: Feminist Engagements,
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Current neuroscience research reveals that emotions are not discrete
voluntary actions, as previous theories speculated, but are instead “con-
structed.” They reflect a series of similar neural connections that are
more accurately understood as “emotion categories,” a “statistical summary”
of neural activity.244 Think of disgust, for example, as a meta-category like
“bread,” which can vary in type and kind—white, wheat, banana nut,
challah—but which across categories shares some key basic ingredients in
common, such as flour or salt. In this way, anger, another emotion, can
be compared to a “cupcake,” which shares flour and salt as common
ingredients but gets combined in different ways with other ingredients to
produce something different. Anger, then, is not a particular bodily pat-
tern—like rapid heartbeats or sweaty palms—reducible to its individual
properties. The sensory and bodily experiences and our perception of
others’ emotions are not biologically determined but constructed social
realities.245 However, the physical experience is real (down to the micro-
neural level); over time our brains give meaning to these bodily sensations,
which are informed by past experiences and contextual cues.246 In sum,
our brains are predictive, and not reactive, to the senses.
Thus, contrary to the view that certain aesthetic, emotional, and, by
extension, behavioral responses to disability are visceral, contemporary
neuroscience, social science, and humanities studies reveal that aesthetic
and affective judgments are habitual.247 We perceive them to be “visceral”
or innate because they produce a biological or somatic response.248 Classic
distinctions between the body and mind (and others) create the percep-
tion that bodily reactions are usually distinct from the emotional arena—
as are the distinctions between the reasoning mind and the emotional self.
The literature on affect suggests that different emotion categories
may be more or less malleable, depending on the aesthetic trigger and the
values it either supports or challenges. One study, for example, explored
the distinctions between three similar negative emotion categories: anger,
disgust, and contempt.249 The study found that each differs in its antecedent
8 Feminist Theory 333, 334 (2007) (“[F]eeling is negotiated in the public sphere and
experienced through the body.”).
244. Barrett, How Emotions Are Made, supra note 18, at 36 (discussing emotion catego-
ries through metaphors related to baked goods). This Article modifies and builds on
Professor Lisa Barrett’s metaphor.
245. See id. at 34–35 (discussing the “neuroconstruction theory” of emotions).
246. See id. at 33–35 (explaining how emotions are constructed socially, psychologically,
and neurologically).
247. See id. at 25–26 (advancing a social-constructivist account of emotions to argue
that how we process stimulation is “habitual”).
248. The work of evolutionary psychologists shows that the habitual nature of aesthetics
and affective responses can be problematic in other ways by positioning people with
disabilities as “unhealthy” or “sick.” See, e.g., Park et al., supra note 16, at 67–69 (discussing
evolutionary psychology as the basis for attitudes toward people with physical disabilities).
249. Cendri A. Hutcherson & James J. Gross, The Moral Emotions: A Social-Functionalist
Account of Anger, Disgust, and Contempt, 100 J. Personality & Soc. Psychol. 719, 723–24 (2011).
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appraisals and functional behavioral consequences.250 Anger is evoked by
appraisals of self-relevance, leading to direct attack when the perceiver
sees the target as a personal or imminent threat.251 When an individual
does not perceive the harm as directly to the self, however, passive avoid-
ance behavior is the likely behavioral response.252 Anger is more of a
fleeting emotion; when the perceived threat subsides, so does the anger
toward the individual.253
By contrast, individuals who are not imminently engaged in threat-
ening behavior, but whose past behavior suggests they should be avoided
to reduce the risk of harm, evoke disgust and contempt.254 An appraisal
that another person is morally untrustworthy produces disgust in the
appraiser. Feelings of disgust tend to linger and, as a result, inhibit the
appraiser from interacting with objects (including people) marked as
contaminated through direct or indirect contact with that object (or
person).255 Finally, contempt seems uniquely related to a judgment that
someone is incompetent or unintelligent.256 Recall the study of non-
disabled middle school students’ reactions to peers with intellectual dis-
abilities.257 When nondisabled students saw their peers with disabilities
demonstrating their competence in typical ways, they were more likely to
seek out more personal interactions.258 Reliance on the assistance of
individuals perceived to be incompetent is understood as a waste of time
or resources in a market-driven economy.259 As a result, nondisabled
people may have a stronger, longer-lasting affective response to someone
who is nonverbal and whom they perceive to be incompetent than to a
wheelchair user with no speech impairments. Moral disgust and contempt
last longer than anger, because they are based on assessments of a
person’s character or competence instead of whether that person
presents an imminent threat.260
250. Id. at 733.
251. Id. at 720, 733.
252. See id. at 732–33.
253. See id. at 730 (noting that anger is perceived to last for less time and be easier to
remedy than disgust and contempt).
254. Id. at 720.
255. Id. at 721 (“Once marked as capable of malicious behavior, an individual should
be consistently avoided, regardless of whether he or she subsequently performs a few
benevolent actions.”).
256. Id. at 733; see also id. at 721 (“Contempt may function to diminish interaction
with individuals who cannot contribute in a meaningful way to the group, especially those
individuals judged to be lower or less capable than the self, yet who do not behave in
intentionally malicious ways.” (citation omitted)).
257. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
258. Siperstein et al., Youth Attitudes, supra note 96, at 452.
259. See Hutcherson & Gross, supra note 249, at 721.
260. Id.
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3. Aesthetics and Affect Are “Sticky” 261 Norms. — While aesthetics and
emotions are habitual, generating prescriptive possibilities, the literature
cautions that they are particularly sticky norms.262 Collective taste in bodies
“resists rational persuasion and is often norm-discordant”—that is, illogi-
cally conflicts with one’s explicitly (and sincerely) held normative commit-
ments.263 An individual’s aesthetic sensibilities are difficult to shift through
cognitive reasoning.264 Thus, a persuasive argument why one ought not be
repulsed by Auggie Pullman, R.J. Palacio’s fictional protagonist in
Wonder, a novel about a boy with facial disfiguration,265 will do little to
challenge the underlying repulsion one feels and experiences somati-
cally. This is so, even though Auggie’s physical difference has no bearing
on his functional capabilities. In this way, taste reflects a “sentimental
bias” rooted in cultural perceptions of bodily perfection as the ideal (and
prime determinant) of happiness.266 Even when someone can subscribe
to a nondiscriminatory approach to interacting with Auggie, addressing
the sentimental bias attached to Auggie’s physical appearance is much
more difficult and socially taboo and does not automatically follow intent
to avoid discriminatory conduct.267 “Awareness” can establish a troubling
dynamic between nondisabled and disabled people which makes equality
unimaginable for some people. For example, helping any nondisabled
peer, friend, or colleague is seen as a “favor” but transforms into “care”
(elevated to an almost charitable status) in the context of disability.268
Consequently, aesthetic–affective norms—reflected, for example, in
collective taste in bodies—resist classic antidiscrimination prescriptions
of awareness, education, and retraining.
261. See Dan M. Kahan, Gentle Nudges vs. Hard Shoves: Solving the Sticky Norms
Problem, 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 607, 608 (2000) (“[N]orms stick when lawmakers try to
change them with ‘hard shoves’ but yield when lawmakers apply ‘gentle nudges.’”).
262. See infra Part IV (offering initial prescriptions on how to reform disability rights
law to reflect the stickiness of the aesthetics of disability). For some outgroups—for
example, gay men—emotional reactions are “the strongest predictor of overall evaluations,
stronger even than stereotypes.” Miller et al., supra note 79, at 222 (emphasis added).
263. Eaton, supra note 21, at 48.
264. Id. (“A person’s sense of, for instance, the beautiful and the ugly, or the sexy and
the repulsive, or the dumpy and the chic, is relatively immune to argument and evidence
and is rarely undermined by contrary cognitive considerations.”).
265. See generally R.J. Palacio, Wonder (2012).
266. Walter Rathjen, Dental Technology, Oral Health and Aesthetic Appearance: A
Historical View, 13 Icon 105, 105 (2007) (“[I]n the hierarchy of aspects characterising the
aesthetic perception of a person the face is the most important factor.”).
267. Eaton, supra note 21, at 48 (“[O]ne can have both the justified belief that fat
hatred governs social relations and the conviction that this is morally wrong yet nevertheless
find oneself disgusted by fat bodies.”).
268. See The Goldfish, Blogging Against Disablism Day 2014 - Against “Awareness,”
Diary of a Goldfish (Apr. 30, 2014), http://blobolobolob.blogspot.com/2014/04/blogging-
against-disablism-day-2014_30.html [https://perma.cc/4X68-R57P] (“Give your non-disabled
friend a lift? That’s a favour. Give your disabled friend a lift? That’s care, have a medal, bask
in the warm-fuzzy of your own philanthropy.”).
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B. Examples of Aesthetics in Disability Rights Law
Aesthetic–affective processes negotiate rights and disrupt the remedial
effects of disability antidiscrimination efforts in different spaces.269 While
attentive to the goals and other variables driving the institutional designs
and policy choices, this section offers examples of how aesthetics can
undermine disability antidiscrimination goals.
1. Access to and the Quality of Rights. — The aesthetics of disability
negotiate access to and the quality or extent of legal protections. For
example, people with disabilities seeking protection from discrimination
in employment, public services, and public accommodations must prove
as a threshold matter that they meet one of three definitions of “disability”—
existence of a present physical or mental impairment that substantially
limits one or more life activities, a record of such impairment, or being
“regarded as” having such an impairment.270 Under Title I of the ADA,
an individual is protected from disability discrimination in employment
when the individual is, statutorily defined, a person with a disability and
when they are “qualified,” meaning the individual can perform the duties
of employment, with or without a reasonable accommodation. Under Title
I, failure to provide a reasonable accommodation to an “otherwise
qualified individual with a disability” constitutes disability discrimination.
Thus, the individual must have an impairment that “substantially limits”
but one that also does not disqualify her from performing what employers
deem the “essential functions” of a job.271
But the aesthetics of disability can directly block access to employ-
ment and limit the scope of opportunities available to people with apparent
disabilities. Consider the following experience of a job applicant with a
visible disability:
I submitted a resume to a medical health facility. During the
interviewing process I was asked if I was . . . really the person in
the resume. I could tell from that point on that the interview
was over. Cosmetically, my appearance was a deterrent to their
organization272 . . . . [Also,] the agency I [was] assigned for the
internship for my master’s [degree] refused my application based
on concern that my disability was a liability working with the
clients. Therefore, I could not experience the internship of my
269. The role of aesthetics in disability rights law is broader than court-based adjudica-
tion of these rights for two reasons. First, research shows that civil rights laws are among
the least invoked of all laws. See Engel & Munger, supra note 17, at 3. Second, court-based
adjudication is on the decline because of the rise of alternative dispute resolution mecha-
nisms (some voluntary and others mandatory waivers of court-based dispute resolution).
See, e.g., Judith Resnik, The Privatization of Process: Requiem for and Celebration of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure at 75, 162 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1793, 1802 (2014).
270. 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (2012).
271. Id. §§ 12102, 12111; see also Michelle A. Travis, Disqualifying Universality Under
the Americans with Disabilities Act Amendments Act, 2015 Mich. St. L. Rev. 1689, 1721.
272. The applicant, Christine Molina, did not state the type of disability but referred
to physical disabilities.
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choice. They did explain that they were fearful I would chase
away clients due to the awkwardness of my disability.273
Reminiscent of the rationale of customer-based preferences in the
context of race discrimination, the potential employers above justified the
applicant’s exclusion on the basis of affective responses of consumers who
might experience negative emotions that deter and discourage business.274
Aesthetics also affect the ways in which people with less apparent
disabilities are received by others in the workplace. Consider the following
example: Wendie, an environmental science professor with a serious back
injury that compromises her ability to sit, self-identifies as a person with a
disability.275 She is described as a white woman, normatively beautiful,
well-dressed, and thin.276 Her disability caused her to stand and walk more
often rather than drive such that she gained physical muscle tone, and
given her location in California, acquired a tan.277 She recalls a conversa-
tion with her nondisabled coworker: “I remember saying to somebody
that I was severely disabled[,] and they were like[,] ‘But you look fabulous’
[s]o I was like ‘Well, thank you.’”278
Although Wendie identifies openly as a person with a disability, she
may not be received this way. The colleague above received her warmly,
but perhaps such response would change if Wendie sought an accommo-
dation from her employer. In addition to the potential hurdles of proving
the need for accommodations when one looks “fabulous,” Wendie may
also receive negative feedback from colleagues who, if her accommoda-
tion was granted and they knew this, may see a fundamental disconnect
between her beauty and disability and see her as “gaming” or taking
advantage of the system, rather than receiving a necessary entitlement
under the ADA. The aesthetics of Wendie’s disabilities, while perhaps
allowing her to avoid certain forms of discrimination or harassment in the
workplace, might trigger cognitive dissonance for coworkers and supervi-
sors who, even after the disclosure of her disability, would consider her as
“not disabled enough” to claim the perceived benefits of disability rights
laws.
273. Testimonial of Christine Molina, in Disability Diaries, Arizona, at 97 (unpublished
compilation) (on file with the Columbia Law Review). This example predated the ADA, but
one would expect there to be a cognizable claim on the merits, assuming evidence of the
agency’s discriminatory rationale.
274. See, e.g., Roby v. McKesson Corp., 219 P.3d 749, 754 (Cal. 2009) (noting a super-
visor’s expressed disgust with a plaintiff with severe panic attacks in a wrongful termination
case). The plaintiff in Roby, a customer service liaison, took medication with physical side
effects such as body odor, excessive sweating, and sores on her arms, and her supervisor
regularly called her “disgusting.” Id.
275. Julie-Ann Scott, Almost Passing: A Performance Analysis of Personal Narratives
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Aesthetic discomfort can also deny litigants with disabilities their due
process rights. Recall the prosecutor’s affirmative use of the victim, D.J.,
as an aesthetic demonstrative in the Stubblefield case that discounted
Stubblefield’s credibility.279 A case pending before the Eleventh Circuit
offers a similar illustration of judicial discomfort and disgust with sensory
details about disabilities. There, the trial judge granted the defendant
leasing agent’s motion to exclude counsel’s references to and discussion
of the plaintiff’s daughter’s disabilities as unfairly prejudicial pursuant to
Federal Rule of Evidence 403 in a housing discrimination case.280 While
judges maintain considerable discretion regarding questions of eviden-
tiary admissibility, the Federal Rules of Evidence reflect a strong prefer-
ence for the admission of relevant evidence.281 Federal Rule of Evidence
403 embodies this sentiment by allowing judges to exclude relevant
evidence only when “its probative value is substantially outweighed” by
“unfair prejudice.”282
The appellant sought to provide the lay jury with relevant contextual
and probative details about her daughter K.J.’s Fabry disease283 and au-
tism. The court held that the only relevant information was that K.J. had
multiple disabilities.284 However, one key issue in the case concerned the
appellant’s request to install a chain lock on the front door of the apart-
ment to prevent K.J. from eloping as she was highly prone to do.285 The
appellees opposed the request for reasonable modification.286 In addition,
and perhaps most illustrative of the aesthetics point, the appellant sought
to contextualize her need to lease the apartment at issue and move from
her prior residence as the direct result of K.J.’s cecostomy and fecal
incontinence.287 K.J.’s disability required the appellant or a nurse to flush
the stoma, or hole on the surface of the abdomen, twice daily, a task which
could take between five and ten hours.288 The trial court repeatedly
279. See supra notes 219–221 and accompanying text.
280. Brief for the Appellant at 16, Johnson v. Jennings, No. 18-10537-C (11th Cir. Aug.
10, 2018), 2018 WL 3998136 [hereinafter Johnson Appellate Brief].
281. The Federal Rules of Evidence have a very low threshold for the admission of
evidence pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 401: “Evidence is relevant if . . . it has any
tendency to make a fact of consequence more or less likely than without the evidence.”
Fed. R. Evid. 401.
282. See Fed. R. Evid. 403 (emphasis added).
283. See Johnson Appellate Brief, supra note 280, at 3–4 (“Fabry Disease is [an]
extremely rare genetic disorder, which causes episodes of pain, particularly in the hands
and feet (acroparesthesias); a decreased ability to sweat (hypohidrosis); cloudiness of the
front part of the eye . . . (corneal opacity); problem with the gastrointestinal system;
ringing in the ears (tinnitus); and hearing loss.”).
284. Id. at 16 (noting that the district court held that a detailing of K.J.’s disabilities “is
unnecessary, unduly prejudicial, consumes undue time, and creates distractions contrary
to 403”).
285. Id. at 6.
286. Id.
287. Id. at 5–6.
288. Id. at 4–5.
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denied counsel the opportunity to ask and witnesses the ability to answer
questions related to K.J.’s disabilities, including asking the home nurse
about her duties: “What difference does all that make except to pander
for sympathy and to emphasize the child’s disabilities and the vivid and
extreme nature of them?”289
2. Determinations of Threat and Risk. — The aesthetics of disability
influence which bodies are surveilled, questioned, abused, and subjected
to punishment. The determination of whether a particular body constitutes
a direct threat to the safety of the individual or others relies on percep-
tion and heuristic devices. Consider how non-normative appearance
triggers safety concerns. Dennis Theriault, a man who uses a wheelchair
and has cerebral palsy,290 sued the New Hampshire Department of Safety
under Title II of the ADA for requiring him to take a road test before
renewing his driver’s license.291 This test was not a mandatory part of the
renewal procedure for all applicants.292 He previously held a license to
operate a vehicle equipped with hand controls for eight years without
incident, accident, or citation.293 The licensing examiner required such
additional testing when he noticed Theriault’s hand shaking, a manifesta-
tion of his cerebral palsy.294 The First Circuit, affirming the trial court’s
decision, held that although the Department of Motor Vehicles discrimi-
nated against Mr. Theriault, such discrimination was permissible under
the ADA because of the state’s duty to determine whether he posed any
“direct threat” to public safety.295
Courts have had great difficulty in determining when something
constitutes an actual threat versus one that is shaped by prejudicial
stereotypes and risk aversion.296 In Theriault’s case, the court said that
the state “cannot be faulted for erring on the side of caution when safety
289. Id. at 19.
290. Theriault’s cerebral palsy reduced “his ability to use his legs and cause[d]
involuntary hand movements. He use[d] a walker to travel short distances and a manual
wheelchair or electric scooter for longer distances.” Theriault v. Flynn, 162 F.3d 46, 47 (1st
Cir. 1998).
291. Id. at 46.
292. Id.
293. Id. at 48.
294. Id. at 46. The issue was whether the state’s request that the plaintiff take the test
as part of the renewal process violated the ADA’s nondiscrimination clause. Id. at 49.
Theriault argued that his condition had not changed, and perhaps even had improved,
since the last renewal, and that he had never had an accident during his eight years of
driving. Id. at 49.
295. Id. (“In the face of a licensing officer’s judgment, based on direct observation,
that an applicant has a condition that could impact his or her ability to drive safely, we
think the Commissioner may reject reliance on an applicant’s statement that the condition
at issue has not changed materially . . . .”).
296. This phenomenon occurs throughout mental disability law as well as in the
context of policing, sentencing, and other risk assessments in criminal law. See, e.g., Jessica
M. Eaglin, Constructing Recidivism Risk, 67 Emory L.J. 59, 94–99 (2017) (discussing how
stereotypes and unconscious bias affect risk assessment in the sentencing context).
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is at issue, providing, of course, that the triggering judgment is based not
on stereotypes but on observable, relevant circumstances.”297 But part of
the stereotypes about cerebral palsy stem from a misunderstanding about
the impact of “observable” physical movements on actual impairments
and functional capabilities. Cerebral palsy, the most common childhood
motor impairment, is also one of the most misunderstood disabilities
because of the significant physical manifestations that deviate from typical
body movements.298 The First Circuit here offered the following caveat or
admission to its decision: “We recognize that, in so holding, we effectively
are saying that it is not ‘discrimination’ within the meaning of the ADA to
rely on the symptoms or appearance of a disability to single out a person
for an individualized assessment.”299 The Supreme Court has cautioned
in multiple cases, however, that analysis of direct threat requires an
individualized assessment in order to avoid biased decisions on the basis
of misleading stereotypes.300 The record in Theriault does not say whether
the state requested any less invasive means of addressing its safety
concerns; one could imagine, for example, a letter or similar document
certifying his fitness to drive or explaining what shaking signifies, not for
people with cerebral palsy writ large, but for Mr. Theriault.
Another critical example of aesthetics mediating access to public
accommodations and services in the name of public safety is policing.301
Perception is critical to the law enforcement enterprise in which officers,
by training, use appearances to manage public safety, determine legitimate
interventions, and modulate the use of force. Negative encounters with
police officers and other community members—who perceive people with
particular markers or engaged in non-normative behaviors to be engaged
in “suspicious,” potentially criminal behavior—can be quite traumatic
297. Theriault, 162 F.3d at 49.
298. See Peter Rosenbaum et al., A Report: The Definition and Classification of Cerebral
Palsy, Developmental Med. & Child Neurology, Supp. Feb. 2007, at 8, 8 (defining cerebral
palsy as a “group of disorders of movement and posture causing activity limitation attributed
to a static disturbance in the developing brain, often accompanied by associated impair-
ments and secondary health conditions”); see also Data & Statistics for Cerebral Palsy, CDC,
https://www.cdc.gov/ncbddd/cp/data.html [https://perma.cc/53E9-LWMK] (approximating
that 1 in 323 children in the United States has cerebral palsy).
299. Theriault, 162 F.3d at 50.
300. Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Echazabal, 536 U.S. 73, 86 (2002) (Hepatitis C); Bragdon
v. Abbott, 524 U.S. 624, 649 (1998) (asymptomatic HIV); Sch. Bd. of Nassau Cty. v. Arline,
480 U.S. 273, 287 (1987) (tuberculosis). I refer to these cases not as illustrations of aes-
thetics at work but rather for the applicability of the Court’s holdings on the individualiza-
tion of risk assessment to counter implicit biases.
301. See, e.g., City of San Francisco v. Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. 1765, 1772–73 (2015)
(discussing the scope of Title II’s applicability to policing); Estate of Saylor v. Regal
Cinemas, Inc., 54 F. Supp. 3d 409, 425 (D. Md. 2014) (“[C]ourts have also recognized an
implicit duty to train officers as to how to interact with individuals with disabilities in the
course of an investigation or arrest.”).
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and even deadly for the individual.302 Contact in these instances, as the
Connor Leibel case in the Introduction showed, is a barrier to the
realization of rights and has significant collateral consequences for both
the individuals involved and the broader normative mission of the ADA.
In many ways, the current policing debates are about aesthetics at the
intersection of race and disability. While the contours of reasonable accom-
modations in policing continue to develop without input from the
Supreme Court,303 several recent cases underscore the critical importance
of the aesthetics of disability at work. In 2016, for example, Arnaldo Rios-
Soto, a twenty-seven-year-old Latinx man on the autism spectrum sat in
the middle of the street by his group home in Miami holding his favorite
toy truck and rocking back and forth.304 He was practicing self-soothing
behavior, common for people who are on the spectrum. Charles Kinsey,
Rios-Soto’s behavioral specialist (and an African American man), was
attempting to get him to go back to the home when law enforcement
officers arrived.305 Despite Kinsey’s attempts to inform the officers that
Rios-Soto possessed a toy and not a weapon, the officers aimed a rifle at
Rios-Soto.306 One officer fired the rifle, missing Rios-Soto and shooting
Kinsey.307 A cellphone video went viral documenting the moments leading
up to the shooting and showing Kinsey lying horizontally on the sidewalk
with his arms raised while attempting to identify himself, Rios-Soto, and
the toy truck.308 The officer who shot Kinsey later said that he believed
Rios-Soto was making strange, suspicious movements with something in
his hands suggesting that he had a weapon.309
3. Spatial Designs and the Built World. — The aesthetics of disability
also affect the design of public and private spaces with both practical and
expressive implications. Architectural design is a civil rights issue in the
302. See, e.g., Aneri Pattani & Audrey Quinn, What Happened Next to the Man with
Autism Whose Aide Was Shot by Police, Wash. Post (June 22, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2018/06/22/what-happened-next-to-the-man-
with-autism-whose-aide-was-shot-by-police (on file with the Columbia Law Review) (discuss-
ing the post-traumatic stress experienced by Arnaldo Rios-Soto and the impact on his life).
303. See Sheehan, 135 S. Ct. at 1772–74 (dismissing the case on other grounds without
reaching the Title II question).
304. Complaint at 2, Soto v. City of North Miami, No. 17-CV-22090 (S.D. Fla. filed June
5, 2017), 2017 WL 2417391.
305. Id. at 8–9.
306. Id. at 10–12.
307. Id. at 12.
308. See Francisco Alvaro et al., North Miami Police Shoot Black Man Who Said His
Hands Were Raised While He Tried to Help Autistic Group-Home Resident, Wash. Post
(July 21, 2016), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/morning-mix/wp/2016/07/21/fla-
police-shoot-black-man-with-his-hands-up-as-he-tries-to-help-autistic-patient/ (on file with the
Columbia Law Review).
309. Id.
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disability context.310 Disability rights law has made notable strides in the
removal of physical barriers to accessing public services and public
accommodations (including transportation). Titles II and III place affirm-
ative duties on public and private entities to remove physical barriers to
access for people with disabilities.311 In fact, many credit disability rights’
advocates’ “U.S. Capitol Crawl”—when physically disabled adults and
children dragged their bodies up the front stairs of the U.S. Capitol
building—as an influential visual protest of the lack of architectural
accessibility, an issue being debated at the time within the walls of the
Capitol.312 Congressional members and staff, forced to walk over the bodies
of adults and children with physical disabilities, had mixed reactions—
from anger and contempt to pity and disgust. “Framed by the stairs in a
striking image, these public bodies communicate[d] what signs and
chants alone c[ould] [not]: this building, a symbol of governance and
democratic citizenship for all—an embodiment of the nation itself—was
not designed with disabled people in mind.”313 In this way, built forms
convey “material rhetorics” which “reveal cultural assignments of
knowledge and power.”314
Examination of our contemporary-built world illustrates both the
ways in which the promises of the ADA are not yet realized and the role
of aesthetics in negotiating necessary changes. The continued prevalence
of stairs, for example, may be invisible to nondisabled persons but is
experienced by people with mobility impairments as a constant reminder
of exclusion. Disabled painter Sunaura Taylor’s work, Thinking Stairs,
illustrates the lived experience of encountering stairs: “When I go out . . .
it’s as if the stairs are all bright red. It’s as if they are all talking about me.
But I don’t know what they are saying. . . . They are manifestations of some-
thing more sinister: discrimination.”315 They communicate that the artist,
Taylor, is out of place—that they were designed without her in mind.316
Disability design elements such as ramps, curb cuts, handrails, and
braille and sound-activated devices are viewed as aesthetically displeasing,
310. See Hamraie, supra note 38, at 255 (quoting the architect of a building designed
with the disabled in mind as saying that “[e]veryone has a right to inspiring, supportive
places in which to live and work”).
311. See 42 U.S.C. § 12182 (2012); see also 29 U.S.C. § 794 (2012) (prohibiting federal
discrimination against individuals on the basis of disability); Architectural Barriers Act, 42
U.S.C. §§ 4151–4156 (predating the ADA and applying only to federally owned or operated
buildings).
312. Davis, Enabling Acts, supra note 74, at 191–98 (describing the organizing and
political strategy behind the iconic image of the “Capitol Crawl”); Pelka, supra note 49, at
517–18 (describing the “crawl-up” as both “theater” and “a statement”).
313. Hamraie, supra note 38, at 1.
314. Id.
315. Id. at 3.
316. Id.
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ugly, and disruptive.317 Defendants in ADA Title II and III actions often
make these descriptive claims as part of their legal arguments. For
example, in Colorado Cross-Disability Coalition v. Abercrombie & Fitch Co., a
plaintiff class of wheelchair users sued defendant Abercrombie & Fitch
under Title III of the ADA for “failure to design and construct facilities . . .
that are readily accessible to and usable by individuals with disabilities”318
except when “structurally impracticable.” 319 One of Abercrombie’s
brands, Hollister, marketed as a beach lifestyle brand, included a raised
platform as its main entranceway to mirror the entrance to a beach
shack. The main entrance, however, was inaccessible to wheelchair users
who had to use a back door to gain access to the store. Once inside, cus-
tomers in wheelchairs had to maneuver around very narrow aisle spaces
and ask for assistance in moving physical barriers to the store.320 Defen-
dants argued that they had complied with the applicable statutory and
regulatory requirements for accessibility and therefore could design the
outer space in accordance with its desired aesthetic and brand. 321
Abercrombie CEO Mike Jeffries notably remarked during an interview
that sex is effectively the “emotional experience” shaping its lifestyle
brand and its market which he described as “the cool kids . . . the
attractive all-American kid with a great attitude and a lot of friends. A lot
of people don’t belong, and they can’t belong. Are we exclusionary?
Absolutely.”322
The plaintiff class, in turn, argued that Abercrombie impermissibly
distinguished between the design of the store and its use to discriminate
against people with disabilities: “Because Abercrombie ‘uses’ its porches
as the central feature of the ‘Hollister experience,’ [that is, to mimic a
surfer’s beach shack] . . . it denies disabled customers the full and equal
enjoyment of that experience in violation of [the ADA].”323 Although the
district court and the dissenting Tenth Circuit judge agreed with this
argument, the Tenth Circuit majority found that Hollister was not liable
317. See, e.g., Sui v. Price, 127 Cal. Rptr. 3d 99, 104 (Ct. App. 2011) (“Simply put, there
is nothing unreasonable about prohibiting the open, long-term parking of disabled vehicles.
The association was perfectly reasonable in prohibiting this unsightly intrusion upon the
aesthetics of their common interest development.”).
318. 765 F.3d 1205, 1217 (10th Cir. 2014).
319. Id. at 1220.
320. Id. at 1208.
321. Id. at 1217.
322. Benoit Denizet-Lewis, The Man Behind Abercrombie & Fitch, Salon (Jan. 24,
2006), https://www.salon.com/2006/01/24/jeffries/ [https://perma.cc/7AJP-6VM8].
323. Colo. Cross-Disability Coal., 765 F.3d at 1219. Specifically, it violates 42 U.S.C. § 12182(a)
(2012). Part of the case before the district court turned on whether the outside “porch”
was an “entrance” or a “space,” the latter of which must be readily accessible and the
former of which could, according to applicable regulations and standards, be an alternative
location that is not the main entrance to the establishment. The Tenth Circuit rejected
this reading of the case. Colo. Cross-Disability Coal., 765 F.3d at 1221.
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for a discriminatory design in violation of the “overarching aims of the
ADA.”324
Private homeowners’ associations have also advanced aesthetic argu-
ments in opposition to individuals’ efforts to make their homes physically
accessible. Recently, a family purchased and received necessary permits
to renovate a dilapidated home in a historic neighborhood in Chicago.
The renovation plans included an attached two-car garage with a
wheelchair ramp, an elevator, and two accessible bathrooms to ensure
that their daughter, a wheelchair user, could access the family home and
minimize exposure to inclement weather.325 The Old Town Triangle
Association (OTTA) and neighborhood residents vehemently opposed
the renovations, particularly the front-facing garage, which they said would
disrupt the aesthetic unity of the neighborhood.326 In a letter to the
zoning board, the OTTA President argued that the garage would ruin
“one of the beautiful, and historic, lines of Victorian homes in Chicago”
and the family “should have put their child’s needs first and moved to a
neighborhood more conducive to her needs.”327
Zoning cases also demonstrate the ways in which forced proximity
(or the possibility thereof) generates negative affective responses from
nondisabled community residents. In City of Cleburne v. Cleburne Living
Center, Inc.,328 perhaps the most famous zoning example in disability law,
the majority reasoned that the denial of a group home’s permit was
based on “irrational prejudice” regarding contact with people with
disabilities, their functional capacities, and perceived risks, rather than
fact.329 However, while eschewing the use of stereotypes in the case at bar,
324. Colo. Cross-Disability Coal., 765 F.3d at 1224–25 (holding that it was error to impose
liability for the design of Hollister stores based on the “overarching aims” of the ADA and
the finding that the porch is a “space” that must be accessible because it is the entrance
used by a “majority of people”). The dissent reviewed the overarching aims of the ADA
focused on integrated access to public accommodations and noted that “Abercrombie’s
use of the porch violates the ADA by denying customers who use wheelchairs the oppor-
tunity to participate and instead providing them a separate, unequal, non-integrated bene-
fit.” Id. at 1229 (McHugh, J., dissenting).
325. Mitchell Armentrout, Dispute Continues over Handicapped-Accessible Garage in
Old Town Triangle, Chi. Sun-Times (Nov. 16, 2018), https://chicago.suntimes.com/
entertainment/old-town-triangle-garage-dispute-accesible-lincoln/ (on file with the Columbia
Law Review). The elevator, in particular, was an attempt to minimize the daughter’s
exposure to inclement weather and to ensure mobility. Id.
326. Jonathan Ballew, Historic Old Town Building Would Look ‘Horrible’ with




328. 473 U.S. 432 (1985).
329. Id. at 450; see also id. at 462–63 (Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part) (“Retarded children were categorically excluded from public schools, based on the
false stereotype that all were ineducable and on the purported need to protect
nonretarded children from them.”).
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the Court determined that state decisions more broadly would be subject
to “rational basis” review.330 The decision shaped antidiscrimination argu-
ments in subsequent zoning cases; objections to group homes now
emphasize the “aesthetic and zoning code considerations” rather than
“intentional discrimination on the basis of [disability],” making it harder
to prove discrimination under applicable laws and regulations.331
IV. REFRAMING DISABILITY RIGHTS LAW
Aesthetic–affective responses to disability influence who has access to
civil rights, when they may exercise existing rights, and how meaningful
rights are for individuals and groups.332 This Part has three goals. First,
this Part proposes a new theoretical lens—the aesthetics of disability—to
reorient our understanding of the problem of disability discrimination.
Second, this Part uses a recent special-education case to illustrate how the
aesthetics of disability operate: (a) as barriers to contact between non-
disabled and disabled people, and, (b) when contact does occur, as per-
versions of the contact theory, exacerbating rather than ameliorating
prejudice. Third, this Part sketches a preliminary agenda for responding
to the aesthetics of disability in antidiscrimination law.
A. The Process of Disability Discrimination
Aesthetic theory can expand our understanding of the nature of
disability discrimination and the qualities and meaning attributed to
certain physical, mental, sensory, and behavioral markers that shape inter-
group contact. The study of aesthetics is apropos because it concerns the
way in which “some bodies feel in the presence of other bodies” and the
330. Waterstone, Disability Constitutional Law, supra note 165, at 539.
331. Town & Country Adult Living, Inc. v. Village/Town of Mt. Kisco, No. 02 Civ.
444(LTS), 2003 WL 21219794, at *4 (S.D.N.Y. May 21, 2003) (holding that the plaintiff
could not show a likelihood of success on the merits in support of a motion for
preliminary injunction because the plaintiff could not show that the zoning board’s refusal
was due to discriminatory animus rather than aesthetic considerations). Interestingly, at
least one plaintiff has argued that the harm associated with denial of zoning permissions
to build a rehabilitation and transitional living facility for people with disabilities in the
community “deprived [the community] of ‘important social, professional, business and
economic, political and aesthetic benefits’ of associating with disabled persons,” invoking
the benefits of contact theory. Kessler Inst. for Rehab. v. Mayor of Essex Fells, 876 F. Supp.
641, 652 (D.N.J. 1995); see also Evans v. ForKids, Inc., 306 F. Supp. 3d 827, 836 (E.D. Va.
2018) (“Similarly, the consistent motivations behind a landlord’s or residential association’s
desire not to allow a structural modification to an existing building are either the desire to
maintain consistent aesthetics or the desire to prevent structural modifications being
performed by any tenant, regardless of disability.”); Rudolf Steiner Fellowship Found. v.
De Luccia, 685 N.E.2d 192, 193 (N.Y. 1997) (describing how an “entrance [was moved] to
the back of the building for safety and aesthetic reasons”).
332. See Engel & Munger, supra note 17, at 3 (“Civil rights differ from other forms of
legal entitlement [because] [t]hey concern themselves not only with the legal interests of
those who belong to civil society but also with the issue of membership itself.”).
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judgments made about them.333 Disability has earned a valued position in
the contemporary study of aesthetics because it supports the artistic
enterprise of thinking about what makes a human being.334 This project
examines the ways in which collective aesthetic and affective reactions to
disability have undermined the explicit normative goals of disability rights
law.
Disability studies scholars, 335 like aestheticians, have long contended
with the role of the body in social exclusion.336 The “body is both the sub-
ject and object of aesthetic production,” as “it creates other bodies prized
for their ability to change the emotions of their maker.”337 Yet “all bodies
are not created equal when it comes to the aesthetic response . . . . The
senses revolt against some bodies, while other bodies please them.”338 In
this way, aesthetic and affective theories concern representations and how
they make us feel. Emotions mediate legislative drafting, interpretation,
and enforcement. One’s proximity to the “normate,” a set of stock physical
and functional characteristics, becomes a measure of social acceptance
and, to some degree, a collective target for happiness and success.339 Aes-
thetic and affective constructions of disability—such as beauty or
disgust—then, are tethered to political and social responses of accept-
ance or rejection, a central concern of antidiscrimination scholars, courts,
and legislators.
The birth of statistics in the nineteenth century brought an ideo-
logical shift in which averageness became the ideal in North American
333. Siebers, Disability Aesthetics, supra note 26, at 1 (emphasis added).
334. See id. at 2.
335. Scholars in other disciplines have contended with the social construction of the
body as well. See, e.g, Judith Butler, Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of Sex,
at xi (2011) (noting, in the context of gender, that “‘sex’ not only functions as a norm, but
is part of a regulatory practice that produces the bodies it governs”).
336. See Siebers, Disability Aesthetics, supra note 26, at 2–3 (discussing how repre-
sentations of disability generate “aesthetic feelings of pleasure and disgust [that] are difficult
to separate from political feelings of acceptance and rejection”). This concept has not
been used or theorized, however, in disability rights law. In addition, my concept of aesthetics
of disability describes the process of disability discrimination and how representations
trigger certain responses based on a collective taste for bodies that excludes people with
disabilities. Other disability studies scholars have appropriated aesthetic concepts to advance
their ideas. See, e.g., Harlan Hahn, The Politics of Physical Differences: Disability and
Discrimination, 44 J. Soc. Issues 39, 42–43 (1988) (defining “existential anxiety” as “the per-
ceived threat that a disability could interfere with functional capacities deemed necessary
to the pursuit of a satisfactory life” and “aesthetic anxiety” as “the fears engendered by
persons whose appearance deviates markedly from the usual human form or includes
physical traits regarded as unappealing”).
337. Siebers, Disability Aesthetics, supra note 26, at 1.
338. Id.
339. Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, supra note 26, at 8 (defining the “normate”
as “the social figure through which people can represent themselves as definitive human
beings”).
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culture.340 An “aesthetic of standardization” works “as [a] metaphor for
ableist values and notions of what it means to be human.”341 A body that
deviates from the standard, such as one that requires ramps or non-
normative workspaces, therefore requires accommodation and disrupts
perceived maximum efficiency. Society has three behavioral responses to
non-normative bodies—isolation and social exclusion, treatment with the
goal of curing or rehabilitating to the established norm, or extinction of
differences. State institutions exert disciplinary or bio-power over bodies
of groups and individuals in service of these goals.342 Disability law and
policies over time have embodied all of these policy goals—for instance,
institutions (segregation), health care (rehabilitation), and eugenics (elim-
ination). This provides broader surveillance authority to police deviations
from established norms. These norms are replicated and circulated through
academic disciplines to define and teach social norms and proscribe
deviance.343
The aesthetics of disability, as markers of corporeal deviation, reflect
the ways in which certain bodies disrupt a constructed ideal of an optimal
“docile body” and its celebrated set of functional capacities that position
the ideal market actor.344 As Michel Foucault described, “[I]t is already
one of the prime effects of power that certain bodies, certain gestures,
certain discourses, certain desires, come to be identified and constituted
as individuals. The individual, that is, is not the vis-à-vis of power . . . [but]
one of its prime effects.”345
Aesthetic norms, rather than explicit legal regulation, are the primary
instruments of social control. Aesthetics of beauty, form, and behavior are
the norms of self-regulation for people with and without disabilities who
aspire to normalcy.
1. Aesthetic Markers of Disability. — One way to identify the aesthetics
of disability in law is to look at the evidentiary markers identified by courts
as relevant descriptively, normatively, or legally. Aesthetic markers of
340. See Davis, Disability Studies Reader, supra note 26, at 2–3 (using the birth of
statistics to explain how the concept of a norm or average became “paradoxically a kind of
ideal, a position devoutly to be wished”).
341. Julia Gruson-Wood, Ableism Kitsch: The Aesthetics of Disability-Related Ethics 19
(2009) (unpublished manuscript) (on file with the Columbia Law Review).
342. See Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 204, at 135–36, 191–92 (discussing
state regulatory control over “docile bodies” that could be “subjected, used, transformed, and
improved,” in part, through medical science).
343. See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders,
at xviii (3d ed. rev. 1987) (developing, for the first time, a means to collect and generate
statistical data through partnerships with the U.S. Census Bureau).
344. Cf. Foucault, Discipline and Punish, supra note 204, at 138–39 (explaining the
theory of the “docile” body).
345. Michel Foucault, Two Lectures, in Power/Knowledge 78, 98 (Colin Gordon et al.
trans., Harvester Press 1980).
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disability generally fall into two categories, appearance-related or
behavioral– functional, although these are intimately connected.346 The
following chart reflects common examples of evidence courts have found
probative of the existence, absence, knowledge, or functional deficits of
disability:
FIGURE 1: EXAMPLES OF AESTHETIC TRIGGERS OF DISABILITY
Sensory Domain Appearance-Related Marker Behavioral–Functional Marker
Sight
• Dirt on bodies347 • Incontinence348
• “Fatness”349 • Absence of eye contact350
• Diaper-like garments for
incontinence351
• Infrequent pointing352
• Bodily excretions (for
example, saliva or drool,
urine, feces)353
• Walking in a slow, limping,
or tilted fashion354
346. This Article proposes this original taxonomy for organizational purposes.
347. See, e.g., The Lepers of Molokai, 1 Brit. Med. J. 1026, 1026 (1909) (“The fact that a
leper is unclean, however, should be insisted upon; and he gives it as his opinion that, from
what little is known of the disease, the segregation of lepers should be rigidly maintained.”).
348. See, e.g., M. Swash, New Conceptions in Incontinence, 290 British Med. J. 4, 4 (1985)
(“Incontinence, defined as the inadvertent or uncontrolled passage of faeces or urine or
both, is a disability associated with profound social consequences.”).
349. See, e.g., George L. Maddox & Veronica Liederman, Overweight as a Social Disability
with Medical Implications, 44 J. Med. Educ. 214, 217–19 (1969) (discussing the disabling
effect of body fat); Lucy Wang, Note, Weight Discrimination: One Size Fits All Remedy?,
117 Yale L.J. 1900, 1922–23 (2008) (discussing legal theories for when “fatness” constitutes
a perceived disability, actionable under Title I of the ADA, the “regarded as” prong).
350. See, e.g., Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental Disorders
50 (5th ed. 2013) [hereinafter Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DSM-5] (defining criteria for diagnosing
Autism Spectrum Disorder as including “[d]eficits in nonverbal communicative behaviors
used for social interaction, ranging, for example, from poorly integrated verbal and non-
verbal communication; to abnormalities in eye contact and body language”).
351. See, e.g., State v. Stubblefield, 162 A.3d 1074, 1076 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 2017)
(describing a male victim with a disability as “severely disabled with cerebral palsy . . . [who]
could not speak words, wore a ‘diaper,’ and needed assistance in every area of daily living”).
352. Id.
353. See, e.g., Elizabeth Altieri, Seeing Disability in New Ways, 203 Counterpoints 109,
111 (2003) (describing a picture “of a child lying prone in a meager hospital gown, bound
to a bench, a puddle of urine beneath him”); Tobin Siebers, What Can Disability Studies Learn
from the Culture Wars?, 55 Cultural Critique 182, 185–86 (2003) (discussing the ways in which
art uses excrement to invoke disability).
354. See, e.g., Rosemarie Garland-Thomson, Shape Structures Story: Fresh and Feisty
Stories about Disability, 15 Narrative 113, 119 (2007) (describing wielding a cane, riding a
wheelchair, and limping as “obvious disabilities”).
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Sensory Domain Appearance-Related Marker Behavioral–Functional Marker
Sight
• Physical deformities or
asymmetries355
• Repetitive motions (for exam-
ple, rocking or stimming)356










355. See, e.g., Elizabeth F. Emens, Disabling Attitudes: U.S. Disability Law and the ADA
Amendments Act, 60 Am. J. Comp. L. 205, 217 (2012) (“[S]ometimes others’ attitudes are pre-
cisely what is disabling about a particular condition. Think here of facial scarring.”); Rosemarie
Garland-Thomson, Feminist Disability Studies, 30 Signs 1557, 1558 (2005) [hereinafter
Garland-Thomson, Feminist Disability Studies] (explaining that the author uses the phrase
“the traits we think of as disability” to refer to “deformities” or “abnormalities”).
356. See, e.g., Stephen Poulson, Autism, Through a Social Lens, Contexts, Spring 2009,
at 40, 41 (“A characteristic associated with autism is repetitive self-stimulating behavior,
called stimming. The most common examples are rocking, pacing, repeating words, stacking
objects, and banging one’s head, among others.”).
357. See, e.g., Garland-Thomson, Feminist Disability Studies, supra note 355, at 1564
(explaining that blindness is a “paradigmatic trope of disability . . . [with] Helen Keller
and her predecessor Laura Bridgman as poster children, iconic objects appropriated by
the empathetic self that developed during the Enlightenment”); Anne Waldschmidt,
Disability Goes Cultural: The Cultural Model of Disability as an Analytical Tool, in Culture
– Theory – Disability: Encounters Between Disability Studies and Cultural Studies 19, 19
(Anne Waldschmidt et al. eds., 2017) (quoting disability studies scholar Lennard J. Davis
remarking, “[D]isability seems so obvious – a missing limb, blindness, deafness. What
could be simpler to understand?”).
358. See, e.g., Hamraie, supra note 38, at 182 (“Code compliance approaches often
required people seeking barrier-free access to convince others of the degree of their
impairment through ‘biocertification’—for example, use of a wheelchair or assistive device
or official proof of a diagnosis.”); Jesus Diaz, Does the Universal Symbol for Disability
Need to Be Rethought?, Fast Co. (Aug. 10, 2018), https://www.fastcompany.com/90216071/
does-the-universal-symbol-for-disability-need-a-redesign [https://perma.cc/W56M-RU8B]
(discussing wheelchair use as the universal symbol for disability and why it is insufficient).
359. See, e.g., Andrew Buckser, Before Your Very Eyes: Illness, Agency, and the
Management of Tourette Syndrome, 22 Med. Anthropology Q. 167, 170 (2008) (“TS is a
disease defined in large part by its visibility and the stigma attached to it; the twitches, jerks,
barks, and curses associated with Tourette can produce profound social difficulties.”).
360. See, e.g., Speech or Language Impairments, Project IDEAL, http://www.
projectidealonline.org/v/speech-language-impairments/ [https://perma.cc/5PLC-SE5F] (last
visited Mar. 25, 2019) (defining speech and language impairment as “a communication
disorder that adversely affects the child’s ability to talk, understand, read, and write” and
providing examples including stuttering).
361. See, e.g., Wills v. Gregory, 92 N.E.3d 1133, 1135 (Ind. Ct. App. 2018) (affirming the
lower court’s modification of child custody after the mother suffered a stroke that resulted
in “some disabilities” including aphasia, a speech impairment that “affects [the mother’s]
ability to express herself”); Harlan Lane, Do Deaf People Have a Disability?, 2 Sign Language
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Sensory Domain Appearance-Related Marker Behavioral–Functional Marker
Sound
• Accented speech362 • Deafness or hearing
impairment363
• Appropriate target, volume,
and content of speech (for
example, self, others,
children, profanity)364
• Use of assistive listening or
communication devices (for




• Tied to developmental
activity of sustenance366
• Incapacity to self-feed using
typical methods (for exam-
ple, Chuck’s use of feet,367
use of tube, or use of other
assistive feeding devices)368
Stud. 356, 367 (2002) (discussing muteness as it relates to deafness and disability).
362. See, e.g., Patricia A. Prelock et al., Speech-Language Impairment: How to Identify the
Most Common and Least Diagnosed Disability of Childhood, Medscape J. Med. CME (June
11, 2008), https://www.medscape.org/viewarticle/575732 (on file with the Columbia Law
Review) (“Unfortunately, non-native speakers of English, speakers of various dialects (whose
language also varies within dialect), and bilingual or multilingual speakers are frequently
classified as language delayed or disordered when, in fact, they are language different.”).
363. See, e.g., Waldschmidt, supra note 357, at 19 (including “deafness” among the list
of “obvious” disabilities).
364. See, e.g., id. (discussing stuttering and other impairments related to the speed,
quality, and control of speech); see also Larry Burd, Language and Speech in Tourette
Syndrome: Phenotype and Phenomenology, 1 Current Developmental Disorders Rep. 229,
230 (2014) (listing common vocal tics); Understanding Coprolalia, Tourette Ass’n of Am.,
https://tourette.org/resource/understanding-coprolalia/ [https://perma.cc/Y4S3-KFWY] (last
visited Mar. 21, 2019) (“Coprolalia is the medical term used to describe one of the most
puzzling and socially stigmatizing symptoms of Tourette Syndrome—the involuntary
outburst of obscene words or socially inappropriate and derogatory remarks.”).
365. See, e.g., Oliver J. Corrado, Hearing Aids, 296 Brit. Med. J. 33, 33 (1988) (discussing
the use of hearing aids for people with hearing loss).
366. See, e.g., Charlotte Aull Davies, Food and the Social Identities of People with
Learning Disabilities, Disability Stud. Q. (2007), http://dsq-sds.org/article/view/21/21
[https://perma.cc/9FVV-DUZC] (examining how “food and its provision are factors in
defining and sustaining essentially undesirable, stigmatizing aspects of the social identities
of people with learning disabilities”).
367. See supra notes 180–182 and accompanying text.
368. See, e.g., Glendale Unified Sch. Dist. v. Almasi, 122 F. Supp. 2d 1093, 1103 (C.D.
Cal. 2000) (noting that the student’s individualized education programs “consistently
identified self-feeding as a goal and objective”).
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Sensory Domain Appearance-Related Marker Behavioral–Functional Marker
Taste
• Certain types of foods
considered abnormal to
ingest369
• Incapacity to eat certain










of self or others (for exam-
ple, public masturbation,
excessive hugging)372
• Tied to awareness of where,





• Motor functioning (for
example, capacity to hold a
fork, spoon, brush)374
369. See, e.g., In re Guardianship of P.D., No. 08CA5, 2009 WL 1830784, at *1 (Ohio
Ct. App. May 26, 2009) (describing behaviors of a child with severe autism including
“behavior that is both dangerous to himself and to those around him . . . [including] the
ingestion of inedible items, including his own feces”); Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, DSM-5, supra
note 350, at 329–30 (defining “pica” as a neurological and eating disorder whose key
feature is “the eating of one or more nonnutritive, nonfood substances on a persistent
basis over a period of at least 1 month”).
370. See, e.g., T.B. ex rel. Brenneise v. San Diego Unified Sch. Dist., 806 F.3d 451, 462
(9th Cir. 2015) (noting that the student receiving special education services had a specific
accommodation for gastronomy tube feeding); Key Med. Supply, Inc. v. Sebelius, No. 12-
752, 2013 WL 1149516, at *3 n.5 (D. Minn. Mar. 19, 2013) (highlighting the association of
types of feeding tubes with people with disabilities).
371. See, e.g., Dennis v. Caddo Parish Sch. Bd., No. 09-1094, 2011 WL 3117864, at *3
(W.D. La. July 26, 2011) (noting that “inappropriate touching” and “crude language”
were manifestations of special education students’ behavioral and emotional disabilities).
372. See, e.g., Matter of William T., 5 N.Y.S.3d 563, 565 (App. Div. 2015) (“Petitioner’s
chief psychologist, Suzanne Fraser, testified that respondent’s developmental disability
involved his inability to control his urges to engage in pedophilic and exhibitionist
activities—which included several instances of respondent exposing his genitalia to young
females or masturbating in public . . . .”).
373. See, e.g., Dep’t of Educ. v. M.F. ex rel. R.F., 840 F. Supp. 2d 1214, 1221 (D. Haw.
2011) (“M.F.’s disability-related issues caused problems with incidents of ‘inappropriate
touching.’”); State v. Kleyman, No. 93896, 2010 WL 3042464, at *2 (Ohio Ct. App. 2010)
(recounting the testimony of a caregiver for a victim with intellectual and developmental
disabilities who described the victim as “socially inappropriate” and unable to “discern
appropriate touching from inappropriate touching”).
374. See, e.g., Philip v. Ford Motor Co., 328 F.3d 1020, 1025 (8th Cir. 2003) (finding
that in determining whether someone meets the ADA definition of disability, “[t]he type
of evidence most relevant to establishing a substantial limitation in the major life activity of
performing manual tasks, includes, for example, an individual’s ability to do household
chores, bathe, brush one’s teeth, prepare meals, do laundry, etc.”).
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Sensory Domain Appearance-Related Marker Behavioral–Functional Marker
Smell
• Body odors, emissions (for
example, sweat, feces,
urine, mucus, saliva, gas,
vomit, blood)375
• Capacity for self-care (for
example, bathing,
cleanliness)376
The chart illustrates a collective preference that emphatically denies
vulnerability, mortality, and uncertainty. The sensory markers above aes-
thetically deviate from the normate.377 This is why people with these markers
stand out.378 The specific markers themselves may change over time in
response to fluctuating visions of “normal” or “typical” but establish an
aesthetic baseline.379 The literature articulates the classic baseline male as
“a young, married, [able-bodied,] white, urban, northern, heterosexual
Protestant father of college education, fully employed, of good complexion,
375. See, e.g., Fallon v. CTSC, LLC, No. 13-00176, 2013 WL 9853376, at *6 (D.N.M.
Sept. 26, 2013) (quoting plaintiff’s claim that his employer “discriminated against [him]
by perceiving him as having a disability (body odor issue)”); Jackson v. Norton Hosp., No.
3:10CV-762-S, 2011 WL 1399838, at *2 (W.D. Ky. Apr. 13, 2011) (noting that plaintiff claimed
“the employees at Norton made fun of her body odor and ‘disability’”); Smallwood v.
Brown, 10 Vet. App. 93, 97 (2007) (describing appellant’s “foot disability” as “excreting a
particularly foul-smelling drainage that seems to suggest that he may qualify as an
exceptional case [for disability benefits]”).
376. See, e.g., Barnett v. Barnhart, 362 F.3d 1020, 1022 (8th Cir. 2004) (noting the
discrepancy between petitioner’s statement to the Social Security Administration that after
the disability, she continued to perform daily tasks such as “personal hygiene and most
household tasks” and her statement at the evidentiary hearing that “she could not mani-
pulate her fingers or use her right wrist”); Cason v. Rochester Hous. Auth., 748 F. Supp.
1002, 1005 (W.D.N.Y. 1990) (“In some instances, the social worker conducts a nursing
evaluation, during which a variety of specific questions concerning the applicant’s dis-
ability, personal hygiene and ability to live independently are asked.”); Jordan v. Shulkin,
No. 16-0073, 2017 WL 2124515, at *4 (Vet. App. 2017) (“The Board failed to discuss
whether this evidence rose to the level of an inability to maintain personal hygiene, as required
for 100% disability rating, much less whether it was evidence of ‘neglect of personal appear-
ance and hygiene’ as mentioned in the exemplary symptoms of a 70% disability rating.”).
377. Garland Thomson, Extraordinary Bodies, supra note 26, at 6–7; see also Garland-
Thomson, Representation and Disability, supra note 24, at 524 (“[W]e are expected to
look, act, and move in certain ways so we’ll fit into the built and attitudinal environment. If
we don’t, we become disabled.”).
378. See Allan, supra note 222, at 35–36 (“[W]e live in a society of the spectacle. [O]ur
perceptions of reality are structured by a series of aestheticized images of it through the
media and advertising.” (citations omitted) (citing Slavoj Zizek, Mapping Ideology (1994))).
379. For example, note the evolution of preferences for the ideal female body type
and form from Marilyn Monroe to Kate Moss to Kim Kardashian. See Julia Belluz, Our
Changing Ideal of Female Beauty, in One Gif, Vox (Jan. 21, 2015), https://www.vox.com/
2015/1/21/7862237/beauty-ideal-by-decade [https://perma.cc/URL5-L437] (“The ideal
body type for women fluctuates with every passing decade: the voluptuous curves of the
50s (think Marilyn Monroe) gave way to . . . ‘heroin chic’ in the 90s (Kate Moss). Now, big
butts . . . are the thing (Kim Kardashian).”).
958 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:895
weight and height, and a recent record in sports.”380 The sensory markers
above delineate “disqualified bodies,”381 or “spoiled identities,”382 relative
to a fictional unmarked, neutral body. They serve two functions: to signal
one’s identity as “typical” and delineate “atypical.” Notice the four
normative values represented—self-reliance and independence, intelligence
and reason, beauty, and health.383
Certain abilities—that is, functional capacities—are marked to the
extent that they deviate from those abilities representative of “typically”
functioning individuals advancing core values. In the context of dis-
ability, behaviors that are popularly associated with certain disabilities,
such as head banging, once seen as a biologically based marker of
intellectual or developmental disabilities, are now understood differently
as social responses. An expert witness for the Department of Justice, in
Wyatt v. Stickney,384 an institutional-reform case in Alabama, testified that
“eccentric mannerisms, the rocking back and forth, peculiar behavioral
mechanisms . . . sit[ting] in a semi-stupor in a place, without any activity . . .
is due to neglect and is not an outcome of [intellectual disability]
itself.”385 Although media attention helped advance the movement for
deinstitutionalization, it also provided vivid (and often the first and only)
representations of intellectual disabilities like those of the Willowbrook
State School in 1976.386
Aesthetic theories help explain why particular markers highlighted
by the chart above are disfavored.387 In the context of disability, three
380. Erving Goffman, Stigma: Notes on the Management of a Spoiled Identity 128
(First Touchstone ed., Simon & Schuster 1986) (1963).
381. Michelle Jarman et al., Theorising Disability as Political Subjectivity, 17 Disability
& Soc’y 555, 557 (2002).
382. Goffman, supra note 380, at 19.
383. See infra notes 384–387 and accompanying text.
384. 344 F. Supp. 387 (M.D. Ala. 1972), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom. Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974).
385. Brief of Amici Curiae American Ass’n on Mental Deficiency et al. at 33, Wyatt v.
Aderholt, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974) (No. 72-2634). The expert also noted that there is
ample documentation that “individuals who come to institutions and can . . . talk will stop
talking, who come to institutions and can feed themselves will stop feeding themselves; in
other words, [there is] a steady process of deterioration.” Stanley S. Herr, Rights and Advocacy
for Retarded People 108 (1983) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Dr. Gunnar
Dybwad).
386. See supra section II.A (discussing the early framing of disability and its introduction
to a national audience).
387. See, e.g., Jonathan Drimmer, Comment, Cripples, Overcomers, and Civil Rights:
Tracing the Evolution of Federal Legislation and Social Policy for People with Disabilities,
40 UCLA L. Rev. 1341, 1350 n.36 (1993) (“Another problem commonly faced by people
with disabilities is that society often considers a disability to be ‘ugly,’ and believes that
people with unattractive exteriors have unattractive interiors. People who are ‘unattractive’
receive substantially worse treatment by society.”); see also Harlan Hahn, Feminist
Perspectives, Disability, Sexuality and Law: New Issues and Agendas, 4 S. Cal. Rev. L. &
Women’s Stud. 97, 141 (1994) (“The social and cultural values that have defined the
prominent attributes of a visible disability as physically unattractive may deprive disabled
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aesthetic values have shaped public attitudes and conduct: beauty,388
effortlessness, and health. The law reinforces health and beauty in a number
of ways—for example, damages awards in the personal injury context389
or, as previously discussed, architectural design.390
While beauty and health are more straightforward as highly salient
and accepted aesthetic values,391 effortlessness requires some explanation.
The effortless value helps explain the ways in which society ranks and
identifies functional capacity and incapacity. The collective taste for
effortlessness—the collective taste for bodies, movements, speech, writing,
intellectual endeavors, or other objects that appear effortless—directly
conflicts with representations and perceptions of people with apparent
disabilities. Though we socially praise effort, “we prize effortlessness.”392
Our modern appreciation for the effortlessness displayed by some athletes
and artists may derive from foundational aesthetic theories valuing “effort”
or “effortlessness.”393 Perceptions of effortlessness are “highly cognitively
adults of many significant sources of satisfaction in life, from personal relationships to
employment.”).
388. People have used disability as a vitriolic synonym for “ugly.” See, e.g., Davila v.
FedEx Trade Sys., No. L-08-74, 2010 WL 346139, at *6 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 22, 2010) (recounting
deposition testimony in a sexual harassment suit alleging that an employee at the defend-
ant’s company “made deprecating comments about her gender and physical disability”
and “always said that she was ugly and that she was fat and that she was huge”); Torres v.
Ind. Family & Soc. Servs. Admin., 905 N.E.2d 24, 26 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (recounting how
the subject of a restraining order verbally and physically attacked another person with
marks of physical disability while shouting, “You sit there just staring at me and not blinking.
At least I don’t have your disability. I’m not ugly. I just can’t hear well.”).
389. See Kershaw v. Tilbury, 8 P.2d 109, 110 (Cal. 1932) (en banc) (per curiam)
(providing factual background, in action for damages against physicians for malpractice,
regarding how “[t]he mother, fearing an operation would leave an ugly scar on the child’s
leg and that an operation might result in permanently disabling her daughter from future
dancing, sought the services of a drugless physician”); Reilly v. Straub, 282 N.W.2d 688, 690
(Iowa 1979) (noting, in a medical malpractice suit related to complications during
childbirth, that “defendant does not seriously dispute that plaintiff’s arm is deformed,
unattractive, and eighty-five percent permanently disabled” (emphasis added)); Boucher v.
Louisiana Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 46 So. 2d 701, 703 (La. Ct. App. 1950) (describing testimony
of an expert who noted, as part of the determination of damages, that the plaintiff’s
“residual scar is noticeable and ugly”).
390. See supra notes 317–331 and accompanying text.
391. See, e.g., supra notes 233–236 and accompanying text (discussing the pro-Ana
movement).
392. Barbara Gail Montero, Aesthetic Effortlessness, in Body Aesthetics, supra note 21,
at 180, 180.
393. Id. at 180–81. Though current aesthetics scholars have moved away from effortlessness
as an ideal, in part, because of a desire to disrupt classic norms, effortlessness was a
foundational principle. For example, Daoist thinkers called it “wu-wei” or effortless action
by both the artist and the politician. Id. at 180. Daoists also developed the concept of “de”
which is “a type of charisma that allows rulers to persuade neither by force nor decree but
merely in virtue of their magnestism.” Id. at 182. Similarly, Italian Renaissance theorist
Baldassare Castiglione called on his contemporaries to “practice in all things a certain
nonchalance which conceals all artistry and makes whatever one says or does seem
uncontrived or effortless.” Id. at 180–81.
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penetrable,” meaning that “our beliefs about it affect how we experience
it.”394 Consequently, one may listen to a musical’s score before seeing the
actual musical and come to appreciate the effortless talent of the artists.
However, if one instead sees the performance live and notices that a
member of the orchestra is sweating profusely and appears to be working
hard to produce the sound (as if it is difficult), one might not hear the
music in quite the same way.395 The illusion of ease as a mark of beauty or
mastery runs counter to the experience of people with some physical dis-
abilities who may have to exert significant effort to perform “ordinary”
movements in an inaccessibly built world.396
Thus, collective tastes for normative representations of beauty, health,
and effortlessness situate people with atypical sensory markers as risky. The
brain engages in affective appraisal assessing the way in which the marker
makes the perceiver feel on two dimensions—pleasantness or unpleasant-
ness and calmness or arousal.397 Whether one feels pleasantness or arousal
depends on the particular “emotion concepts” tied to engagement with
the aesthetics of disability.398 We relate these sensations to present context
and past experience and assign an emotion concept to them.399 For exam-
ple, bodily excretions are socially unacceptable because of their associa-
tion with disease and contagion, but when present in a child they may be
viewed as developmentally appropriate, such as in the case of a drooling
infant. While the child is equally human, she is not perceived to have
equal social status. The perceiver can hold this child at arm’s length
knowing there is no apparent identity threat. A drooling adult, however,
evokes a different response. The law demands equal treatment and status
of the adult who drools and the one who does not, but the perceiver is
394. Id. at 186.
395. Id. at 187. Professor Barbara Montero describes this phenomenon as “proprio-
ceptive [or physical] sympathy” in which “we feel, in watching a graceful movement, that
our body, though stationary, is in some way attuned to the body of the graceful individual . . . .
[I]t is the process by which upon watching someone else move, one feels as if one were
moving in a similar way oneself.” Id. at 189.
396. It does seem that when we watch effortless movement, one of the things we enjoy
is the feeling gained from the performance of a difficult movement in a smooth, coordi-
nated, efficient way.
397. Barrett, How Emotions Are Made, supra note 18, at 72–74. This is similar to the
stereotype content model in social psychology. See Susan T. Fiske, Managing Ambivalent
Prejudices: Smart-but-Cold and Warm-but-Dumb Stereotypes, 639 Annals Am. Acad. Pol. &
Soc. Sci. 33, 35 (2012) (describing the “Stereotype Content Model,” which describes the
dimensions—warmth and competence—along which a person perceives another whom
she is meeting for the first time).
398. See Kristen A. Lindquist & Lisa Feldman Barrett, Constructing Emotion: The
Experience of Fear as a Conceptual Act, 19 Psychol. Sci. 898, 898–99 (2008) (explaining
emotions as “conceptual acts”).
399. Other disciplines understand, label, and explain these phenomena as related to
implicit biases and the operation of heuristic devices for everyday decisionmaking. See,
e.g., Daniel Kahneman, Thinking, Fast and Slow 9–10 (2011) (describing this process in
behavioral economics).
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less likely to see the drooling adult as an equal because appearance deviates
from normative images of beauty and health. The perceiver is likely to
draw upon a common emotion concept of unpleasantness and disassociate
by discounting the person’s humanity or equal status. This allows the
perceiver to hold the drooling adult at arm’s length, much like the child.
Affect assignment, therefore, shapes the appropriate behavioral responses—
ignorance, avoidance, attack (regulated by criminal law), or exclusion (reg-
ulated by antidiscrimination law).
Interestingly, aesthetics work alongside implicit biases to mitigate the
strength and impact of the bias based on one’s aggregate proximity to
aesthetic norms. Beauty, health, and effortless norms, then, can shift the
degree of desired contact and the remedial effect of that contact. Con-
sider, for example, the ways in which Jerry’s Kids conformed to aesthetic
norms of beauty, such as the adorable Shirley Temple child in a wheel-
chair, and effortlessness, such as the child on the spectrum who perfectly
executes the most challenging piano sonata or the blind child opera star.400
These individuals gain popular acceptance “despite” their disabilities
because they have other aesthetic features that allow them to “overcome”
disability.
2. Aesthetic–Affective Processes at Work. — In the first instance, a person
is assessed descriptively, with particular note of those markers that deviate
from the baseline above. The seemingly individual and “visceral” experi-
ences that are triggered collapse two intermediate processes—what this
Article calls “aesthetic trigger”401 and “affective appraisal”402—that obscure
the constructed, collective dimensions of disability discrimination. The
popular understanding of discriminatory conduct begins with the individ-
ual noticing some marker of difference, the “aesthetic trigger.” Consider,
for example, in the context of disability that Jim, a nondisabled person,
meets Tina, a new employee and his new project teammate. They are
both client representatives at a paper company. Although Tina just joined
the firm, she has three more years of experience than Jim does. When
Jim first meets Tina, he hears a slight stutter in her speech. After they
shake hands, Jim watches Tina walk over to her cubicle with what appears
to be a pronounced limp. Later that afternoon, Jim notices Tina has a
facial tic—her head and neck tilt to the side every so often. Jim, wanting
to hear more about Tina’s prior job, sits next to her in the lunchroom.
Jim physically winces each time he sees Tina’s tic so much so that he has
400. See Bradley A. Areheart, When Disability Isn’t “Just Right”: The Entrenchment of
the Medical Model of Disability and the Goldilocks Dilemma, 83 Ind. L.J. 181, 199–200
(2008) (discussing the use of celebrity-hosted telethons to raise money to “cure” particular
disabilities, among the most famous being the Jerry Lewis Muscular Dystrophy Telethon to
raise money for “Jerry’s kids” with muscular dystrophy); Jill Elaine Hasday, Mitigation and
the Americans with Disabilities Act, 103 Mich. L. Rev. 217, 261 n.148 (2004) (noting the
backlash from disability rights advocates to the use of telethons to pathologize disability).
401. See supra Figure 1.
402. See supra note 397 and accompanying text.
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to excuse himself. The physical wincing is his “affective appraisal.”403 He
genuinely wants to get to know his new colleague, but he feels that he
cannot physically be near her and, thus, avoids her, choosing to take all
breaks outside of the office rather than have to come up with excuses for
not interacting with her. He attributes his feelings of disgust and physical
distaste to his interactions with Tina. This is his “affective attribution.”404
Over time, Jim sees that Tina generates high-quality work and demon-
strates her competency to him and others. Jim then gets promoted and has
to assign a new project leader to work with him on major client accounts.
Tina has produced quality work, though she has received a few negative
reviews from clients who, unofficially, told Jim that they preferred to work
with another team member, Mya. Mya, a nondisabled, typically attractive
woman, has poorer performance reviews but higher client ratings. Jim’s
reluctance to interact with Tina—the proximity is part of the job descrip-
tion—leads him to choose Mya for the promotion. However, because Mya
has had more interaction with and experience presenting to the client,
she arguably appears more qualified on paper.
Although contact cured Jim’s initial association of disability with incom-
petence (to the extent that such association existed in the first place)405
when he saw Tina’s contributions, he continues to avoid her because of
her non-normative appearance and behavior (tics); that is, Jim’s percep-
tion of her as aesthetically displeasing leads him to feel disgust (affective
assignment).406 The aesthetic–affective process leads Jim to exclude Tina
from the potential promotion despite her performance.407 This would be
a very tough case for current disability antidiscrimination law to remedy
despite what appears to be a pretextual employment decision.408
Jim (consciously or unconsciously) compares these physical markers
or behaviors above—Tina’s tic, limp, and stutter—to deeply engrained
403. See Amy Coplan, Feeling Without Thinking: Lessons from the Ancients on
Emotion and Virtue Acquisition, 41 Metaphilosophy 132, 141 (2010) (“[A]n affective
appraisal involves a series of bodily changes that gauge how some stimulus or situation
bears on the organism’s well-being and prepare the organism to respond accordingly.”).
404. “Affective attribution,” or “affective evaluation,” refers to an “attitude toward
general stimuli, which influences future formation of attitude toward a new but similar
stimulus.” Ping Zhang, The Affective Response Model: A Theoretical Framework of Affective
Concepts and Their Relationships in the ICT Context, 37 MIS Q. 247, 258 (2013).
405. Disassociating disability and incompetence was an explicit normative goal of the
ADA. See supra section II.B (discussing legislative history and congressional intent).
406. See supra section III.A.2 (discussing the ways in which disgust and other emotions
work).
407. The hypothetical suggests that the negative client review may also be a product of
aesthetics.
408. See, e.g., Carmack v. Nat’l R.R. Passenger Corp., 486 F. Supp. 2d 58, 89 (D. Mass.
2007) (“[A] plaintiff claiming that he is [sic] disabled cannot merely show that his
employer perceived him as somehow disabled; rather he must prove that the employer
regarded him as disabled within the meaning of the ADA.” (internal quotation marks
omitted) (quoting Cornwell v. Dairy Farmers of Am., Inc., 369 F. Supp. 2d 87, 103 (D.
Mass. 2005)) (misquotation)).
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collective taste in bodies and minds, the affective appraisal. Appraisals
are subjective interpretations of objects or events; accordingly, they may
vary at the individual level in response to the same object or event despite
the existence of some accepted normative reaction.409 Appraisals are not
perceptions of innate characteristics of objects, “but rather of the object’s
implications for the perceiver (or the perceiver’s group), so that a gen-
erally positive object” may still trigger negative emotions in the individual
perceiver. 410 Recall the earlier discussion of moral emotions—anger,
disgust, and contempt.411 All three of these affective responses distinguish
behaviors that violate three moral ethics: (1) contempt for violations of
community (respect for the hierarchical and communal obligations of an
individual to society); (2) anger for violations of autonomy (disregard for
the personal rights or freedoms of the individual perceiver); and (3)
disgust for violations of divinity (disrespecting the sacredness of religious
norms or causing degradation or pollution to oneself or another).
B. Case Study: Aesthetics and Integration in Special Education
Consider the following special-education example of how aesthetics
mitigate rights. Note how the aesthetics of disability operate and the
baseline assumptions about the value of integration (and for whom).
M.C. is a fifteen-year-old student in a mainstream public school receiving
special-education services for a communication disorder, visual and
processing impairments, and after-effects of an early stroke.412 She also
has “cerebral palsy that affects her left-side movement and visual field
and that impairs the use of her left arm.”413 The particular disabilities
make oral movements and swallowing difficult, reducing her speech
intelligibility and frequently causing her to drool. 414 Her academic
performance is average to low-average.415 M.C.’s father described M.C. as
“sociable and want[ing] friendships but does not have friends due to her
drooling and language issues.”416 Although M.C. expresses a sincere
interest in social activities, “she is never invited to a peer’s house, a sleep
over, movies, or parties[,] . . . people are repelled when M.C. hugs them
and gets them wet with her drool,” and her drool “falls on her papers,
409. Smith & Mackie, supra note 39, at 367.
410. Id. at 367–68.
411. See supra notes 249–260 and accompanying text.
412. Stanley C. v. M.S.D. of Sw. Allen Cty. Schs., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902, 905–06 (N.D. Ind.
2008). The legal standard for receipt of special-education services is that one or more
categories of disability negatively affect a student’s ability to access a “free appropriate
public education” (FAPE). Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C.
§§ 1400(d)(1)(A), 1412(a)(1) (2012).
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homework, and reading materials, and . . . makes other students avoid
her.”417
The aesthetics of M.C.’s disabilities negatively shape her statutory
right to a “free appropriate public education” under the Individuals with
Disabilities Education Act. 418 M.C.’s parents filed a number of due
process complaints to challenge the school district’s placement of M.C.
and components of her individualized education program (IEP).419 In
fact, her parents advanced a version of this Article’s aesthetic– affective
discrimination theory (though not explicitly using this language) in
three interesting ways. First, her parents argued that the school district
failed to provide M.C. with a “free appropriate public education” in viola-
tion of the IDEA, in part, because it did not consider the effect of drool-
ing on her ability to learn and develop her social skills, both targeted areas
for development in her IEP.420 Second, because she could not meaning-
fully access mainstream education, M.C.’s parents argued, they should
receive reimbursement for the tuition and expenses they paid for M.C. to
attend a private program.421 M.C.’s parents unilaterally removed her from
the mainstream public school setting in favor of a more restrictive (less
integrative) educational placement that focused on academics and social-
ization to prepare her for independent living.422 Third, M.C.’s parents
claimed the school district overvalued the social benefits of the main-
stream integrated setting rather than necessary academics and skills in
developing and implementing her IEP.423 The district court, in a detailed
and lengthy decision, granted summary judgment for the school district.424
The court doctrinally relied on procedural deference to local school
417. Id. Also, M.C.’s “elementary school would not allow [her] to eat [lunch] in the
school cafeteria because of her drooling.” Id.
418. 20 U.S.C. § 1400(d)(1)(A) (2012) (“[The purpose of the IDEA is] to ensure that
all children with disabilities have available to them a free appropriate public education
that emphasizes special-education and related services designed to meet their unique needs
and prepare them for further education, employment, and independent living . . . .”).
419. Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 909–10.
420. Id. at 972, 974. The parents argued that the school did not conduct a Functional
Behavioral Assessment (FBA), an empirically based assessment to determine the ways in
which particular behavioral manifestations operate and their antecedents and effects.
M.C.’s parents said that the FBA would help the school construct a Behavioral Intervention
Plan to intentionally develop ways to mitigate the effects of drooling on M.C.’s ability to
learn and access the educational experience. Id. at 913. When developing an IEP, the IEP
team, “[i]n the case of a child whose behavior impedes his or her learning or that of
others, [shall] consider, if appropriate, strategies, including positive behavioral interventions,
strategies, and supports to address that behavior.” 34 C.F.R. § 300.346(a)(2)(i) (2006).
421. See Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 923.
422. Id. M.C.’s parents assumed, of course, that students with disabilities at the private
school would not respond poorly to M.C.’s aesthetic markers.
423. Id. at 929 (“[T]he social benefit of education in the public school is not enough
to outweigh the [academic and social] benefits of intensive therapy.”).
424. Id. at 905.
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districts425 combined with a reading of the IDEA’s integration mandate
that assumes placement in a mainstream, general-education classroom
“raises expectations” and progress for all children with disabilities.426
The Supreme Court of the United States recently revisited the appli-
cable standard for receiving an “appropriate” education under the IDEA.427
For children accessing a general-education curriculum in the mainstream
classroom, the IDEA typically aims for grade-level advancement, which, as
some commentators have noted,428 would seem inconsistent with the
needs of a child. The school district, by virtue of finding the child eligible
for special-education services, has determined that the child is not making
progress in the general-education setting.429 For students receiving a
modified curriculum, the Supreme Court said that a school cannot satisfy
its IDEA obligations by planning for “barely more than de minimis
progress” because “‘merely more than de minimis’ progress from year to
year can hardly be said to . . . [be] an education at all.”430
When we apply an aesthetic–affective lens, therefore, this example
raises two related questions about disability law and policy. First, who
benefits from the current model of integration? Is it M.C., her parents,
other students in the classroom, or the school district? The IDEA says the
focus is on the individual student’s needs, but the quality of the contact
with her peers, teachers, and administrators in the school setting should
matter in the calculus of whether the IEP and a given placement is
“appropriate.” Second, this case is about the “least restrictive environment”
425. See Bd. of Educ. of the Hendrick Hudson Cent. Sch. Dist. v. Rowley, 458 U.S. 176,
206–07 (1982) (describing how courts give significant deference to school districts in
matters of “sound educational policy” in the special-education context).
426. Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d at 922–23 (“Congress found that the education of chil-
dren with disabilities can be made more effective by having high expectations for them
and by ‘ensuring their access to the general education curriculum in the regular classroom’
in order for them to meet developmental goals . . . .” (quoting 20 U.S.C. § 1400(c)(5)(A)
(2012))).
427. See Endrew F. v. Douglas Cty. Sch. Dist., 137 S. Ct. 988, 999–1001 (2017) (“To meet
its substantive obligation under the IDEA, a school must offer an IEP reasonably calculated
to enable a child to make progress appropriate in light of the child’s circumstances.”).
428. See, e.g., Colker, The Disability Integration Presumption, supra note 192, at 796–
97 (“At first glance, the breadth of the integration presumption is baffling. . . . Each child
needs an IEP because a regular program does not meet their educational needs. Why,
then, would we presume that the regular classroom is the best program for them?”);
Gilmour, supra note 89, at 11 (“It is a mistake to equate the setting . . . (that is, the general-
education classroom) with the actual progress a student is making. Such an assumption
ignores the fact that students are found eligible for special-education services precisely
because they are failing to progress in general education.”).
429. See 20 U.S.C. § 1401(3)(A)(ii) (defining a “child with a disability” as one who
“needs special education and related services”).
430. Endrew F., 137 S. Ct. at 1001 (reasoning that the IDEA demands more, requiring
“an educational program reasonably calculated to enable a child to make progress appro-
priate in light of the child’s circumstances”).
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and the integration presumption.431 If the integrative setting is not
beneficial academically or socially for M.C.,432 and aesthetics may be
perverting the normative goals for the broader student population, as
the example suggests, then is contact successful? For whom? Raising
these questions does not undermine integration as a core remedy; instead
these questions call for a deliberate articulation of end goals, intended
beneficiaries, and benchmarks to better understand how to develop
meaningful remedies to advance clear normative values. There is an
assumption that M.C.’s social and emotional development would achieve
greater success in the segregated setting because students with disabilities
would be more accommodating of M.C.’s aesthetic markers, which
ultimately proves untrue.
M.C.’s case illustrates central challenges with contact and aesthetics
in the context of disability, both of which stunt desired normative shifts.
Aesthetics may serve as a barrier to contact even when people want to
interact (as Jim and Tina’s example showed).433 When contact does occur
(as M.C.’s case shows), aesthetics may generate (or exacerbate) disgust, as
demonstrated by M.C.’s classmates and Jim. Consider the ways in which
M.C.’s drool undercuts the antiprejudicial goals of contact. The case record
reflects M.C.’s overwhelming desire to interact with other students, build
friendships, and participate in typical adolescent life. The school dis-
trict’s theory of the case emphasized the social benefits on balance in
favor of contact between M.C. and her peers. “[T]he benefits of the ‘oppor-
tunity to learn, socially and knowledge-wise, from her peers . . . needs to
be balanced with those of a more therapeutically intensive but also more
socially isolated educational placement.’”434 Teachers, administrators, and
experts testified that M.C. made “noticeable social gains”435 in the main-
stream public school setting including her participation in reading groups,
attendance at school dances, and interaction with peers during free
431. 34 C.F.R. § 300.114(a)(2)(ii) (2012) (providing that a child with a disability may
only be removed from the regular educational environment when “the nature or severity
of the disability is such that education in regular classes with the use of supplementary aids
and services cannot be achieved satisfactorily”).
432. Assessment of contact’s relative success at the individual level must consider what
M.C. wants, which may change over time. Any individualized approach must be person
centered and maximize opportunities for the individual to drive the decisionmaking
process with or without accommodations or support.
433. See supra section IV.A.2.
434. Stanley C. v. M.S.D. of Sw. Allen Cty. Schs., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902, 934 (N.D. Ind.
2008) (quoting Transcript of Record at 3659, Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902 (No. 1:07-CV–
169–PRC)) (recounting expert testimony from Dr. Stauffer on behalf of the school district).
435. Id. at 932. The school counselor noted, “I really see a different [M.C.] this year.
She was more mopey last year. I think she loves it here.” Id. at 936 (quoting Transcript of
Record at 2987, Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902 (No. 1:07-CV–169–PRC)). The school
psychologist said “one of the things that was important that I saw she can be a part of her
peer group, be accepted within that peer group . . . . This is a talent she can take beyond
this building . . . into the working world.” Id. (quoting Transcript of Record at 2987,
Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902 (No. 1:07-CV–169–PRC)).
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time.436 “[R]emoving [M.C.] from social and emotional interaction with
her peers would be a detriment to her.”437
Contrary evidence strongly suggests that the school’s understanding
of M.C.’s social success was superficial at best and illegal at worst. For
example, M.C.’s mother testified that “M.C. cried hysterically after each
dance . . . [and] has been excluded by her regular education peers at
social events and in the cafeteria.”438 The occupational therapist at the
public school noted in an evaluation that “[w]hen M.C. wants to express
affection toward a peer, she may attempt to hug and she is not always
aware of how her drooling affects her social relationships.”439 The parents’
experts testified that “although M.C. wants friends, her social inter-
actions with peers are unsuccessful . . . . [They] did not reciprocate her
social overtures.”440 The school district’s legal duty to create and imple-
ment an appropriate IEP did not attend to the aesthetics of disability and,
therefore, failed to provide an appropriate education in accordance with
the IDEA.
C. New Prescriptive Pathways
My critique of the way in which integration has developed in the disa-
bility context does not mean that reversion to segregated public accommo-
dations, residential, educational, or employment settings is desirable.
Rather, this Article calls for a deliberate reflection on the origins and
evolution of the normative orientation of disability rights law. By showing
how integration developed and what it looks like today, this Article begins
a difficult conversation on the future of disability rights law, one which
must attend to aesthetics to successfully mitigate and reduce prejudice.
Prescriptive responses to the aesthetics of disability require disaggre-
gation along several axes. First, aesthetic–affective responses require a
degree of visibility. Certain disabilities may be more apparent than
others; wheelchair users, for example, are the quintessential models used
in public spaces and by the media to represent disability (think disability
parking placards or diversity marketing materials that include a wheelchair
user). Psychosocial, intellectual, or developmental disabilities, in some
cases, may offer non-normative physical or behavioral markers that can
trigger affective responses (such as facial features of Down Syndrome)
but, more often, do not present any visible markers. Aesthetics still operates
436. Id. at 935, 955–56.
437. Id. at 935 (second alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Record at 3676,
Stanley C., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902 (No. 1:07-CV–169–PRC)) (recounting expert testimony
from Dr. Couvillion on behalf of the school district).
438. Id. at 956.
439. Id. at 955 (alteration in original) (quoting Transcript of Record at 3073, Stanley
C., 628 F. Supp. 2d 902 (No. 1:07-CV–169–PRC)).
440. Id. at 956. M.C. reported to teachers at her alternative placement that the
students in her public school “made fun of her drooling and poor articulation” and how
much she valued “acceptance from her friends” at the alternative placement. Id. at 937.
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in these spaces, albeit differently where individuals may choose to disclose,
“pass,” or deliberately perform identity by drawing attention to one of
the physical or behavioral markers previously discussed.441 One of the
innovations of the ADA was its definition of disability discrimination,
which includes people “regarded as” disabled who may not have a
disability or who may have an impairment, and are treated as having a
disability, but the impairment does not meet the statutory definition
(substantially limiting one or more major life activities).442 Courts have
limited plaintiffs’ relief under this definitional prong; 443 a broader
recognition of the aesthetics of disability should assist courts in expand-
ing the scope of “regarded as.”
Second, the goals of education, employment, and public accommo-
dations vary and will affect the nature and scope of remedial designs to
advance particular antidiscrimination norms. While a widely accepted
mission statement for public education has proven elusive, policymakers
generally understand it to include training for democratic citizenship
and economic self-sufficiency. States must offer an “appropriate” education
to all children of a certain age. By contrast, employment advances finan-
cial goals of economic productivity; employers are not required to hire
people with disabilities unless they meet the essential requirements of a
position with or without reasonable accommodations. Disrupting the oper-
ation of aesthetics may require attention to specific facilitating conditions
such as critical mass and visibility which may vary based on setting. For
example, the general recommendation offered by social scientists that a
reduction in prejudice and discrimination requires a critical mass of
outgroup members may require classrooms to be structured differently
but, in the workplace, it may require—in addition to affirmative action in
the hiring process—the creation of incentives for individuals to publicly
disclose less-visible disabilities.444
Institutional redesigns would benefit greatly from more empirical
research on contact and disability disaggregated according to the axes
discussed above.445 One could imagine a series of empirical studies in
441. This is the subject of a current project and beyond the scope of this Article. See
Harris, Reconciling Privacy, supra note 12, at 1–3.
442. See Mark A. Rothstein, Innovations of the Americans with Disabilities Act: Confronting
Disability Discrimination in Employment, 313 JAMA 2221, 2221 (2015) (describing how
the ADA’s definition of disability expanded on the traditional notion of disability).
443. See Arlene B. Mayerson, Restoring Regard for the “Regarded As” Prong: Giving
Effect to Congressional Intent, 42 Vill. L. Rev. 587, 591–98 (1997) (collecting cases and
regulations demonstrating the high barrier plaintiffs must overcome to receive relief in
disability cases).
444. See Harris, Reconciling Privacy, supra note 12, at 38–39 (developing a “publicity”
approach to disability discrimination in the workplace).
445. Returning to Allport’s positive facilitating factors, employment and, in particular,
education offer equal status, opportunities for friendship development, and common
goals in ways that engagement in public accommodations may not. In recent months,
education scholars have increasingly called for empirical research in order to build a solid
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mainstream schools, for instance, to test the effects of contact along a
continuum of aesthetic markers of disability. That is, take two second-
grade classrooms in the same school446 with a number of students with
different disabilities and aesthetic markers—for example, compare a
child with dyslexia with no aesthetic markers of disability to a child with
severe quadriplegia with several aesthetic markers of disability such as use
of a wheelchair, breathing tube, and facial and bodily deformities.447 On
day one, survey the students to gauge their attitudes about disability.448
Midway through the semester and on the last day of school, repeat the
survey. The data collection could yield information about the ways in
which students responded to different aesthetic markers initially, over
time, and what effect contact had not only on the students with disability
but the nondisabled students in the classroom, the teacher, and even
administrators. This would take seriously the lessons from Brown and
Moberly to pay due attention to the integration of other key components
of successful integration—such as teachers with disabilities or with
special-education certifications. The point is not to discuss the specific
design of much-needed research studies449 but to identify that (1) empiri-
cal data on contact and disability are lacking and (2) studies should
examine the effects of contact not only from the perspectives of the
person with a disability but also from other stakeholders who could or
should benefit from the contact, such as M.C.’s classmates and her teachers,
Tina, Mya, Jim, and the paper company.
Empirical studies should shape specific remedies, but several
possible prescriptive pathways may emerge.450 A “contact plus” approach
accepts the contact theory as invaluable and seeks to improve the ways in
which we codify it in disability rights laws and policies. Are there
particular areas where contact works better or worse than others such
empirical foundation for prescriptive interventions. See, e.g., Gilmour, supra note 89, at 9
(noting that “research has yielded only weak evidence that inclusion confers benefits on
SWDs” and calling for new “research that can inform future discussion[s] about inclusion
and how it can work well for all stakeholders”).
446. See id. (reviewing existing data on integration and special education and
identifying research limitations and methodological flaws).
447. The goal here is not to structure specific studies for empirical researchers but
rather to suggest ideas for data collection that currently do not exist and could prove
tremendously helpful in developing legal (and other) prescriptions.
448. There are existing disability-specific attitudinal scales in psychology. A researcher
may use an existing one or develop a student-specific version.
449. This is an interdisciplinary project I hope to explore in the future through
collaborations with empiricists and psychology scholars.
450. This Article focuses on those prescriptions most relevant to law and policy.
Several nonlegal solutions might assist in the legal interventions. For example, aesthetic
theory emphasizes representation as a focus on remedial efforts. According to Aristotle,
moral and ethical education is one way to “shape a person’s affective orientation” and
guide society to appreciate something through exposure. See Eaton, supra note 21, at 48–
53. One may want to educate on the emotions—to teach people how to feel about certain
groups.
970 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 119:895
that we should invest more heavily in certain areas or settings (schools,
places of public accommodations, employment)? For instance, empirical
studies may reveal, as suggested above, that critical mass is among the
most important determinants of contact’s effectiveness. An empirical
study here might look to see if contact changes depending on the
number of students with disabilities in a classroom or the type of
aesthetic markers—visual, auditory, or olfactory. If students in a classroom
possess a broad spectrum of disabilities with different aesthetics markers
and functional capabilities—for example, a person with dyslexia who
comes out as disabled, a wheelchair user, a student with Down Syndrome,
Auggie, Tina, the student with severe quadriplegia, D.J., and M.C.—the
research may tell us that we should invest more heavily in a diversity
approach to disability to reduce prejudice and discrimination.
Using an aesthetic–affective lens could enhance the work of scholars
thinking about meaningful access, accommodations, and universal
designs. Aesthetics may demand different accommodations even when,
for example, the person does not functionally require accommodations.451
Reasonable accommodations to meet the aesthetic–affective process in
employment, for example, could include employers designing a hiring
process that involves a series of initial screening interviews that mask the
appearance of the candidate (conducting interviews over the phone, for
example).452 Similarly, the legal standard for a FAPE might consider aes-
thetic markers in developing an “appropriate” IEP. Accordingly, an
aesthetic–affective critical lens would help the school district (and
adjudicators) understand M.C.’s drooling as an impediment to her
education which may require additional support and services to address.
Here, the integration presumption will continue and the school would
focus on providing accommodations and services to make mainstream
education meaningful. The results of empirical studies could also inform
current debates on the use of default rules or presumptions. When
integrative goals conflict with individual needs or preferences, which way
should the scales tip? This will help develop default rules or presump-
tions that intentionally make these difficult choices and better guide
administrative law and federal judges deciding these cases. It may be the
case that the “I” in “IEP” favors “integrative” rather than “individualized”
when the potential to shape structural norms is strong.
Finally, and most controversially, the empirical studies may reveal
that structural changes in the context of disability require more gradual
451. The ADA does not currently provide reasonable accommodations for covered
individuals “regarded as” disabled and subject to discrimination on that basis. See 42
U.S.C. § 12201(h) (2012) (omitting reasonable accommodations for people “regarded as”
disabled).
452. See, e.g., Claudia Goldin & Cecilia Rouse, Orchestrating Impartiality: The Impact
of “Blind” Auditions on Female Musicians, 90 Am. Econ. Rev. 715, 716 (2000) (finding
that “blind auditions may account for 25 percent of the increase in the percentage of
orchestra musicians who are female”).
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and differentiated integration to shift the normate. For instance, it is
possible that further study will show that placing nondisabled students in
classrooms with a diverse array of students with disabilities of varying
degrees of deviation from the aesthetic “norm” actually reduces attitudi-
nal shifts by the nondisabled students. Such a finding might suggest that
the aesthetics of disability are so powerful—that exposure to students
with numerous markers of disability evokes such a strong response
among nondisabled persons—that a “contact slow” strategy would be
more effective at changing social norms. Such an approach in the
education context might consider expanding the continuum of available
placements within a school and integrating children at a slower and
more structured pace, where nondisabled students are gradually inte-
grated with students with additional aesthetic markers of disability so as
to begin the difficult task of breaking down and reformulating our norms
around physical appearance. Aesthetics, of course, should not be the sole
determinant of whether a general education classroom is “appropriate”
for the student. The interdisciplinary literature, however, deserves a place
in the calculus.
CONCLUSION
Disability rights norms will not shift unless we pay due attention to
the ways in which society feels about the visible markers of disability.
Understanding the collective aesthetic responses and why they reflect
structural biases creates opportunities to address them in meaningful
ways. While the ADA has increased the visibility of some people with
disabilities, it has not shifted the aesthetic tastes and emotion categories
that underwrite disability discrimination. The aesthetics of disability offers
a multipurpose lens to reorient disability rights scholars and critically
examine passive reliance on contact to craft antidiscrimination remedies.
Attention to aesthetics research offers new opportunities to define what
integration should mean in different settings as a path to a more inclu-
sive society.
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